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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the past couple of decades it has become clear that intangibles and
human capital are playing an increasingly important role in determining the
value of a firm and it’s risk-adjusted expected stock returns [169, 24]. The
subject of intangibles and human capital is multifaceted1 and increasingly
relevant to firms and stakeholders in the 21st century. Their importance is
increasingly recognized in the academic literature and technical reports for
valuation purposes even though they are difficult to visualize, measure or
report [257]. One of the main challenges with the study of intangibles and
human capital is, they are also notoriously vague and have no measures which
is widely accepted. Some have argued that the problem of measurement
emanates because of rigid accounting requirements with respect to intangibles
generating processes such as Research and Development expenses (RND)2.
The crux of the matter remains that the risks associated with intangibles and
human capital are misunderstood since Accountants and Economists fail to
agree on how to measure and value of these resources.
In academic discourse relating to intangibles3, the lack of a consistent
theory have led to several definitions [156]. Most studies on intangibles take
a very narrow view, focusing only on RND. Others have tried to divide the
1Intangibles and human capital are of interests to researchers with diverse interests
and agendas — such as Accountants, Economists, Financial Analysts, Regulators, Stock
Holders, Retail & Institutional Investors, etc.
2See Lev and Zarowin’s [176] arguments in favor of more disclosures and Skinner’s cri-
tique [224] of the lobby for “more-disclosure” and thus following rejoinders and discussions
by Lev [170] and Skinner [225].
3In literature, the same idea has been expressed as “intellectual capital” without es-
sentially diverging from the conceptual meaning of the term.
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ideas of intangibles into three categories: (i.) human, (ii.) structural and
(iii.) relational4. This study argues that the term “intangibles” represents
all encompassing assets/liabilities, with or without a separate legal identity
of itself, with or without a future cash flow generating ability. Furthermore,
intangibles are not only endogenous but also exogenous. For example, a
country that is governed by the “rule of law”, and where contracts are fiercely
enforced, regulations are transparent and well defined, provides intangible
benefits to the firms operating within its confines. A certain, transparent,
and consistent regulatory and legal framework provides much needed investor
confidence and any changes to it is a cause of concern or a potential risk.
Regulatory Risk is therefore one of the most overlooked intangibles in the
entire Accounting, Finance, Economics and Management literature. In most
academic studies, an exogenous factor such as regulation is hardly ever con-
sidered to be an “intangible”, let alone an “intangible asset”. However, the
importance of regulatory bodies have never been more important5. Regula-
tion Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) enacted by Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion in 2000 and Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) have been a significant
regulatory change in the field of information disclosure. This has led to
many discussions in academic literature[167, 59, 146]. In this study special
emphasis has been given to these regulatory changes, and it is found that
this regulatory change has altered the information environment, for better
or for worse6.
In accounting, the role of intangibles has been limited to the study of
disclosures that are voluntary in nature. Mandatory disclosures with respect
to intangibles are scarce. However, over the years several firms have found it
important to disclose various intangibles related information on a voluntary
basis. There are firms in the pharmaceuticals industry that go on so far as to
disclose what drugs are they working on, at what stage the drugs are in the
“discovery” phase, completely on a voluntary basis. Still, there are important
questions about how relevant this information is in explaining the cross-
4There are many more classifications, either expressing the same idea or further sub-
dividing intangibles into more finer parts. See Kaufmann and Schneider for a detailed
review [156].
5Most economists in the United States and elsewhere now agree that the financial melt-
down that was an outcome of the “Credit Crunch” in 2008, that led to the Bankruptcy of
many banks, most significantly — Lehman Brothers, is an outcome of recklessly managed
regulatory environment. See Rajan’s paper [207] on the financial innovations .
6More on this in Chapter 4.
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section of returns, and subsequently, the cost of capital? Do these disclosures
help in reducing or increasing information asymmetry? Do they even have
any impact at all? These are all important questions about the value of
disclosures on intangibles, from intangibles-intensive firms. Therefore, from
a stakeholders perspective, accounting and finance literature should advance
what information is value relevant and explain the risks of not disclosing or
not understanding disclosed information.
In management science literature human capital has been defined as a
sub-division of “intangibles” or “intellectual capital.” Traditionally, research
interest in the area of human capital have attracted Economists with a focus
mainly in Labor Economics [24, 190, 215]. However, Financial Economists
and Accountants have indulged themselves with human capital by focusing
on “Executive Compensation.” Although the importance of human capital
in a firm’s valuation and its risk adjusted expected returns have long been
well established in the theoretical literature [183, 184, 251, 150] there are still
unavailability of clear and undisputed micro-level data for empirical research.
In order to overcome such problem researchers have used industry level data
to model human capital in empirical literature [104, 199, 95]. This study have
tried to overcome some of these shortcomings by using a new measure for
human capital in the form of Selling, General and Administrative expenses
(SGA).
One key intangible category in the management science literature is or-
ganizational capital. It does not have a widely accepted method for mea-
surement or valuation. Recently, one of the most important contributions to
the empirical study of organizational capital was made by Lev and Radhakr-
ishnan by introducing SGA its measure[171]7. Others have divergent views
on what constitutes an organizational capital and they have come up with
many different definitions for its visualization or measurement. Therefore,
the measurement and management issues relating to organizational capital
are still wide open. Even with all these challenges researchers from various
fields have arrived at a common conclusion that — it exists and its econom-
ically important. Therefore, underestimating or not understanding such a
factor value is short sighted and potentially risky. Later in this, an attempt
has been made to develop a new model to capture this illusive organizational
capital.
7This study argues that this method of measuring organizational capital is restrictive
and short-sighted. Please see additional arguments and critique of this view in Chapter 5.
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Last but not the least, there are many similarities between human capital
(measured using SGA) and structural intangibles (e.g. RND), they are both
non-tradable assets and treated similarly in the accounts — expensed when
incurred. Therefore, this parallel is explored in this study, to find out how
these variables behave individually and collectively in explaining the cross-
section of asset returns.
1.1 Objective
The main objective of any researcher, especially in the field of accounting
and economics — a field in which there is no dearth of credible high quality
data, is to produce new variables to study different aspects of economic life.
Although intangibles and human capital augments this problem because of
the lack of universally accepted variables, ones that are measured, reported,
or analyzed. Therefore, to understand how intangibles and human capital
explain the information environment of the risk-adjusted expected stock re-
turns, approximate variables need to be found, that could reliably measure
their economic impact.
Furthermore, in order to study a variable, it must be defined credibly.
Therefore, each variable must be created following the traditional conven-
tions found in the literature or by justifying it giving acceptable economic
arguments to build its case.
It is very important for research dealing with uncertain concepts such
as intangibles, where there is a lack of credible theories that can explain
the expected economic impact, is to expand the literature by contributing
towards the development of new theories.
Lastly, and most importantly, the objective of a researcher is to produce
“evidence”. Evidence is the key to understanding and accepting the reality as
it presents itself. Therefore, it is fundamental for any researcher to produce
new evidence to support or disregard hypothesis, general understanding or




When dealing with dissimilar subjects such as intangibles and human capi-
tal, it is not always easy to choose a research approach. As outlined earlier,
intangibles can explain a lot of different factors, starting from exogenous
regulatory environment in an economic geography8, to endogenous struc-
tural investments in RND. Similarly, human capital can be measured at a
macroeconomic-level using industry level income data or at the microeconomic-
level using executive compensation data.
Historically, due to the complexity of the topic many researchers have
opted to approach the subject from various perspective using different method-
ologies. It would be dishonest to state that the approach selected in any study
is completely independent to the academic background and personality of the
researcher. With that in mind, this study conducts a mixed-method research.
In a mixed-method, the research topic is analyzed using both qualitative and
quantitative data. This makes the research more useful, diverse and aca-
demically rich. Therefore, this thesis studies not only the financial figures
associated with the assets, but also the written word in the annual reports.
The study basically looks at intangibles and human capital in two ways
— (i.) macro-economically and (ii.) micro-economically. Then the study di-
vides the impact of intangibles and human capital in two distinct ways — (a.)
informational effect and (b.) value relevance. This whole thesis is divided
into four distinct cases: (1.) informational impact of voluntary non-financial
and textual disclosures on the cost of capital, (2.) regulatory change and the
search for alternative factors to study information environment, (3.) orga-
nizational capital, and (4.) human capital in comparison and amalgamation
with structural capital.
1.3 Research Philosophy
As in the case of any research, this doctoral study makes some philosophical
assumptions about the construct of organizations and society. This study
is constituted according to what Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill [214] view
as a “resource research” which falls under the Epistemological paradigm of
Positivism. Obviously there are many caveats associated with a positivist
8Economic Geography is defined as a Sovereign boundary of a State within which the
a firm operates under the enforceable legal, economic and regulatory framework.
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research paradigm where, (i.) the researchers are expected to be detached
from the data generation process, (ii.) the ‘facts’ are observable from the
data, and (iii.) the ‘reality’ of a social world is expressed in a way similar to
Natural Scientists.
There are some merits in viewing organizations as the creation of pre-
dictable individuals who work mostly within the boundaries of social struc-
tures, norms and laws9. In this social construct the researcher can take the
Ontological position of Objectivism and make observations about the subject
with or without minimal personal bias or prejudice affecting the conclusions
drawn. The social object of such research positions is to be able to generalize
the conclusions from the research in a form of “social laws”, the precedence
of which is available in the natural science research field.
This research position is of course not without its share of shortcomings
and inherent biases, details of which are available in the text of Remenyi,
Williams, Money and Swartz [208]. Because of Axiological reasons [141]
the researcher makes choices about data, method, etc. which are intrinsic
biases and therefore unavoidable to the whole research process. Therefore,
this whole research, given its topic, subject field and researcher, therefore
finds itself in the bottom-right quadrant of the Burrell and Morgan’s “four
paradigms for the analysis of social theory” - the ‘Functionalist ’ paradigm
[45].
1.4 Research Methodology
Overall this study has a mixed method, that means both qualitative and
quantitative techniques of analysis. A greater emphasis has been given to
quantitative techniques because it provides clarity that cannot be achieved
using qualitative techniques. This is not an indictment of qualitative tech-
niques of research but an acknowledgment that in such techniques there is
a greater deal of subjectivity that a researcher needs to worry about, and
discount the emerging conclusions. That does not go on to mean that there




Content Analysis is one of the most common ways of performing qualitative
research. It helps understand the subtle meanings behind the written word.
This methodology has its origins in “Theology”, reflecting Catholic Church’s
obsession with interpreting the written word in more ways than normative
[159]. This methodology is most frequently used in the accounting studies,
generally to study the published materials of the firms. The main idea behind
performing a qualitative analysis is to create a type of score board with
various units of information with which the text can be enumerated10.
There are many ways in which the text can be enumerated. For e.g. one
can count the number of times a word has been used in a given text, or count
the number of lines of information provided about a subject of interest. The
score can be used to count, in terms of how many actual number of times a
word has been mentioned, or it could be binary — meaning if the word has
been used then 1, else 0. All these are methodological decisions that must be
made by the researcher while performing the content analysis. For each step
a proper justification must be provided explaining how the set of choices will
be useful in detecting the trend the analysis is trying to capture. The main
demerit of using content analysis is the amount of subjectivity that goes into
the analysis, even when the objective is to enumerate and quantify the text.
1.4.2 Quantitative Techniques
One of the benefits of being a researcher in the area of accounting and finance
is that there is easy availability11 of very high quality micro-economic data.
Still, there are plenty of subjective decisions one has to make when dealing
with quantitative data. Financial data is available in time series over a
number of years both on accounting variables and from the stock market.
Dealing with a number of firms over time creates panels of data with similar
type of data being available for a number of firms over a number of years.
Dealing with panel data has its own merits and demerits, especially when
dealing with accounting and market data. For example, firms list on the
market and go out of the market for various reasons all the time. Therefore
one has to make a subjective decision about the time scale for the research
10Although, that may not always be the case in other fields that use content analysis.
11Given one has the necessary access to relevant databases such as Compustat and
CRSP [73, 79].
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very carefully because not all the firms will be in existence in the sample for
whole time period. That can make the sample biased and the conclusions
unclear or incorrect [253].
When modeling financial data one has to be aware that financial data
is not like physical data — a constant. What that means is, financial data
is affected by a range of problems because it is generally denominated in
currencies. Therefore, at any time the value of financial data is not what it
seems like. Currency values are affected by fluctuations in currency at the
international markets, inflation, lags and delays in reporting etc. Therefore,
one has to account for all these deficiencies when dealing with financial data,
especially over a long period of time. The first rule of time series analysis
is the stability of the data [245, 181], which means all data should be either
real or nominal but not a mix of the two, that will give incorrect or biased
estimates.
One of the most crucial decisions a researcher has to make when modeling
financial data is deciding the estimation method. All the assumptions made
in a model is enshrined in the estimation technique. By all accounts Ordinary
Least Square (OLS) comes as the most trustworthy estimation method con-
sidering asymptotic efficiency and accuracy as parameters of judgment. But
there are limitations in financial data just as exogeneity condition not being
met most of the times for the independent variables and found correlated
with the error term. Therefore in a panel data Generalized Least Square,
2SLS or even Maximum Likelihood estimation techniques must be explored
on a case by case basis, giving justifications for each choice and explaining
how each choice will effect the possible outcome of the analysis.
Last but not least, the data analysis must provide sufficient basic statistics
and visual data representations such as graphs and charts to help decipher
the results more intuitively.
1.5 Organization of the Thesis
Intangibles and human capital is not a singular or unitary topic but a col-
lection. Therefore, to study them there is a need for diverse perspectives.
This thesis addresses two primary problems associated with intangibles and
human capital — information and value relevance. Therefore four chapters
in this thesis look into each set of problems separately, which collectively
addresses the risks associated with intangibles and human capital.
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The thesis starts with a Literature Review in chapter 2. In this chapter
the existing literature on the subject of intangibles, information disclosure,
value relevance through asset pricing, cost of capital, human, organizational
and other types of intangibles, are reviewed.
The next chapter (ch. 3.) focuses on the non-financial and textual disclo-
sures which are generally voluntary in nature. This chapter tries to find out
if the information given in the annual reports of firms are in any way value
relevant to the asset returns. Here the expected asset returns is a measure
of a firm’s cost of capital.
Chapter 4. of this thesis looks into the macroeconomic intangible of reg-
ulations. Obviously, any changes to existing regulatory or legislative changes
is a cause for concern to say the least. Therefore, the chapter studies the
effect Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) and Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
have had on the information environment of Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology
and Life Sciences firms, all listed in the United States capital markets.
In the following chapter (ch. 5.) organizational capital, which is a type of
intangible commonly found in the management science literature, is modeled
using accounting and market data.
In the chapter 6. the returns of portfolio assets are explained using a
new human capital, structural capital and a new variable called intangible
capital. This new variable is an amalgamation of both human and structural
capital.
Last but not least, the final chapter (ch 7.) concludes the study with
some remarks and observations.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
Many academic researchers from different fields have an interest in the
subject of intangibles and human capital. This interest is inspired mainly
because of two reasons — (i.) information, and (ii.) value.
Due to the difficulty in visualizing, measuring and reporting on intangi-
bles and human capital, it is argued by many researchers that market and
the investors are not fully informed about the risks associated with the intan-
gibles and human capital when they decide to invest in a firm or a project.
This line of research is being developed in the financial accounting litera-
ture. Accounting researcher rely mainly on the published information sources
that are mandated by the SEC and the emphasis is clearly on the financial
disclosures. Whereas, the problem with intangibles is that they are rarely
represented in the accounting statements in financial terms. Some corpora-
tions give non-financial and text based disclosures about their views on the
performance and risks associated with these assets, however, the research in
these non-financial disclosures are scarce and needs attention. Additionally,
there is a need to find alternative information sources other than just the
published, mandated and voluntary disclosures made by the insiders. This
thesis pays attention to these two problems of — (i.) non-financial and tex-
tual disclosures, and (ii.) alternative information sources, in the upcoming
chapters.
The clear difficulty in reporting leads to the next main problem identified
earlier — valuation. Without sufficient and reliable financial disclosures on
intangibles and human capital, it becomes very difficult for the investors, or
for that matter the market, to value the assets or assess the risks associated
with them. This problem is only increased when the intangibles are classi-
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fied in various groups, such as organizational, human, and structural. The
question that must be asked is, are all these factors assets or are they risky
too? Are they equally valuable or equally risky? Is the risk level different
for each factor? If so, how to determine if there is a variance in the levels
of risk, and what are the measures to value them? These are some of the
question that has been addressed in next few chapters, with an emphasis on
three — (i.) organizational, (ii.) human, and (iii.) structural intangibles.
Additionally, a new factor is created with the amalgamation of human and
structural to create an overall factor called (iv.) intangible capital, but more
on that later.
In the following sections, the leading academic literature associated with
information and valuation of intangibles and human capital are presented in
detail. In the next section (2.1) the issues, classifications and relevance of
intangibles to this study is discussed. The section following that (2.2) delves
into the theoretical and empirical informational role of disclosures on intan-
gibles by firms that invest in human or structural intangible is elaborated.
In the next section (2.3) a discussion on Analysts is presented, they play a
very critical intermediary role in the information environment of stocks in
the capital markets. In section 2.4 the theoretical and empirical cross-section
of asset pricing1 is presented with a special emphasis on intangibles. Next
section (2.5) discusses the ways in which returns can be used as a measure of
cost of capital. Section 2.6 discusses the theory of market microstructures,
which serves as a proxy for information asymmetry. In section 2.7 the liter-
ature related to a special type of intangible called organizational capital is
discussed. The literature related to human capital, which is a key intangible
asset for firms is presented in section 2.8 of this chapter. The section 2.9
delves into the research philosophy guiding this thesis. Section 2.10 presents
the methodological framework used for the studies in the following chapters.
This chapter ends with a brief summary in section 2.11.
2.1 Intangibles
The epistemological origin of the term “intangibles” lies in the theory of “cre-
ative destruction”, a view put forward by noted economist Joseph Schum-
peter in his magnum opus — “Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy” [216].
1Asset pricing is a well known method to study value relevance or risk loading of factors
on asset returns.
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In the book Schumpeter notes;
“Capitalism, then, is by nature a form or method of economic
change and not only never is but never can be stationary. And
this evolutionary character of the capitalist process is not merely
due to the fact that economic life goes on in a social and natural
environment which changes and by its change alters the data of
economic action” (Schumpeter, 1943, Ch. vii., pp. 82.)
This “evolutionary character of the capitalistic process” is fueled by firms
creating many different types of intangibles. Still, the central question re-
mains — what are these intangibles? As per Lev, “an intangible asset is a
claim to future benefits that does not have a physical or financial (a stock
or a bond) embodiment” [169] (pp. 5). International Accounting Standard
38 defines intangibles assets as “an identifiable non-monetary asset without
physical substance” [72] (emphasis added)2.
With all the conundrums with regards to the definitions and terminologies
of intangibles, there is no convergence on classification as well. What that
means is that whenever a terms such as “intangibles”, “intellectual capital”
or “intangible assets” is invoked, it does not mean just one thing or one
set of variables. It could mean different things, collectively, or individually,
to many different people or stakeholders. Therefore, many researchers have
tried to categorize a set of commonly observable characteristics as a set of
variables. However, the only intangible that is officially recognized in the
financial accounts is “Goodwill” [252].
Financial economists, organizational theorists and management science
researchers reject the exclusivity bestowed upon goodwill in the current reg-
ulatory regime as the sole measure of a firm’s intangibles. Some argue instead,
in favor of categorizing intangibles into (i.) human capital, (ii.) structural
capital and (iii.) organizational capital, as the three basic classifications 3.
2There are obviously many other definitions of intangibles found in the literature.
Harrison and Sullivan [136] describes “intellectual Capital”, their alternate terminology for
intangibles, as “...knowledge that can be converted into profit”, which is a similar construct
as by Lev [169]. Edvinsson and Malone [94], both pioneers in the area of intangibles and
intellectual capital argues that, “intangible asset are those have no physical existence but
are still of value to the company.” For Bontis et al. [35] “intellectual capital is quite
simply the collection of intangible resources and their flows.”
3Edvinsson & Malone [94] and Bontis et al. [35] have used just two classification which
are human and structural in their papers. Canibano et al. [51] proposed in addition of
human and structural, a new type of intangible called “relational capital” in their paper.
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In many empirical literature with a focus on intangibles, RND becomes the
sole measure [174, 56, 175, 172]. Some have tried to include additional clas-
sifications as well such as — advertising, IT, human resources, brands, etc.
[126, 127] 4.
Intangibles are not a monopoly of the microeconomics — there are many
things that can be considered to be an intangible yet they are available
macro-economically to all firms operating in a legal or regulatory confines
of a geography. Theses intangibles are (i.) rule-of-law, (ii.) demographics,
(iii.) property rights, (iv.) clarity and strict implementation of legal and
regulatory framework [112]. Therefore, uncertainties associated with these
factors are also a cause of concern both for insiders, investors and researchers
who deal with intangibles.
2.2 Disclosures
Intangibles is of great interest to both management scientists and financial
economists. As evidenced in the previous section there is still very less con-
vergence on the definition of intangibles let alone its classifications. This
creates a unique problem for the accountants, vis–a`–vis reporting on intan-
gibles. Reporting is necessary not only to meet regulatory requirements set
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in a prescribed format of
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), but also to inform and com-
municate with investors who would want to invest or have already invested
in the firm’s projects and endeavors. This communication with investors is of
great importance to management scientists and financial economists as the
level of confidence investors show in the managements determine the cost of
capital of the firm, the economic viability of the project and the expected re-
turns of the investors. In this section the theoretical and empirical literature
on disclosure theory is presented with a special emphasis on intangibles.
2.2.1 Voluntary Disclosure
The main problem with accounting for intangibles is that most of it is vol-
untary in nature. The theoretical foundation of voluntary disclosures was
laid by Grossman [124] that drew heavily from information economics theory
4There are many more classifications and reporting models on intangibles. For a de-
tailed literature review please see Canibano et al. [50] and Kaufmann & Schneider [156].
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proposed by Spence [229] and Akerlof [4]. According to him a monopolist,
who in the case of a firm are the insiders (management), would not like to
give misleading information especially when the information is ex-post veri-
fiable. Milgrom [188]5 concluded in his paper that if the news is good, then
the stockholders will purchase more stock, driving the price up, and vice-
versa. Taking this relationship forward Milgrom and Roberts [187] discussed
the incentives of the insiders in divulging information. Verrecchia [243] ar-
gues in his paper that in a disclosure equilibrium expectation of the market
should be be marginally below the incentive of the insiders to disclose. The
threshold level of disclosure increases as the proprietary cost of withholding
information increases to a level where it becomes unprofitable to withhold.
Wagenhofer [246] offered that in a market with competing interests, there
could always be a full-disclosure equilibrium but there could never be a non-
disclosure equilibrium. One of the assumptions that researchers make when
conducting research on voluntary disclosure is that, information that is dis-
seminated will be understood by the capital markets as it is intended by the
insiders. Fishman and Hagerty [108] concluded from their theoretical paper
that mandatory disclosures will be essential only when disclosed information
is relatively difficult to understand — this observation is most pertinent when
it comes to intangibles6. Furthermore, they modeled a situation in which not
everyone understands the disclosed information. In this situation, they con-
cluded that mandatory disclosure will only benefit informed investors, will be
neutral for uninformed investor and the insiders will be real “losers” in this
situation. Is this the real reason for the dearth of voluntary disclosures or is
that disclosed information is misunderstood? This is one thread of literature
that this study wishes to address.
2.2.2 Information Asymmetry
Intangibles provide some of the most unique challenges in understanding
the information environment of firms that invest heavily in assets that are
difficult to visualize, measure, report or value. Diamond & Verrecchia [86]
established the link between information asymmetry and the cost of capital.
That means it costs money to be uninformed. Not only for investors, but
5According to Milgrom [188] financial accounting is concerned with providing informa-
tion to its stakeholders.
6This also one of the reason why there are researchers who argue in favor of more
mandated disclosures when it comes to intangibles [176].
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also for the firm, as the cost of raising fresh capital increases with asymme-
try of information. Kim and Verrecchia [157] went so far as to claim that
even disclosure of financial information such as earnings could be a cause of
information asymmetry7. Barry and Brown [19] explored a model of mar-
ket equilibrium with differential information. They found that during listing
period, when there is high differential information persistent in the market,
information asymmetry is related to size. Additionally, they found from the
market data of NYSE, that security returns for period 1931-1980 perceived
risk of low information security is higher than the perceived risk of high infor-
mation securities. Therefore, investors would require higher returns to hold
that risk thus the abnormal returns of the low information securities could be
explained. In their next paper, Barry and Brown [20] modeled the differen-
tial information and tried to explain that amount information differs across
securities, which shows that this differential information produces differences
in the degree of estimation risk. Furthermore, they show that estimation
risk can have effect on the various observable attributes of market equilib-
rium when there is a variance in the degree of information asymmetry. This
variance in information asymmetry risk could have an impact on the cost of
capital for the firm8. Easley and O’Hara [92] developed a model that shows
that both private and public information have an impact on the asset returns
of a firm — but more on that later in section 2.5.
2.2.3 Empirical Evidence on Structural Intangibles
There is a large and continuously growing empirical research body when it
comes to intangibles. This is fueled mainly because of the various measure-
ment and reporting challenges. RND is the most important and interesting
variable when it comes to empirical financial accounting literature and it has
been studied by Accountants and Economists. The relationship between the
investments in RND and its impact on stock prices is a key insight [119, 142].
Tobin’s Q is found to be an important explanatory variable for asset mar-
ket value and RND investment in papers by Ben-Zion [25, 26] and Dukes et
al. [87]. Other studies with Tobin’s Q as a variable highlighting intangible-
7Kim and Verrecchia [157] argued that institutional investors have advanced analysis
technology and therefore they could decipher implied meanings by using advanced analyt-
ical techniques, thus increasing the information asymmetry in the market.
8More results on the cross section of information risk estimates are found in Clarkson,
Guedes and Thompson [66].
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intensiveness in various industries are by Griliches [122], Hirschey & Wey-
gandt [143], Cockburn & Griliches [71] and Hall [131]. They all found signif-
icant relationships between Tobin’s Q and RND investments/expenditures.
Some researchers have analyzed market-to-book ratio with RND invest-
ments in cross-sectional model, such as Sougiannis [227] and Lev and Sougian-
nis [174, 175]. Time series analysis are frequently used to compensate the
shortcomings of cross-sectional models. Some of the studies with time se-
ries models are Megna & Mueller [185], Lev & Zarowin [176] and Ballester,
Garcia-Ayuso & Livnat [16]. All these studies found RND investments are
associated with market value. As for the shortcomings of the existing studies
on RND, Canibano et al. [50] noted that most empirical studies “do not con-
sider the existence of alternative intangible factors explaining market value
and returns with respect to which RND intensity may have little incremental
explanatory power.”
In an Initial Public Offering (IPO) scenario, Guo, Lev and Zhou [130] doc-
umented that intellectual property and technology are the most important
data points for Bio-technology firms. Therefore, it debunked the “conven-
tional wisdom” that IPOs are influenced by the reputation of the underwrit-
ing or the venture capital firm involved in the IPO. In another study by
Guo, Lev and Zhou [129] they created a disclosure index based on product
related information such as — (i.) product development stage, (ii.) patent
protection, (iii.) venture capital backup and (iv.) ownership stake retained
by pre-IPO founders. Their findings show this information is of value to
the investors. The information asymmetry variables included the liquidity
measure of bid-ask spreads, quoted depth and return volatility.
Some researchers have argued that the mandatory expensing of RND ex-
penditures gives rise to mispricing of the stocks [176]. Boone and Raman
[37] have provided evidence that immediate expensing of RND expenditure
is causing a liquidity challenge for the firms in the market and therefore addi-
tional information about the RND activities might be useful. They hypoth-
esized that with the increase in value of intangibles in the firm’s valuation,
there is a decrease in liquidity, a result of increased information asymme-
try. This decrease in liquidity is because of higher transaction cost to the
investors and this results in higher cost of capital to the firm9.
9This conclusion has been challenged by Ronen [211]. He argued that empirical asso-
ciation between accounting numbers and market value cannot be a basis for accounting
policy change. Also see response by Boone and Raman [36].
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Researching the information environment around firms that invest in
RND, Aboody and Lev [2] found that insiders take advantage of asymmetric
information between them and the investors by participating in insider trad-
ing. The evidence provided by the study suggests that insiders are able to
gain by trading on the information available to them before it becomes public
information. The investor reaction to the information of insider trading is
also significantly stronger for firms that invests in RND than those who do
not.
Francis and Schipper [110] outlined the different interpretations of “value
relevance” in their paper. According to them, there are four interpreta-
tions of value relevance — (i.) financial statement information such as earn-
ings, profitability leading stock prices, by capturing intrinsic market value
[197, 198, 135], (ii) financial information is value relevant by the ability of
earnings to predict future dividends, future cash flows, future earnings, or
future book values, (iii) implies value relevance if the “news” changes stock
prices because it causes investors to revise their expectations, and (iv) fi-
nancial information is value relevant if it can predict asset returns, particu-
larly over a long window of time. From their empirical analysis, the study
finds that the value relevance as explained by the R2 of earnings has been
on a decline both for high-technology firms (identified by their spending on
RND, computers, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, etc.) and for low-
technology firms (grocery stores, wood and paper products, and railroads)
taken alone and combined. However, they did not find any significant reduc-
tion in the explanatory power of book value of assets and liabilities (alone
of combined). Lev and Sougiannis [174] also explored the value relevance
of RND capitalization to address the reliability and objectivity concerns of
accounting framework setting policy. They concluded that “RND capital is
reliably associated with subsequent stock returns” which was a concern for
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to allow capitalization of
RND expenditures.
With a large sample data, a study by Lev, Sarath, and Sougiannis [172]
hypothesized profitability bias10 for the firms that invests in RND. Their
results found evidence of profitability bias. This bias creates a systematic
mispricing of the securities which is disadvantageous to firms that are con-
servative in their reporting policies in accordance with Generally Accepted




When it comes to comparing mean-variance asset returns model based on
RND portfolios, a study by Chan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis [56] did not
find any evidence of an association between RND spending and future stock
returns from their dataset. Their study basically reaffirmed the consensus
within the financial economist community that capital markets are more or
less efficient and they do value the unbiased expectations of the investors
about the RND spending. This results did show some association between
market volatility with the RND spending that is after controlling for size,
age and industry effects which might be a cost to the investors that can be
explained by the lack of relevant information. Also, their evidence shows
that firm that spends on RND, enjoy excess returns during the post portfolio
formation.
The study by Chambers, Jennings and Thompson [55] explored the rela-
tionship between RND intensity and excess returns further from where Chan,
Lakonishok and Sougiannis [56] left, and provided some additional evidence
that there is indeed a relation between RND and stock returns, especially
when RND intensity is measured by the ratio of unrecorded RND assets to
market value of equity.
As evidenced from the above mentioned studies, RND as a measure of
intangibles have been researched from various perspectives. Some studies
have gone forward to include other variables or factors to study intangibles,
such as Amir and Lev [8]. They studied the cellular companies because of
their unique business model. The evidence from their study of the industry
suggests that the financial disclosures were “inadequate”. However, they
agreed that the industry is aware of the inadequacies of the GAAP and the
investors do not just rely on the financial information from accounting figures
but also on the non-financial information (non-accounting and textual) that
the company provides voluntarily11.
2.2.4 Measuring Disclosures
In the 1990s, a lot of research in voluntary disclosure was possible because
of the availability of standardized reports that measured the quality of vol-
untary disclosures. In 1993 Lang and Lundholm [163] studied the analyst
11Similarly RND has been modeled using many other perspectives. Sougiannis [227]
argued in favor of increase in profitability, Deng and Lev [84] found “In-process” RND
have significant associations with future cash flows.
29
published evaluations of a firm’s disclosure policies and practices. They pro-
vide evidence from a cross-sectional analysis that the analyst given ratings
increases with size, firm performance as measured by earnings and returns.
There is a decreases in correlation between earnings and returns and again
higher for firms that issue equity in the current or future periods. Following
that, Lang and Lundholm [164] in their 1996 paper studied the disclosure
practices, this time using analyst-following of the firms, using earning fore-
cast produced by the analysts. Their sample included the disclosure ranking
database created by Report of the Financial Analysts Federation Corporate
Information Committee (FAF Report 1985-89) which is the predecessor of
Association of Investment Management Research (AIMR) report. They con-
cluded that “firms with more informative disclosure policies have a larger
analyst following, more accurate analyst earnings forecasts, less dispersion
among individual analyst forecasts and less volatility in forecast revision”.
Botosan [38] in her study of disclosures using AIMR rankings found that
firms with low analyst following have higher level of disclosures, and that
has an association with lower cost of capital. She claimed that her results
are consistent even though the research duration is just for one year. Her
argument is that firms don’t change their disclosure policy every year.
Sengupta [218] again using the AIMR ranking of disclosures, which was
then published by Corporate Information Committee Report (CICR) found
that firms with high disclosure quality has a lower cost of debt. This find-
ing is in line with the findings of Botosan [38]. In the decade after 2000s,
the standardized AIMR report stopped and therefore affected the research
quantity into voluntary disclosures.
Nevertheless, many researchers have come up with their own measures of
qualitative assessment of voluntary disclosures. Francis, Nanda and Olsson
[109] created a self-coded disclosure index and found that firms with good
earnings quality have better voluntary disclosure regime than firms with poor
earnings quality. Shalev [219] also created a different disclosure quality index
that is specific for the business combination scenario, and used a construction
of a numerical disclosure score deflated by ‘relevant’ disclosures. He found
that the disclosure level in business combinations decreases with abnormal
levels of the purchase price allocated to goodwill.
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2.2.5 Other Information Sources
The disclosure literature have been going through a Renaissance of its own as
researchers are finding new sources of information to model the information
environment. Take for example the study by Antweiler and Frank [10]. In
this paper they studied the effect of about 1.5 million messages posted on
the Yahoo! Finance12 and Raging Bull website for 45 firms from the Dow
Jones Industrial Average and the Dow Jones Internet Index. They used
computational linguistics methods to measure bullishness. Their findings
show that stock messages help predict market volatility. The effect on stock
returns is statistically significant but economically small.
Tetlock [236] on the other hand explored the interaction between the
news and the stock market using the daily content of the Wall Street Journal
columns. He finds that high media pessimism predicts downward pressure on
market prices followed by a reversion to fundamentals, and unusually high or
low pessimism predicts high trading volume. These and similar results are
consistent with theoretical models of noise and liquidity traders. However,
they are inconsistent with theories of media content as a proxy for new in-
formation about fundamental asset values, as a proxy for market volatility,
or as a sideshow with no relationship to asset markets.
Furthermore, Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky and Macskassy [235] examine
whether a simple quantitative measure of language can be used to predict
individual firm’s accounting earnings and stock returns. Their three main
findings are — (i.) the fraction of negative words in firm-specific news sto-
ries forecasts low firm earnings, (ii.) firm’s stock prices briefly under react
to the information embedded in negative words, and (iii.) the earnings and
return predictability from negative words is largest for the stories that focus
on fundamentals. Together these findings suggest that linguistic media con-
tent captures otherwise hard-to-quantify aspects of new information in them,
which investors quickly incorporate in the stock prices.
2.3 Financial Analysts
Financial analysts play a very keen role in measuring, evaluating and explain-
ing intangibles. For e.g. Barth, Kasznik and McNichols [21] found in their
study that analysts have a greater incentive to follow firms who have a larger
12See www.finance.yahoo.com
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share of investment in intangibles that includes RND. They found that firms
with sales higher than $1 million (eliminating financial and utilities firms)
have an increase in following by analysts as the size of the firm increases, its
investment in RND and advertising increases, because they are perceived to
be mis-priced. Therefore in this section the literature relating to analysts is
presented.
2.3.1 Analyst-Following: The Theory
Sell side analysts play a key role of information intermediary in the market
and it has been evaluated with some caution and care in the theoretical
literature. Beyer et al. [27] notes that these analysts are very informative
to the market. Sell side analysts face very little regulation and they have
interest in moving “strategically” in the market. Information can not only
be expropriated from the analyst forecasts and recommendation, but also
from the following of a firm, timing of a forecast or recommendation, etc.
Analysts are very conscious of their reputation in the market and they like
to be as accurate they can be in their earning forecasts [240]. Graham [120]
predicted that if analysts are unsure of the accuracy of their forecast they are
very likely to herd. Beyer and Guttman [28] find that analysts are more likely
to produce “optimistic” forecasts in the event of greater private information.
They are also likely to increase trading volume. Fuller and Jensen [113] shed
light into the possibility of forming a nexus between managers and analysts
where both start “colluding” to provide management forecasts. The stock
prices are then driven by the forecast rather than the performance or the
strategy of the firm.
2.3.2 Analyst Empiricism
There is also a huge body of empirical literature concerning analysts, —
their motivations, incentives in following a firm, etc. In a seminal empirical
study Bhushan [30] found that most of his indicators with respect to a firm’s
characteristics are related to some degree with analyst following. However,
the study did not focus on the causality of relationship.
Hong and Kubik [147] studied the career concerns of analysts and the
accuracy of their forecasts. They found that the accuracy of their forecasts
is indeed important and they are rewarded for it. Further on, controlling
for accuracy they found that analysts who are optimistic more likely enjoy
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favorable job separation. However, for analysts whose brokerage houses have
the securities they follow as underwriting clients are less likely to be judged
on the accuracy of their forecast.
O’Brian, McNichols and Lin [194] find that investment banking ties with
clients does have an impact on the way analysts report on good news and
bad news. They find that banking ties make analysts reluctant to report on
bad news whereas good news is reported swiftly 13.
2.3.3 Management Forecast
The study of analysts cannot be complete without a look into Management
Forecasts — the ritual forecasts given out by insiders to the market. There
are many competing theories about why management indulge in the giving
out forecasts, when they don’t have to do it legally14. Hirst, Koonce and
Venkataraman [144] provide a framework to evaluate the management fore-
casts from the perspectives of researchers, managers, investors and regulators.
They conclude that management forecast characteristics are less understood,
both in terms of theory and empirical research. They state that prior litera-
ture ignores the iterative nature of management earnings forecast15.
Hutton, Miller and Skinner [149] studied the decision to supplement man-
agement forecast earnings. They classify supplements as qualitative “soft
talk” and/or verifiable forward looking statements. They found that man-
agers provide “soft talk” disclosure with equal frequency for good and bad
news but are more likely to provide verifiable forward looking statements
only when they forecast good news.
Baginski, Hassell and Kimbrough [15] found in their study of manager’s
explanations of earnings forecast for their sample size of 951 management
forecasts from the year 1993-1996, that such attributions are more likely for
larger firms. Less likely for firms in regulated industries and forecast issued
over long horizons.
Many researchers have speculated that insiders are more eager to give out
“good news” and withhold “bad news”16. This hypothesis has been tested by
13For more empiricism on analysts please see literature review paper by Beyer et al.
[27].
14A nexus between management and analysts is the most common argument on the
subject [113].
15See paper for more details [144].
16See Milgrom [188].
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Wasley and Wu [248]. They found that management issues cash flow forecast
to signal good news to meet investor demand for cash flow information and
to pre-commit earnings in terms of cash flow, rather than accruals thereby
reducing the chances of earnings management. Their results also indicate
that cash flow disclosures are made to negate the impact on the earnings
if there is bad news associated with it, to lend credibility to good news in
earnings and to enhance credibility should the firm be young. Rogers and
Van Buskirk [209] found that managers selectively disclose good news by
removing the effect of the contemporaneous earnings news.
The method of providing management forecasts have also been sufficiently
explored. Bowen, Davis and Matsumoto [40] found that conference calls
increase the ability of the analysts to forecast earnings accurately confirming
that the information environment improves with it and reduces the forecast
dispersion among analysts. However, during the time period of the study,
conference calls were available only to a few analysts, therefore, it could create
an information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors.
Bushee, Matsumoto and Miller [46] explored “open” conference calls that
are open to everyone rather than for select few analysts. They found that
the decision to make conference calls free and open depends on the investor
base and the complexity of the financial statements. They also found that
for firms with open conference calls there is an increase in the number of
small trades and higher price volatility during the call period.
Brown, Hillegeist and Lo [44] found that cross sectional and time series
tests shows that information asymmetry is negatively related to conference
calls. They also found that firms that have regular conference calls enjoy a
lower cost of capital. Kimbrough [158] found that conference calls are related
to reduction in the analyst forecast error.
2.4 Cross-Section of Risk-Adjusted Returns
Present value theory has its origins in the most important work of the noted
economist Irving Fisher. In the chapter IV. of his book “The Theory of
Interest” Fisher lays down the key assumptions behind the “Second Approx-
imation to the Theory of Interest”, which are — (i.) income streams are
modifiable by loans, (ii.) by other means (i.e. the choice of investment), and
(iii.) there is perfect foresight [107]. Therefore, the core argument of Fisher
[107] is:
34
“In consequence of such a range of choice, any given productive
instrument, or any given set of productive instruments, including
human beings, may produce any one of many different income
streams” (Fisher, 1930, Ch. iv., pp. 127.)
In measuring, reporting, defining and categorizing conundrums one can be
forgiven for overlooking the fact that — intangibles including human capital
are all but a “choice” of inputs, generating “many different income streams”,
one of many available to the investors to put their money in, once they de-
cide to forgo their immediate consumption17. The “risks” associated with
intangibles stem from three basic sources — (i.) known-knowns, (ii.) known-
unknowns, and (iii.) unknown-unknowns18. Known-knowns are the risks
investors take on with the assumption of perfect foresight and no informa-
tion asymmetry. The known-unknowns refers to the risks of information
asymmetry, where the insiders know something but the outsiders, who are
mostly investors but could be other stakeholders, don’t have all the neces-
sary information about their prospect or performance of their investment.
Unknown-unknowns is the systematic risk unknown to the insiders as well
as the outsiders.
The risks with intangible-intensive firms or assets are more complex than
other firms who are in the business of brick-and-mortar. It is because, with
intangibles the production function is much more complex with additional
variables involved making the outcome uncertain. Obviously there are risks
in any investment, but an investor is assured when he sees that a Steel
company is meting rocks to forge steel. It becomes a bit difficult to over-
state how ridiculous it might look to a risk-averse investor investing in a
pharmaceuticals firm when the outcome of all the research investments are
absolutely uncertain from the point get go. With that in mind, the follow-
ing sub-sections presents the theoretical and empirical development of the
mean-variance asset pricing literature in some detail.
17See [82, 11, 12]
18The original idea of “unknown-unknowns” is attributed to a press statement made by
Donald Rumsfeld, Ex-United States Secretary of Defense in February 2002.
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2.4.1 Asset Pricing Theories
The foundation of classical financial economics was laid using the theory of
capital asset pricing model (CAPM)19 by three important researchers with
three distinctly seminal papers, they are — Sharpe [221], Lintner [179] and
Mossin [192]20. They argued that all idiosyncratic risks21 can be diversified
away, and investors must focus on the systematic risk 22. The measure of
systematic risk they proposed was the returns on the market index whose
empirical underpinnings was criticized by Roll [210].
Mayers [183, 184] expanded the dimension of the CAPM by including the
non-tradable assets, which the Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin model ignored as they
derived their models using only perfectly tradable assets.
Merton [186] contributed significantly to the field by developing the inter-
temporal capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) by challenging the assump-
tions made for a single-period model. He argued that there are transaction
costs and the market is indeed not frictionless. Therefore the perfect substi-
tutions of a liquid asset over time as assumed by the Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin
model is not feasible in real time. He introduced a transformed CAPM model
with wealth and a state.
Breeden [41] expanded the theory by deriving an asset pricing model with
marginal utility of consumption 23.
2.4.2 Arbitrage Pricing Theory
Ross [212] introduced the idea that there could be many factors — macroeco-
nomic and microeconomic, that could explain the cross-section of asset prices
in a linear model. Connor and Korajczyk [74] contributed to the development
of the econometric tests in time series and cross section with different factors
19Adapting the ideas of portfolio diversification from 1952 Markowitz paper [182] and
discount rates from 1958 Modigliani & Miller [191] paper.
20Also see Treynor’s unpublished manuscript [239] on his version of CAPM that predates
both Sharpe and Lintner.
21Merriam dictionary describes idiosyncrasy “a peculiarity of physical or mental con-
stitution or temperament”. Therefore, the whole of financial literature is based on the
assumption that “peculiarity” of a individual asset in terms of “choice” of income stream
is unimportant to investors.
22Also known as the one-factor model, returns on market portfolio being the only ex-
planatory variable used as the single factor. There is also very little agreement about what
constitutes a “systematic risk” [118].
23See Cochrane [70] for more details.
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returns. Fama and French [101, 102] extended the literature by providing
the insight that accounting based factor on size and book-to-market ratio
can explain the cross-section of asset prices.
2.4.3 Empirical Evidence
The empirical kinks in the classical capital asset pricing model started ap-
pearing as early as 1968 with the Fama and Babiak paper [97]24 wherein
they found that dividends and earnings have a good predictive power of the
stock returns. This was completely contrary to what proponents of CAPM
had predicted. This empirical evidence was further advanced by Basu [22]
who found that price-earnings ratio was able to predict returns better than
the single-factor market portfolio. Banz [17] found that size of the asset or
portfolio can also explain risk-adjusted returns. Bhandari [29] found that
the common stock returns are related to the ratio of debt to equity (where
debt is defined by non-common equity liabilities), controlling for beta and
firm size.
Fama & French [101] in their seminal empirical paper found a decreas-
ing relationship of returns with size and book-to-market ratio. They then
proposed a three factor model created using portfolios of firms that could
mimic the risk factors such as size and book-to-market ratio, they called
them Small-Minus-Big (SMB) and High-Minus-Low (HML) portfolios in ad-
dition to the market portfolio mimicking the systematic risk. Carhart [52]
added to that model by including a momentum factor that could mimic the
short term variations in expected stock returns.
Several studies have been conducted to explore how factors based on
intangible assets can explain the risk-adjusted expected stock returns. Key
among them are by Lev & Sougiannis [175] and Chan, Lakonishok & Sougiannis[56]
where they used RND expenditure to explain the cross-section of stock re-
turns to various degrees of success.
2.5 Cost of Capital
Advancing the capital asset pricing model Easley and O’Hara [92] introduced
the role of public and private information in determining a firms cost of cap-
ital. In their model the expected returns of the assets is the measure of a
24See follow-up papers on dividends [32, 98, 49, 189].
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firms cost of capital because for a firm with greater information asymme-
try, investors would demand higher returns. Easley and O’Hara [92] argued
that for a firm with greater amount of private information, investors would
demand higher returns because informed investors would benefit when new
information arrives and it will be the loss of the uninformed investor as well
as the liquidity trader.
Hughes et al. [148] clarified that it is in fact the liquidity traders who
will be the ultimate loser when new information arrive in the market and
even the uninformed investor has information advantage over liquidity trader.
Nevertheless the cost of the capital depends on information asymmetry in
the market. Since intangibles and human capital are idiosyncratic, they are
a major source of information asymmetries prevailing in the market.
2.6 Market Microstructures
As discussed briefly in the previous sections (2.2.3) bid-ask spread is used as a
legitimate measure of information asymmetry between firms and the investors
in the stock market. Amihud et al. [7] noted in their book that liquidity is
the “ease of trading a security”. Therefore, liquidity is inversely proportional
to bid-ask spread. The also identify that there are three main causes for
illiquidity, which are — (i.) exogenous transaction cost, (ii.) inventory risk,
and (iii.) search friction.
Copeland and Galai [76] noted that the profit of the market makers are
tied to the difference in the bid-ask spread that maximized his transaction
with the liquidity and information traders. With liquidity trader a market
maker is expected to make money, whereas with an informed trader he is
expected to lose money. Therefore, the market maker sets the bid and the
ask price as such that he covers the risk of losing money to an informed trader
whereas encourages a liquidity trader to make a speculative trade. Glosten
and Milgrom [116] found that informed trader leads to positive bid-ask spread
25.
Therefore, this bid-ask spread has a ubiquitous role in the information
environment of a firm. The liquidity measure is commonly used as a measure
of information asymmetry.
25See literature review on market micro-structures by Easley and O’Hara [91].
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2.7 Organizational Capital
Organizational capital is a special type of intangible that tries to explain al-
most everything that has not been explained by other measures. According
to Prescott and Visscher [205] “information” is the most significant organi-
zational capital. Hall [133, 132] in his papers treats what he describes as
an “e-capital”, a form of organizational capital, produced by the productiv-
ity, and achieved by the college educated and non-college educated human
resources. Whereas, Black & Lynch [33] argued that a firm’s training sched-
ules, work design and employee voice could be the factors that produces
organizational capital.
Spender [230] has argued that organizational capital is a “social good”
available to firms in the form of a “soft capital that is allocated by its man-
agers”.
Carlin et al. [53] have argued that a firm’s organizational capital can
be explained by its “intrafirm communications”. They theoretically show
that “richer internal language have lower employee turnover.” According to
Atkeson & Kehoe [14] organizational capital is a “plant-specific capital good”
and a result of its endogenous operations over the years that builds up plant
specific “knowledge”, that is measurable and transferable and from which
the owners extract rents in the future once an investment has been made in
the past.
Other views on organizational capital are as a result of a firm’s idiosyn-
cratic human capital [117] and/or as a result of its intellectual capital [154].
According to van Rens [242] organizational capital is a simple matter of
fluctuating labor cost management. Last but not least, Lev and Radhakr-
ishnan [171] have advocated in favor of treating the accounting measure of
selling, general and administrative (SGA) expenses as a measure of organi-
zational capital. This view is further explored by Papanikolaou & Eisfeldt
[201] but they argued that the organizational capital is “embodied in the
firm’s key employees.”
2.8 Human Capital
There has been a widespread consensus among academics from various fields
that human capital is very critical to the success of firms. In the literature
concerning management sciences, human capital have been repeatedly iden-
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tified as the one of the key intangibles [35, 50, 94, 126, 169]. There is also a
whole range of literature that is based on executive compensation.
Cheng [62] studied the role of the compensation committee in setting
compensation structure for CEOs in order to provide them with incentive to
invest in RND. The study hypothesized that in only two situations a CEO has
an incentive to reduce investments in RND, (i) “when the CEO is approaching
retirement”, and (ii) “when the firm faces a small earning decline or a small
loss.” Both of these hypotheses have been proven to be “consistent” as the
compensation structures have been found to be significantly changed in only
these two situations.
Furthermore, Cheng and Lo [61] found in their study that managers suc-
cessfully time the “bad news” forecast for the firms to reduce the market
price of the firm when they decide to purchase shares. This phenomenon is
most prevalent for the CEOs than for any other executives although they do
keep litigation risk related to insider trading in mind. Obviously executives
are not the only ones who work in a firm, but still can be considered to be
human capital.
One of the main reason why there is not much research in the microeco-
nomic field of human capital is because of lack of disclosed data. One variable
that is found in the United States is the SGA that includes the salaries of
directors, employees and various other services that a firm avail of various
agencies. This variable has been used to model organizational capital in the
past [171, 201], but it can be argued that this variable can be better served
as a measure of human capital.
At the macro-economic26 level some advances have been made to address
the subject. Among others, Mincer [190], Schultz [215], Becker [23], and
Williams [251] are some of the most prominent early adopters of the concept
and offer their perspectives.
The human capital plays a critical role in the firm’s valuation, however,
the risk-adjusted expected stock returns are still relatively unexplored. Ja-
gannathan and Wang [150] developed a conditional CAPM model that in-
cluded human capital in order to explain risk-adjusted expected stock returns
where the risk-loading can vary over time.
Similarly, Palacios-Huerta [199] paper evaluates the extent of which the
international diversification puzzle can be explained when human capital is
26Notable advances was made at the micro-economic (accounting) level as well, see Lev
& Schwartz [173].
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considered part of the wealth of nations. The analysis examines whether (i)
the inclusion of human capital in the wealth of portfolio of individuals, (ii)
the different human capital assets held by stockholders and non-stockholders,
and (iii) frictions in human capital markets, can help explain the puzzle. The
methodology consists of comparing Hansen – Jagannathan bounds on the
stochastic discount factor (IMRS) implied by human capital and financial
returns across different countries. The results suggest that the information
contained in the human capital of stockholders can greatly contribute towards
explaining the international diversification puzzle.
Next, Palacios-Huerta [200] performed an empirical evaluation of the con-
ditional CAPM with human capital to explain the cross section of variability
of security returns. It develops human capital returns based on educational
investments, skill premium, worker experience and other relevant features.
They find that some of the measures definitely improve the performance of
the model. They got their human capital data from Current Population
Surveys for the period 1964-1990.
Eiling [95] uses the Aggregate Labor Income Growth as a measure of hu-
man capital albeit industry specified. The main results of the paper show
that the heterogeneity of the human capital as captured by the paper af-
fects the cross-section of stock returns. The paper uses Size-BE/ME and
Size-beta to make portfolios dependent variable returns. The human capital
is calculated for the following industries: goods producing, manufacturing,
distribution, services, and government. The findings of the models show that
the human capital CAPM estimates are a poor predictor of the cross section
of stock returns, unlike the findings of Jagannathan and Wang (1996)27.
2.9 Summary
The literature on intangibles is plenty and from various perspectives and still
the risks associated with them are not clearly understood. It is a complex
subject and therefore it requires careful analysis. What is evidently clear
from the existing literature is that management researchers are convinced
that intangibles benefit firms. Although they have not been able to pin down
how firms are benefiting from their set of intangibles. On the other hand,
financial economists who study market and accounting, are still skeptical of
these assumed benefits from intangibles. They are indeed working toward
27Also see Campbell [48] and Lettau & Ludvigson [166].
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more evidence and clarity about how each type of intangible helps a firm,
investor or a general stakeholder.
The irony with the study of intangibles is that there is a void of variables
in the jungle of data that can explain its economic impact. Even when there
are variables there is little consensus amongst researchers about the economic
story it can tell. Therefore, in this study various aspects of intangibles will
be investigated independently from each other to find out how they relate
to the exogenous macroeconomic and endogenous microeconomic risk-return





In this chapter1 the numerated non-financial and textual disclosures of
largest intangibles-intensive firms from the Pharmaceutical, Biotechnology
and Life Sciences industry are modeled to find out if expected returns,
which is a measure of cost of capital, can be explained. Large firms in
the intangibles-intensive sectors such as Pharmaceutical, Biotechnology and
Life Sciences spend heavily in RND which ties most of their resources in soft
assets. In order to compensate for the lack of clarity in the production func-
tion these firms are known to provide financial and non-financial voluntary
disclosures. In the process of disclosing the firms often give detailed infor-
mation about their strategy, product pipeline, services, and other forward
looking textual information in their annual reports. Arguably this reduces
1Previous version of this chapter have appeared in Indian Accounting Review with the
title “The Relevance of Intangibles Disclosure for Market Risk: An Exploratory Study
of US Healthcare and Pharmaceutical Industry”, volume 15, issue 1, pages 24 - 41 in
2011. This chapter have been presented at the 10th International Accounting Conference,
Kolkata, India on 8th Jan 2011; British Accounting and Finance Association Doctoral Col-
loquium, Birmingham, UK on 12th April 2011; and Mid-Term Conference of Marie Curie
Initial Training Network on Risk Management and Risk Reporting, Deutsche Bundesbank,
Berlin, Germany on 5th May 2011. Helpful comments by Prof. Swapan Chowdhuri, Prof.
D.V. Ramana, Prof. Andrew Stark, Prof. Elisabeth Dedman and Prof. Martin Walker




the information asymmetry risk associated with these firms [232].
The study evaluates the annual reports of the twenty-five of the largest
Pharmaceutical firms listed in the United States capital markets for the pe-
riod 2004-2006. The choice of this sector is tangentially based on investments
they make in RND, which is a structural investment to drives innovation and
creates intangibles and intellectual property (patents, trademarks, chemical
compound, etc.). These types of intangible resources and idiosyncratic com-
petencies [18] get largely ignored in financial statements. Studies have in the
past highlighted that the relevance of financial information, such as earnings,
cash flow and net assets towards the explanation of the market value is on
the decline [176]. However, these firms generally make an effort to disclose
non-financial information voluntarily. Therefore, there should be importance
given to the non-financial text based on the forward looking information in
the annual reports with a special emphasis on the Management’s Discussion
and Analysis (MD&A)2. This study extends the literature in the field of non-
financial and textual interpretations of the voluntary disclosures provided in
the MD&A section which are essentially forward looking.
The objective of this chapter is twofold — (i.) this chapter analyzes the
non-financial textual disclosures in the annual reports to create a index of
the “data availability” and “quality” of information, and (ii.) to model the
numerical representation of the “availability” and “quality” of the disclosures
to predict the cross-section of stock returns, which in this model is a measure
of its cost of capital [92].
Exploring the field of non-financial and text based information from the
annual reports for Pharmaceutical firms listed in the US is complex and
delicate matter because of unavailability of standards to numerate the quali-
tative data. Additionally, the voluntary disclosures are not regulated by the
SEC and there are no generally accepted standards available in the informa-
tion marketplace. It is also important to note that these type of disclosures
in the annual reports are not immune to the self-interest of ‘insiders’ oth-
erwise known as ‘management’ [243, 88, 246, 233]. Therefore to tackle the
incentives problem, firms only in one industry with a large market value are
targeted to homogenise this study. This creates an equilibrium in the in-
centives of the insiders among competing firms and therefore assumed to be
a constant to keep the dimensions of the study limited to as-is disclosures.
There have been many empirical studies related to disclosure theory from
2SEC released an “Interpretation” guidance document on the MD&A in Dec 2003 [217].
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the perspective of earnings, cash flow, book value, etc. Most of these stud-
ies [168, 227, 174, 8, 37, 56, 55, 130, 172, 84] end up by calling for further
disclosures and a better regulatory framework that can ensure more qual-
ity in the disclosures, both for financial and non-financial information. This
chapter will therefore extend the boundaries of the empirical disclosure re-
search by including the non-financial and text based disclosure that plays a
role in the information environment and potentially could have an impact on
the cross-section of expected stock returns, which is a measure of its cost of
capital.
The evidence from this chapter shows that non-financial textual disclo-
sures on the whole does not have any explanatory power, in two separate
models — (i.) one where the evidence of information is used as an indi-
cator, and (ii.) second where the quality of information is estimated using
a counting process based on the number of sentences devoted to a piece of
information3. However, when the disclosures are divided into sub-groups of
indicators which highlight a particular type of communication that a firm
would like to convey, such as, — Strategy, Customer and Market, et al.
the results are encouraging. The evidence shows that using the existence of
an information model, ‘customer and market’ information has a statistically
significant explanatory power. When the quality of information is used in
a model, the forward looking information on ‘innovation and IPR’ are more
relevant in explaining the cross-section of stock returns thereby having an
impact on the cost of capital.
This paper is divided into four sections. In the next section (3.2) the
background literature is presented. Section 3.3 presents the empirical foun-
dation of the analysis along with the model estimate results. The section
following that (3.4) discusses the literature and interprets the results, and
the final section (3.4) ends with some concluding observations.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Financial Reporting
The mandatory financial reporting to the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) and to the investors by corporations that are listed in the United
States stock exchanges are basically made up of annual reports (10-K form)
3For a review of the content analysis process please see Krippendorff [159].
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and quarterly filings (10-Q form)4. In these filings the firms give a brief per-
formance review in the previous financial year or quarter. There are two main
types of information a large corporation gives in these filings — (i.) financial
and (ii.) non-financial disclosures. For the most part financial disclosures
such as balance sheet, income statement, etc. are mandatory. There are
also many instances of numerical disclosures in the annual reports that are
not financial in nature, such as number of employees, number of patents and
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), etc. Then there is the non-financial and
non-numerical information such as a discussion on the corporation’s future
strategy, in case of Pharmaceutical firms — their product pipeline, future
prospects, market outlook, industry trends and new developments as the
management sees it. All these information is primarily located in the Man-
agement Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section of the annual report. It
is obviously not a rule, and there could be exceptions, but large firms tend
to give the non-financial and textual explanation of their performance only
in their annual reports rather than quarterly filings.
The focus of this chapter is the numerical non-financial and textual vol-
untary disclosures that firms make in their annual reports. This chapter tries
to understand if the forward looking non-financial information have any ex-
planatory power when it comes to future returns, which is a measure of its
cost of capital.
3.2.2 Voluntary Disclosure
In the seminal paper of Akerlof [4], he talks about the tension between the
insiders (management) who have perfect information and the outsiders who
does not, but would like to invest in the firm or make a purchase of a product
or a service. The topic under consideration in this chapter is voluntary
disclosures of non-financial and textual information made available to the
investors by the insiders through their annual reports. Many authors have
discussed the incentives [124, 188, 187] of insiders with a special emphasis
on voluntary disclosures 5. The principle incentives of the insiders and the
4There are many other types of filings but 10-K and 10-Q are the two main for large
corporations.
5Beyer et al. [27] have aggregated from various research papers the conditions under
which a firm discloses private information voluntarily, they are — (i.) costless disclosures,
(ii.) investors know of new information that is available to the firm insiders, (iii.) no
difference in the interpretation of new information by insiders and outsiders, (iv.) insiders
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outsiders that creates or reduces information asymmetric tension, persists
when it comes to voluntary disclosures in any of its forms.
Much of the empirical research regarding voluntary disclosure revolves
around the financial disclosures such as earnings forecasts. Therefore, the
literature have explored the incentives of the firm insiders in terms of raising
equity capital [193], issuing debt [138] or personal gain [1]. However, the
research on the non-financial disclosures especially on the textual interpre-
tations of the forward-looking information that firm provides in the MD&A
are not sufficiently explored. Even if some researchers such as Clarkson, Kao
& Richardson have studied MD&A the focus is generally on the impact on
the analysts or value relevance [67, 68].
Here in this study the forward-looking non-financial and textual voluntary
disclosures are numerated to find out if the existence of the information or
the quality is able to predict stock returns.
3.2.3 Measuring Written Word
Many attempts have been made in order to study non-financial disclosures,
some at the industry level and some at personal level. During 1990’s Asso-
ciation for Investment Management and Research (AIMR) created an index
for measuring disclosure quality and regularly disseminated a report based
on its assessments of the disclosures some of the biggest US firms made in
their annual reports and other such publications. With the publication of
this industry standard report on the quality of voluntary disclosures quickly
a flurry of papers emerged in the disclosure literature [164, 38, 218, 138].
With this new measure of voluntary disclosures researchers studied analyst
following [38], cost of capital/debt [218], information asymmetry [164] and
even stock price performance [138].
After the AIMR reports ceased being published, some researchers have at-
tempted to construct their own disclosure measuring indexes. Francis, Nanda
and Olsson [109] used basic historical information about firms and other fi-
nancial and non-financial information in their index of disclosure quality.
Their disclosure index with all its merits does not however accommodate
different types of intangibles found normally in the annual reports of an in-
novative firm. In another study, Shalev [219] created a different disclosure
quality index that is specific for the business combination scenario, and it
want to maximize the market equity of the firm, (v.) no permanent disclosure policy.
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used a construction of a numerical disclosure score deflated by the ‘relevant’
disclosures. The weakness of this construction is that it is very situation spe-
cific and subject to the judgment of the researcher’s perception of ‘relevance’.
Zambon and Bergamini [256] created a disclosure index with a focus
intangibles-intensive firms that is much more comprehensive in capturing
the various aspects of a firm’s non-financial and textual nuances. In this
model the researchers created a three-dimensional framework based on the
following principles:
 nature of information (forecast and actual)
 six communication dimensions — (i.) Strategy, (ii.) Customer and
Market, (iii.) Human Resources, (iv.) Innovation and IPR, (v.) Orga-
nization, and (vi.) Corporate Governance
 the depth of communication dimensions, minimal, reasonable and ex-
tensive information in five level
3.2.4 Intangibles-Intensive Firms
Firms with a heavy investments in RND is a frequent subject of study in
the accounting and finance literature. Canibano, Garcia-Ayuso and Sanchez
[50] in their review of papers related to the study of intangibles reflected on
the various streams of literature that has been explored in the field starting
from the economic nature of intangibles and their definitions. Empirically,
with RND, the focus of the research agenda has been earnings, profitability
and their effect on the stock price. The relationship between the investments
in RND and its impact on the stock prices has also been explored [119,
142]. Some researchers have analyzed the market-to-book ratio with RND
investments along with cross-sectional data, such as Sougiannis [227] and Lev
& Sougiannis [174]. Time series analysis was used to cover the limitation of
cross-sectionality, which implies that the probability of success of RND does
not differ from industry to industry [185]. All these studies found that RND
investments are an important component of the value creation process for the
firms. However, for this study the need for the firms in the sample to invest
in RND is tangential to the actual objective. The aim of this study is to find
out if the forward-looking non-financial and textual voluntary disclosures
available in the annual reports of the intangibles-intensive firms such as the
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ones in the Pharmaceuticals sector have any explanatory power when it comes
to the value-weighted returns.
3.2.5 Management’s Role
Obviously, insiders have an incentive to both disclose and withhold informa-
tion in different situations. Incentives that prompt disclosure or withhold
help shape the information environment around a firm. Information source
such as financial statements are mandated6, therefore insiders have to provide
them to stay compliant. However, for information that are not mandated in-
siders have full discretion about releasing or withholding. Studies such as
by Wasley & Wu [248], Rogers & Van Buskirk [209], Chen, Matsumoto &
Rajgopal [60], etc. found that management guidance are to some extent mo-
tivated by self-interest of the insiders as theorized by Akerlof [4] and Jensen
and Meckling [152].
Technologies have made dissemination of forward looking information,
interactions with analysts and discussing past performances by the insiders
ever cheaper. Reduction in dissemination costs made information available
to a wider audience that helps the overall information environment [234, 40].
However, technology is just an enabler for the insiders, not the cause of
the information. Even though management incentive is a key variable in
the whole picture of the information environment created by the mandatory
disclosures, voluntary disclosures and “cheap talk” [114], it is outside the
scope of this chapter. As described in the following sections (3.3) all the
firms in this study are from the Pharmaceuticals sector, large and invest
heavily in RND. Therefore the incentives of insiders are assumed to be a
constant as they are expected to be similar for the purpose of this study.
3.2.6 Cross Section of Returns
The asset pricing models in conjugation with disclosure theory works to study
the cost of capital. Cost of capital is indeed a very important aspect of a
firm’s risk profile. The higher the information asymmetry the greater will
be the cost of capital [92]. In the theoretical capital asset pricing model
proposed by Sharpe [221], Lintner [179] and Mossin [192] they proposed that
the only risk that could impact a fully diversified portfolio stock returns is
6Studies on mandatory disclosure are scarce as observed by Dye [89].
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the systematic risk, all other risks are indeed diversifiable. Since then much
empirical evidence has emerged showing that there are accounting factors
such as size [17], earnings [22], debt [29], etc also to explain the cross-sectional
asset prices. In 1992-1993 Fama and French [101, 102] in their seminal work
found that Size ME and BE/ME ratios are an essential factor in explaining
the cross-section of stock returns. In 2004 Easley and O’Hara [92] showed in
their paper that information is a very important aspect that is missing from
this whole equation.
This raised the interest in the information based asset pricing models,
which is nothing but another method to measure the cost of capital of firms.
According to Easley and O’Hara7 investors demand a higher return from
the assets that has high information asymmetry. The increased information
asymmetry creates more risk and to bear that risk investors need higher
returns as a compensation. Similar to Lambert et al. [162] this study uses
the asset returns as the measure of its cost of capital and the information from
the forward-looking non-financial and textual information from the annual
reports are used a predictor.
3.2.7 Summary
In summary, this chapter would like to ask the following questions:
 If the non-financial textual voluntary disclosures can explain the value-
weighted returns of the largest firms in the Pharmaceuticals sector?
 Does the quality of the information in any way impact the outcome of
the analysis?
 Do the sub-divisions (or the communication types) of the non-financial
disclosures have an impact on the returns?
3.3 Empiricism
3.3.1 Data
The dataset used for this chapter is randomly selected Pharmaceutical firms
from the Ocean Tomo 300® Patent Index [196]. This is the industry’s first
7See critique of the Easley and O’Hara predictions in the Hughes et al. paper [148].
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index based on the value of the intellectual property, and represents a di-
versified portfolio of 300 firms that invests a large portion of their yearly
book equity in RND (expense). The index is priced and published by NYSE
Euronext (NYSE Euronext: OTPAT).
From this portfolio of 300 firms, about 50 are from the Pharmaceuti-
cal industry. From this initial portfolio of 50 firm only those that met the
following criteria are selected for the study:
 The firm should be listed in a United States Stock Exchange, preferably
NYSE or NASDAQ.
 The firm should publish annual reports for a period of three years from
2004 to 2006.
 Daily stock price data of the firm should be available at the Center for
Research in Security Prices [78] for the entire period under considera-
tion (2004 to 2006).
 Accounting data of the firm should be available in the Compustat
database from Standards and Poor’s during the entire period under
consideration (2004 to 2006).
From the initial portfolio of OT300 firms that included about 50 Pharma-
ceutical firms only 25 met all the above criteria for a period of three years.
3.3.2 Methodology
Since the aim of this chapter is to find if the non-financial voluntary disclo-
sures on intangibles-intensive assets have any explanatory power of returns,
the scope of this chapter is limited to the US listed Pharmaceutical firms.
The annual reports of the Pharmaceutical firms are qualitatively analyzed
in order to numerate the disclosures based on the number of sentences con-
forming to a set of indicators [159] as listed in the Appendix A.1.1 (See
Zambon-Bergamini [256]).
Once the indicators are numerated the variables are regressed on a cross-
sectional panel data model with returns as dependent variable. The following




In this chapter the variable used as dependent or regressand is the continu-
ously compounded value-weighted annual returns on assets8.
3.3.3.2 Primary Explanatory Variable — Voluntary Disclosures
Here in this chapter the disclosure scoring model of Zambon and Bergamini
is used [256]9. The Zambon-Bergamini disclosure model has the following
specifications — (i.) the nature of information (actual or forecast)10, (ii.)
six communication dimensions: strategy, human resources, customer and
markets, innovation and IPR, organization, and corporate governance11, and
(iii.) the level of communication depth: no information, minimum informa-
tion, reasonable information, and extensive information. For this study the
Zambon-Bergamini model is adapted in a two-dimensional way: (a.) the
existence of non-financial disclosures on the annual reports, and (b.) quality
of the disclosed information.
In order to model the binary variable of “Information Existence” the
annual report of a firm in the year t−1 is analyzed to find out if information
about a certain variable is present or not. If the information is present
then the indicator is marked ‘1’ otherwise ‘0’. This will create a measure of






IndicatorFound is the number of non-financial indicators found for the firm
i in the year t− 1
8The returns is calculated between the last working day of December in the year t− 1




9The model was first introduced in 2001-03 within the EU PRISM Research project,
and it is the outcome of collaboration between the University of Ferrara and the Italian
Association of Financial Analysts (AIAF).
10To simplify, the non-financial voluntary variables are not identified as actual or forecast
in this chapter.
11For the full list of indicators please see Appendix A.1.1.
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TotalIndicator is the total number of indicators in the model for the firm i
in the year t− 1
To model the voluntary disclosure quality the indicators are scored by count-
ing the sentences [159] devoted to a particular indicator in an annual report
using the following weights — (i.) for no information ‘0’, (2) insufficient
information is measured as 1 - 4 sentences, is scored ‘1’, (3) sufficient infor-
mation is measured by 5 - 10 sentences in the annual report, is scored ‘2’, and
(4) sufficient or detailed information in annual report is scored as ‘3’12. This







3.3.3.3 Other Explanatory Variables
In the regression model there is a combination of four financial control vari-
ables, they are — (i.) risk-adjusted market returns, (ii.) size, (iii.) BE/ME
ratio and (iv.) RND/BE ratio.
The market return is calculated using a sample of 7,799 firms sample
between the year 1975-2011 using monthly returns (for more information see
Section 5.4.2.3). The stock return are adjusted for risk using the annualized
one-month treasure-bill returns. To check the robustness of the measure of
market portfolio the returns is Pearson correlated with annualized S&P. The
Pearson correlation is found to be 97.97% and statistically significant with
p-value < 0.05.
Size of the assets are calculated by multiplying the stock price with the
number of shares outstanding in the December of year t.
lnMEt = ln(prc ∗ shrout)t
The BE/ME ratio is calculated by the dividing the book equity in the year
t−1 by the market equity in the December of year t−1. Here the book equity
is calculated by adding book value of common equity to the deferred taxes
and investment tax credit if available, minus the carrying value of preferred
stock.
12In the Zambon-Bergamini model five levels of information quality is used, which is





The RND/BE ratio is calculated by dividing the RND spending in the





In this chapter, it is hypothesized that non-financial disclosures have the
ability to predict stock returns. Many studies in the asset pricing literature
have argued that stock returns are only predictable by the systematic risks
[221, 179, 192]. However, over the years evidence has emerged that the capital
asset pricing model is in fact misspecified and there are a number of financial
factors that can be used to predict stock returns, such as size [17], earnings
[22], dividends[32], book-to-market ratio [101], etc. Studies have now started
venturing into the other factors which are more qualitative in nature that
could have the ability to predict stock returns [235].
Easley and O’Hara [92] have argued in their 2004 paper that “private” and
public “information” have an impact on the cost of capital of a firm, where
the expected returns on the assets are a measure of its cost of capital. They
argue that for the firms with higher private information investors demand
higher compensation to cover the risk of know-uncertainty13. Voluntary dis-
closure provides non-financial and descriptive textual private information to
the investors. Therefore using the Easley-O’Hara model of information based
capital asset pricing model14, this study models the numerated non-financial
textual disclosures to predict the expected stock returns, which, in this set-
up is an estimate of the risk compensation of private information otherwise
known as cost of capital.
13Known-uncertainty is risk compensation for the information that are privately avail-
able with the insiders but unavailable to the investors. Similarly unknown-uncertainties
are the risk compensation investors demand for bearing the systematic risk for which even
the insiders have no information.
14Also see Lambert, Leuz & Verrecchia [162] and Hughes, Liu & Liu [148].
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Non-financial and textual voluntary disclosures are given by firms to in-
vestors every year in their annual reports. Most of the non-financial disclo-
sures are descriptive in nature which informs the investors about the future
in terms of strategy, product pipeline, innovations, etc. Essentially these
disclosures serve as a ring side view of what to expect from the firm in the
following year. To model these disclosures, the basic assumption here is —
more information is better predictor stock returns. Econometric assump-
tions of the factors developed through numerated non-financial disclosures
is that they are distributed independently and identically with mean zero
and constant variance [InfoEx ∼ N(0, σ2)]15. This returns model therefore
is econometrically represented as follows:




Y + υi + εi,t
E(Ri,t) is the expected (E being the expectation operator) annual con-
tinuously compounded value-weighted asset return for the firm i
in the year t
Rm is the return on the index market
Rf is the risk-free rate of return
X are the voluntary disclosure variables of firm i in the year t − 1
as listed below;
InfoEx is the voluntary disclosure factor that represent the
total existence of information in the annual report
InfoQt is the voluntary disclosure factor that represent the
quality of information in the annual report
Strategy represents the voluntary disclosure factor of Strategy
factor, both information existence and quality mea-
sured separately
Cust.Mkt represents the voluntary disclosure factor of Customer
and Market factor, both information existence and
quality measured separately
15Other factors are assumed to be of the same distribution.
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HR represents the voluntary disclosure factor of Human
Resources factor, both information existence and qual-
ity measured separately
Org. represents the voluntary disclosure factor of Organi-
zational factor, both information existence and qual-
ity measured separately
Inv.IPR represents the voluntary disclosure factor of Innova-
tion and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) factor,
both information existence and quality measured sep-
arately
Corp.Gov. represents the voluntary disclosure factor of Corpo-
rate Governance factor, both information existence
and quality measured separately
Y are the financial accounting factors as listed below;
lnME is the Size factor calculated of the firm i in the year t
BE/ME is the book-by-market ratio factor of the firm i in the
year t− 1
RND/BE is the RND-by-BE ratio factor of the firm i in the
year t− 1
υ is the firm specific estimation error distributed i.i.d [υ ∼ N(0, σ2υ)]
ε is the individual and time specific estimation error distributed
i.i.d [ε ∼ N(0, σ2ε)]
3.3.5 Summary Statistics
In the Table 3a the summary statistics of the variables used in this study are
tabulated. In the Panel i. the indicators16 of the voluntary disclosures are
presented. The voluntary disclosure data is processed to be numerated in
two ways — (i) in the first set, the “existence” of information in the annual
report is captured using a binary operator, and (ii.) in the second set, the
“quality” of information17 is identified counting the number of sentences.
16See Appendix A.1.1 for the detailed list of indicators under each sub-heading.
17See Section 3.3.4 for more details about the variables.
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From the Panel i. the “Information Existence” section, it is noted that
from the sample firms the average level of voluntary disclosures are found
to be above 50% of the prescribed indicators. When the information is sub-
divided into sub-groups of indicators it is found that the average firms in
the sample gave information on 12% of the strategy indicators and 15% of
the customers and market indicators. Rest of the indicators are found to be
under 10% levels.
The quality of the information is gauged and numerated based on the
number of sentences each firm wrote about an indicator in their annual re-
port18. Using that as a measure of “Information Quality”, the average of the
total voluntary disclosure indicators is found to be 33%. When the variables
are sub-divided into various measure of indicators similar to the previous
sample, the Strategy and Customer & Market have the most amount of dis-
closure at 9% and 10% respectively. All other indicators are found to have
less than 5% of the proposed indicators.
In the Panel ii. the mean of the accounting and market variables are
presented. The average return of the sample firm over a period of three years
is found to be 17%. On the other hand, the average return on the market
is found to be 1%. Therefore the return of the pharmaceuticals sector is
found to quite superior when compared to the average stock market during
the same period. The mean BE/ME ratio is found to be 23%. It means that
the firms in this sector have book equity of 23% and about 77% of its value
are intangibles or forward looking. One of the main reason these sample
firms are chosen is because of the investments they make in RND. With a
conscious decisions firms invest in creating structural intangibles. The mean
RND per BE of the sample firms over a period of three years is found to be
32%. Which means that the firms in the sample spends on an average 32% of
their book equity on RND and considering the mean BE of the firms in the
sample is $4.13 Billion, that is an enormous investment in creating structural
intangibles. These enormous investments in RND are the chief risk for these
firms as well as the investors. Therefore, this study tries to find out if the
voluntary non-financial disclosures these firms make, have any explanatory
power when it comes to the firm’s stock returns.
Insert Table 3a — Appendix A.1.4
181 - 4 sentences is tabulated as ‘1’. 5 - 10 sentences is tabulated as ‘2’. More that 10




In the Table 3b. the Generalized Least Square Random Effect (GLS-RE)
estimates are presented of the information based capital asset pricing model
where the dependent variable is the annual asset return in the year t. In
this table the estimates are divided into two section, (i.) one where the in-
dependent variables measure the existence of information about an indicator
in the annual reports of a firm in the year t− 1, and (ii.) the second where
the quality of information is numerated in a three level scale counting the
number of sentences that are written about the given indicator, again in the
year t− 1.
In the Panel i. of the table which is denoted by “Information Existence,”
the independent variable InfoEx is the natural log of number of indicator
on which information is given in the annual report by the total number of
indicators. This indicator measure the existence of various types of informa-
tion based on the sub-division of the list of indicators. The estimates from
the Panel i. Sub-Panel i. show that the variable InfoEx is not found to
be statistically significant in the presence of risk-adjusted market variable, a
control for the systematic risk (see a.). Additionally, it is not found to be
significant in the presence of size as well in the second model (see b.). In
this third model, BE/ME ratio is found to be statistically significant at 5%
confidence level (p-value < 0.05) (see c.). However, information existence
variable is still not found to be an significant explanatory variable of the
returns.
The next set of independent variables in Sub-Panel ii. are the categorized
sub-division of the voluntary disclosures — (i.) Strategy, (ii.) Customer and
Market, (iii.) HR, (iv.) Organization, (v.) Innovation and IPR and (vi.)
Corporate Governance19. The estimates in this econometric set up show
that the information about customer and market is statistically significant
at 5% confidence level (p-value < 0.05) (see models d., e. and f.). None of
the other variables are found to be statistically significant including the risk-
adjusted market variable which is a measure of systematic risk. However,
in the model f. BE/ME ratio is again found to be statistically significant
at 5% confidence level. The coefficient of determination R2 for these set of
variables have also increased from the previous set of less than 19.6% in the
previous setup to 27.2%.
19All the variables are the natural log of the number of sub-indicator existence dividend
by the total number of indicators variable in each sub-division of indicator.
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The next Panel (ii) is where the quality of the information is defined
based on the number of sentences devoted to each of the indicators. In the
Sub-Panel iii. the independent variable InfoQt is the total figure of the
information quality. However, in none of the three models (see models g.,
h. and i.), estimates listed in the panel the variable is found to be a sig-
nificant explanation of the returns. When the information quality is further
sub-dividend into the sub-indicator groups as listed in the Sub-Panel iv. the
information quality of Innovation and IPR is found to be significant explana-
tion at 5% level in models j. and k. Although, in the model l. the estimates
of Innovation and IPR is not found to be statistically significant, thus dilut-
ing the evidence. The coefficient of determination or the R2 is also found to
be as high as 24% wherein size, BE/ME and RND/BE ratios are used.
Insert Table 3b — Appendix A.1.5
3.3.7 Robustness Check
In this study the voluntary disclosures are numerated based on a qualitative
analysis of the annual reports, which requires a lot of subjectivity even with
the specification of the method clearly diarized. However, the variables are
subsequently transformed into natural logarithms when used for economet-
ric estimation. The estimates are calculated using GLS Fixed Effect and
the Ordinary Least Square (OLS)20 method and no difference is found with
the general conclusion of the analysis. Additionally, model assumption of
homoscedasticity is checked using White test for heteroscedasticity [250] and
the estimates are found to be consistent and robust.
3.4 Discussion
In this chapter an attempt has been made to understand if the non-financial
and textual voluntary disclosures are able to predict stock market returns.
In 1983 Stoll and Whaley [232] found that small sized portfolios faced ex-
ceptionally large transaction cost which is a result of very high information
asymmetry. Therefore, the obvious deduction is that, for large firms infor-
mation asymmetry in the stock markets are indeed less. Over the years this
20Estimates not listed in this study but available from the author on request.
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evidence has only increased, although there are many who find that tradi-
tional financial reporting, which consists mainly of financial information is
becoming less informative [176]. If one believes the analysis of Stoll and
Whaley [232], can the voluntary non-financial information from the annual
reports of largest Pharmaceuticals industry firms explain the asset returns?
The sample selection bar is deliberately kept low as Pharmaceuticals firms
are known to give out a lot of information about their strategy, product
pipeline, etc. information in their annual reports and with large firms the
implied assumption here is of low information asymmetry even though some
might argue that the industry where RND is the most important and sub-
stantial investment, it is inherently less informative [9]. One of key reason
to be interested in the information environment of firms is because they help
determine the cost of capital of the firms [92, 148].
Voluntary disclosures of firms is a difficult topic to study as there are no
set measure of indicators. There are many sets of indicators used in research
papers of the past to study voluntary disclosures. Some were industry made
standards [164, 38], now obsolete, and some were self-developed [109, 219].
In this study Zambon-Bergamini [256] disclosure model is used with modi-
fication to suit the data and later analysis. There are mainly two reason to
use this disclosure model — (i.) first it has never been used on US data, and
(ii.) second, the indicators are more suited to evaluate intangible-intensive
firms such as the ones in the Pharmaceuticals sector.
The study modeled non-financial voluntary disclosures to predict the re-
turns. The non-financial disclosures on the annual reports are numerated
and tabulated based on the indicator model proposed by Zambon-Bergamini
[256] with the following sub-groups: (i.) strategy, (ii.) human resources, (iii.)
customer and markets, (iv.) innovation and IPR, (v.) organization, and (vi.)
corporate governance. The information is extracted from the annual reports
on two accounts, one where just the information’s existence is acknowledged
and scored and second where the quality of the information is measure by
counting the number of sentences devoted to a piece of information on a scale
of four where ‘0’ is the lowest and ‘3’ being the highest score. The dependent
variable, continuously compounded value-weighted returns are calculated an-
nually from a portfolio of 25 largest Pharmaceutical firms selected at random
from the list of largest firms in the sector as highlighted by Ocean Tomo 300
inter-industry index focusing on intangibles-intensive firms.
The empirical findings from this study gave a mixed picture. Overall
the variable that represented the cumulative of the non-financial disclosure
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indicators are found to be uninformative to the market. They do not have
a statistically significant explanatory power when is comes to annual value-
weighted returns, a measure of its cost of capital. However, when the the
disclosures are sub-dividend into the groups of indicators some of them are
indeed found to have statistically significant explanatory power. The key
among them is Customer & Market and Innovation & IPR. From the sum-
mary statistics one can deduce that firms in the Pharmaceuticals industry
give the most amount of information on Strategy and Customer & Market
when compared to other indicators but this is not the case with Innovation
and IPR. The disclosures on Customer & Market is found to be significant
whereas strategy is not when the measure is existence of information. How-
ever, when the quality of information is in question, Innovation and IPR is
found to be more predictive of the value-weighted returns.
Overall the study finds that, for at least the large Pharmaceutical firms
as the information is drilled down to the fundamentals of certain types of
information, the ability of the variables to explain or predict value-weighted
returns is increased.
There is obviously a need for caution when interpreting these results
as numeration of qualitative information such as the written word is not
always objective. A great deal of subjectivity goes into determining what
disclosure indicators are important and what are not. Similarly, there is
still a lot of subjectivity involved when information is evaluated based on
written sentences as has been done in this study especially when the quality
of the information is in question. Additionally there is always the added
subjectivity with the econometric assumptions a linear regression models
makes with its distribution et al. Even with these subjective shortcomings,
the results are fairly robust and relevant.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature of intangibles-
intensive firms. Here the impact of the non-financial and textual information
is numerated to model its impact on the expected stock returns, a measure
of a firm’s cost of capital. Evidence from this chapter shows that the non-
financial and textual information provided in the annual reports are indeed
useful for the market and the investors. In the first step, using a qualitative
content analysts method the written word from the annual reports of the
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largest Pharmaceutical firms operating in the US capital markets are enu-
merated. In the second step, the enumerated data from the annual reports
are used to predict the future expected stock returns. The evidence from the
study found significant impact of various sub-groups of non-financial indica-
tors such as Customer & Market and Innovation & IPR can explain returns,
a measure of its cost of capital. The core findings from this study is, with
the improvement or increment in the quality of non-financial and textual in-





In the late1 1990s and early 2000s two successive events happened that
are hypothesized to have an impact on the information environment of the
capital markets in the United States — (i.) the first was the implementa-
tion of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in 2000, and (ii) the second was the adoption of Sarbanes-
Oxley Act in 2002 (SOX). The prevailing regulatory environment in a country
is a macroeconomic intangible available to firms operating within its regu-
latory jurisdiction. They bear the cost and enjoy any subsequent benefits
of operating in this regulatory framework. Any changes in regulation is a
cause for risk as it increases uncertainties that may not be priced in the
stock markets. The question this chapter raises are — did these regulatory
1Previous version(s) of this chapter have been presented at 7th Interdisciplinary Work-
shop on Intangibles, Intellectual Capital & Extra Financial Information in Warsaw, Poland
on September 29, 2011, at Accounting Renaissance - Lessons from the Crisis and Looking
into the Future. Learning from Histories and Institutions in Venice, Italy on Nov 04,
2011, at European Accounting Association 35th Annual Congress in Ljubljana on May 11,
2012, at Financial Reporting — Third Workshop in Naples, Italy on June 15, 2012 and
at American Accounting Association 2012 in Washington DC, USA on August 07, 2012.
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changes (i.e. Reg FD and SOX) led to the eventual change in the informa-
tion environment causing a macroeconomic intangible risk and contributing
to information asymmetries and uncertainties? Here, with the help of two
key information intermediaries of the market — (i.) News Articles and (ii.)
Analysts, the liquidity measure of information environment is studied to find
out the impact. Additionally, a causal relation is also explored between the
News variable and Analysts to understand the directional flow of informa-
tion between these intermediaries [164, 21]. The study focuses on just one
industry with three sectors, (i.) Pharmaceuticals, (ii.) Biotechnology and
(iii.) Life Sciences, to keep the unnecessary inter-industry noise out of the
model estimates2.
The two main information intermediaries that make the principle ex-
planatory variable of the information environment are — (i) News Articles
from Factiva database and, (ii) Analysts coverage of the firms obtained from
I/B/E/S database.
News Articles are produced by the business press and it plays an impor-
tant role in forming and facilitating the information environment around a
firm [47]. Analysts are also a key market participant who analyzes the pub-
licly available information, collects private signals from the insiders through
various meetings, interactions and personal research through conference calls,
etc. and produces earnings forecasts thus contributing to the information en-
vironment around the firms [27]. This study compares the role of these two
market participants that are the enablers of the information environment
around a firm using various liquidity based econometric tests.
The evidence produced through this empirical set-up shows that the reg-
ulatory reforms of Reg FD and SOX collectively changed the information
environment since their implementation. The impact analysis of News and
Analysts on the liquidity based information environment show that before
the regulatory reforms Analysts were contributing in reducing the informa-
tion environment, however the roles were reversed somewhat. News was able
to reduce the information asymmetry whereas Analysts contributed to it.
There could be several reason why Analysts are found to be contributing to
the information asymmetry — the key among them is based on their business
model of selling information for a price. Many small investors don’t have ac-
cess to the Analysts reports. In a discriminatory information sharing set-up
2The key reason to select this industry is because of the Research and Development
(RND) investments, which makes their information environment an ideal set-up to study.
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a few privileged few get information from the insiders thereby contributing
to asymmetry of information. After the regulatory reforms the impact of
both these variables are visibly reduced.
In terms of causal relation between the two information intermediaries
News and Analysts, the Analysts are still driving more information into the
market, which means that there is a unidirectional causal relation between
Analysts and News going from Analysts to News. This is also found to be a
result of the regulatory reforms.
In the next section (4.2) the background literature of the study is pre-
sented. The following section (4.3) discusses the empirical issues such as
sample, methodology, model and the economic outcome of the various esti-
mates. The next section (4.4) discusses the econometric results in a wider
context of the research and how the findings in this study advances the knowl-
edge of information environment affected and created by News Articles and




The pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and life sciences sector from the larger
Pharmaceuticals industry in the United States have witnessed tremendous
growth during the past 21 years (1990-2010). It is evident from the growth
in the number of firms (Appendix B.2.1) and their combined market capital-
ization3 (MV – Appendix B.2.2) that it has been a high growth sector since
the early nineties. The growth in the number of new firms coming into the
capital markets has been quite consistent and steep since the early 1990s.
That growth have shown stagnation or recession only after 2008-09 when the
wider American economy went into recession due to the burst of the housing
bubble followed by the credit crunch in the financial markets.
This rapid growth in the number of firms entering the capital markets has
3The market capitalization figure is not for the entire market but only for the sample
dataset selected for this study that meet the selection criteria. Please refer to the section
Sample Selection Criteria (Section 4.3.2) for more information about the selection criteria.
Although the market capitalization figures are not absolute, they are expected to be a
good representation of the growth seen by the sectors over the years.
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not been matched by the annual returns from the sector. As Appendix B.2.3
shows that the financial returns have been quite volatile for the sector over
the years with some years witnessing high growth followed with no return or
in some cases, negative returns. What is interesting from the returns graph
(B.2.3) is that almost all the negative returns follow the burst of a bubble in
other industry segments, which represents how closely the sector is related to
the wider American economy. For example the sector witnessed a slowdown
in return during the short recession of 1991-1992. During the dot-com bubble
the sector witnessed a slowdown after the initial exuberance of 2000 for two
consecutive years before returning to any respectable returns expected by
the investors. The sector then witnessed slowdown when the housing bubble
burst in 2008, showing glimpses of recovery only in the year 2010 without
any guarantee of its sustainability4.
4.2.2 Regulatory Change Risk
Any change in the regulation or an enactment of any law that aims to regulate
the market has some inherent risks. A regulatory framework is a macroeco-
nomic intangible and therefore any changes to it introduces new cost for the
firms. These risks are largely because of the uncertainties associated with the
new environment and investors are comfortable with certainties not changes.
There are largely two broad levels of regulations associated with the sam-
ple under investigation in this chapter — (i.) the first is the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) regulatory framework under which the Pharmaceu-
ticals, Biotechnology and Life Science function, and (ii.) the information
environment in the capital markets regulated broadly by SEC and Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB)5. The scope of this study is limited to
the information environment.
The two main regulations that is hypothesized to have an impact on the
information environment of the sample firms came into effect during the pe-
riod of 2000-2002. They are Regulation Fair Disclosure of 2000 (Reg FD) and
4See raw data of the graphs that are not tabulated in this chapter but are available
from the author on request.
5Additionally the sample data has to conform to the legal and political environment
of a country such as the United States. A study by Baginski, Hassell and Kimbrough [15]
showed that in two comparable business environment except for their legal structure, US
is considered to be more litigious when compared to Canada. However, these factors are
outside the scope of this study.
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Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). Primarily, to deter ‘selective disclosure’
of information to a small group whereas a larger base of small investors re-
mained at a disadvantage [140, 46]6. Moreover, during this period a number
of irregularities and frauds committed by executives of large US corporations
came to light7. These regulations, especially SOX, are also to some extent
as a result of the public and the political pressure on the American legisla-
ture to curb the various accounting and insider trading frauds. This chapter
studies the period before and after the implementation of Reg FD and SOX
to find out how the News Articles and Analysts impacted the information
environment because of this regulatory and legislative changes.
4.2.3 Information Environment
The information environment of a firm develops because of the demand and
supply of information [188]. On the supply side, disclosures about a firm’s
assets and liabilities are made by insiders (managers such as CEOs, CFOs,
etc.), whose knowledge about the firm is expected to be precise. On the
demand side the users of the information such as analysts and investors need
information to revise their expectations about the firm’s performance. If the
information about the firm’s expected performance is ‘good’ then investors
would increase their investments in a firm and if the information is ‘bad’ then
investors would try to sell off their shares [188].
Firms that are operating in highly technical and knowledge intensive in-
dustries such as Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology and Life Sciences would
not want to disclose proprietary information. Company insiders on the other
hand have incentive to withhold information and use it to their benefit [243]
since their payoff is tied to the performance of the firms. Insiders would want
to give out ‘good news’ and suppress ‘bad news’ [88], moreover it is difficult
for the investors and analysts to identify if insiders are manipulating infor-
mation at all unless they receive signals about information that is probably
6Heflin, Subramanyam, and Zhang [140] found in their study that post Reg FD imple-
mentation the “information efficiency” before earnings announcements have increased, the
ability of Analysts to predict stocks accurately are not reduced and there is a “substantial”
increase in the trading volume. Bushee et al. [46] used a database on conference calls and
finds that post Reg FD there is a significant negative impact on the managers’ decision to




available to the insides [233]. When the demand for information raises to an
extent that the payoff of disclosing information is higher than withholding
it, then insiders have an incentive to disclose [90].
Heavy reliance on the financial reporting as the primary source of infor-
mation is risk as they are slow and sometimes delayed. Moreover, there are
doubts expressed about the reliability and completeness of financial informa-
tion [176, 2]. Especially for the firms in the industry where the value of the
firm comes not only from its capital investments but also from its expenses in
RND, human capital, operational efficiency and relations within the industry
to hedge operations risks [174, 255]8.
There are, however, other information intermediaries that try to overcome
the shortcomings of financial reporting. Tetlock [236] used the Wall Street
Journal (WSJ) columns employing a software generated variables to model
“investor sentiments.” Furthering this line of research in the next paper
Tetlock et al. [235] used WSJ and Dow Jones News Services (DJNS) News
stories to create a crude measure of “good news” and “bad news” and used it
to predict earnings and stock returns using the data from Factiva database.
Other have used News data from Dow Jones News Service (DJNS) [237] and
Dow Jones Interactive Publication Library (DJIPL) [57] database to model
the information environment. With the rising interest in alternative sources
of information (See Appendix B.2.5) and furthering this line of research using
Factiva database, this study uses the News Articles count data to explore its
impact on the information environment in the capital markets of United
States.
4.2.4 Analysts Coverage
There are many incentives for an Analyst to follow or unfollow a firm, some
of them can be personal [137] and others could be institutional [42]. There
could also be exogenous factors such as the “precision” of the information
already available in the market thus deterring Analysts to follow firms [106].
Therefore it should come as no surprise that the overall Analyst following of
sample firms from this study has been on the decline (See Appendix B.2.4).
8Firms in the pharmaceuticals sector are known to hedge their risks by forming RND
relationships within the industry and by buying options on a drug that are in the develop-
ment phase to diversify their product pipeline and share the risks of failure [81]. Moreover,
some of the firms are outsourcing the RND to companies in the emerging markets to reduce
costs, increase productivity and hedge risks [34].
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This decline in the Analyst following is a cause of concern for the man-
agement of the firms as it is in their interest to have a healthy levels of
Analyst covering their firm because it increases market liquidity [213] and
reduces the cost of capital [39]. This essentially points towards the reduction
of information asymmetry risk hypothesis.
Lang and Lundholm [164] have found in their study that the firms that
provide “qualitatively” more information to the market, would make it worth-
while for the analysts to invest time and effort to produce earning forecasts
and recommendations. This means the causality of the Analyst following
runs from information towards coverage [13].
On the other hand, Analysts want to follow firms that are promising in
the future [137]. Therefore, the decision to follow a firm by the analysts
can also be made based on the expectations of the analysts from the firm’s
investments. Barth, Kasznik and McNichols [21] found in their study that
analysts follow firms that have huge investments in RND creating opportu-
nity for growth in the future. This means the decision to follow a firm by
Analysts is based on the real of perceived information asymmetries associated
with the firms.
Therefore, the question of information asymmetry and its causality with
respect to information is still dichotomous at best. This chapter models the
information environment based on the liquidity measure of bid-ask spread
and uses Analysts coverage of firms to find out if they have any impact.
4.2.5 Liquidity Based Information Economics
This study make use of the liquidity measure of bid-ask spread to model the
information environment. This idea of using bid-ask spread as a measure of
information environment is not a novel one and there are plenty of studies
that has made use of this measure in their study of asymmetric information
associated with the capital markets and insiders [249, 213, 129]. Still, it is
necessary to explain the basic economics of the market liquidity.
As Amihud et al. [7] noted in their book, there are mainly three reasons
for illiquidity in the stock markets — (i.) “exogenous trading costs”, (ii.)
“inventory risk” and (iii.) “search friction”. The ask price (offer) is that an
investor has to pay to acquire a stock and face tradeoff of lower price in the
future. The bid price is the holding risk the same investor faces, should the
prices go lower. On the other hand, the market makers who facilitate the
trade and bear the inventory risk of holding a stock until he finds a suitable
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buyer, in addition to the risk of trading with an informed investors are priced
in the difference in the ask price and the bid price. Therefore, the larger the
risk of information asymmetry the larger will be the spread in the ask and
bid price causing illiquidity [76, 116, 6].
For pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and life sciences firms the informa-
tion environment between market and insiders is expected to be divergent.
The firms typically have to get their products (drug molecule, formula, etc.)
approved by the FDA before launching any product into the market. The
quality and safety of the drugs produced by these firms aside — a non-
negotiable aspect, the investors have no way to pick the winning firms or
invest in products that are expected to be the next blockbuster drug.
The role liquidity measure of bid-ask spread plays in the informational
efficiency of the market is well documented by Amihud & Mendelson [6] and
Copeland & Galai [76]9. This study tests the level of information asym-
metry in the pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and life sciences sectors over
the study period of 1990-2010, testing the impact separately for information
intermediary variables such as News Articles and Analysts.
4.2.6 Summary
In summary, this chapter asks the following three basic questions:
1. Did the regulatory reforms (i.e. Reg FD and SOX) have an effect on
the information environment as determined by the liquidity measure?
2. Ceteris Paribus, do News Articles and Analysts have any statistical
impact on the liquidity measure of information environment?
3. What is the causal relationship between News and Analysts post reg-
ulatory reforms?
9Copeland and Galai [76] described the relation between the dealer and market where
the dealer is self-serving and wants to maximize his own profit. If the bid-ask spread is
too high, then the dealer loses revenues, and if the spread is too small, informed investors
might take advantage of the asymmetric information generating above normal returns.
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4.3 Empiricism
4.3.1 Sample Selection Criteria
The sample firms selected for this study belongs to the Pharmaceuticals,
Biotechnology and Life Sciences sector operating in the three main capital
markets of United States — NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ. In the 21 year study
period 1990-2010, the firms are identified using the industry identifier Global
Industry Classification Standard (GICS)10 and about 308 firms are found in
these three sectors. Upon removal of firms with no data the study is left with
a sample size of 219 firms with 4746 firm years under consideration. In order
to avoid survivor bias no restriction has been applied in terms of minimum
size (financial or otherwise) or longevity, etc. to filter out firms. All firms
with data have been accepted in the sample.
4.3.2 Data Description
For this study financial journalists are assumed to be an independent group
that follows the performance, growth prospects, management actions, and
investor’s reactions and also from time-to-time provide their own analysis
of the current situation based on their own observations. The event of a
journalist reporting occurs only when there is new information available or
an update on previous information, their own analysis of the information
or someone else release their analysis of the publicly available information
about the firm. This study assumes that the News Articles are distributed
independently and identically or i.i.d (News ∼ N(0, σ2)).
News Articles about the firms in the study are collected from the Factiva11
database. In this database the names of the firms are used as keywords to
search for News items12 in a particular year. Once the number of News
10BioTech (GIC 352010), Pharmaceuticals (GIC 352020) and Life Sciences Tools &
Services (352030)
11Factiva is a news media repository used for information and research and maintained
by Dow Jones & Company. Access has been kindly grated to this database by Manchester
Business School’s access management system.
12Each of the firm’s names is used as a keyword inside a time period (for e.g. 01-Jan-
1992 to 31-Dec-1992). When searched, the database returns news items irrespective of
it being “good news” or “bad news”. One of the key features of the database is that it
includes news reports from more than 600 continuously updating newswires and eliminates
duplicate that increases the reliability of the news report.
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item per firm per year is returned by the database, it is noted down and
the same process is followed for the next year. Firms that have changed
their official names during its lifetime have been taken into consideration, as
long as the corresponding permanent number (PERMNO, from Compustat)
is unchanged. The new names of the firms have been used as search terms
along with the old names and the number of News Articles found for them
in any particular year has been reported as the final figure of News Articles
for that firm.
The Analyst Following data is based on the earnings forecast data avail-
able from the I/B/E/S database. The decision by the Analysts to cover a
firm is assumed to be distributed i.i.d (AF ∼ N(0, σ2)) without an endoge-
nous influence13. The earnings forecast data is recorded by Thomson Reuters
I/B/E/S database found int the WRDS website [254]14.
Market data such as stock price 15, bid price, ask price, market makers,
trading volume16 data has been downloaded from The Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) database maintained by University of Chicago Booth
School of Business [79]. The accounting data such as Earnings per Share data
is collected from the Compustat database [73]. The market data is monthly
that has been annualized to match the News per year and Analyst following
per year data. The Market Equity ME, Bid-Ask spread, price volatility and
returns are calculated monthly and annualized by averaging across the year.
13There is evidence in the literature that the assumption of analyst independence is
unrealistic. Analysts face career concerns and sometimes institutional pressure to follow
or report favorable earnings forecasts. This assumption is made here for the sake of
econometric simplicity and the factors influencing the decision of analysts to follow a firm
is outside the scope of this study. See Beyer et al. [27] for more details and relevant
references.
14Accounting data, analyst forecast, and security price data has been downloaded from
the integrated multipurpose database hosted by Wharton School of the University of
Pennsylvania —Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) [254]. This integrated database
gave access to Compustat, I/B/E/S and CRSP databases. Access has been kindly granted
to the database by Manchester Business School’s access management team.
15Some of the stock price data (negligible as compared to the volume of the overall data)
was reported negative in the CRSP dataset. This happens in CRSP database when the
day’s price is not recorded in the database due to some error, then the mechanism is set
as such that the price data takes the average of the bid-ask price with a negative symbol
in front of it indicating the recording error. The negative sign has been eliminated and
the bid-ask average data has been used as the days price. Due to the negligible amount
of such error, it is not expected to cause any bias in the overall analysis.
16Volume of the shares traded in the stock is the average shares traded in month.
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4.3.3 Summary Statistics
In the Table 4 the summary statistics are presented of the primary dependent
variables such as relative bid-ask spread SR and average absolute bid-ask
spread S. Additionally, the table summarizes that the primary explanatory
variables are the News and Analysts AF that are modeled in the later part of
the study. Information control variables such as Earnings per Share lnEPS,
Market Equity ME, Market Makers MM , average Stock Price lnPrc, av-
erage Returns lnRet, Trading Volume lnV ol, Price volatility lnV ola and
Turnover Ratio lnTURN17 are also summarized.
In the Panel i. the pairwise Pearson’s correlation coefficient are listed
along with its signification denoted by (*). Two of the most important cor-
relations needs to be pointed out here. As dependent variables relative spread
ratio and average absolute bid-ask spread are used. Evidence from the vari-
able show that both are only 64% (significant at p-value < 0.05) correlated
to each other.
Using ratios as an economic factors is cause for econometric risk of spu-
rious regression, as pointed out by Kronmal[160]. Therefore, to avoid the
suspicion of spurious regression the models are estimated in the following
sections using both, (i.) a ratio, and (ii.) the absolute liquidity spread given
by S.
The second issue that needs to be pointed out here is the correlation
between the News and AF which is found to be 19% (significant at p-value
< 0.05). Correlation is not necessarily causation, therefore in the final part
of this analysis a causal relation between News and Analysts is explored in
greater detail. Other than that, all information controls used in this study are
found to statistically significantly correlated to the information environment
measured by the liquidity factor of bid-ask spread. Lastly, the mean bid-ask
spread ratio is found to be 0.11 and the absolute bid-ask spread is $0.16
averaged across 219 firms and 21 year sample period.
Insert Table 4 — Appendix A.2.1
4.3.4 Estimation Methodology
Similar to Amihud and Mandelson [6] in this study the relative bid-ask spread
is used as a measure of information environment. However, using a ratio al-
17TURN = Trading volume/shares outstanding
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ways comes with the econometric risks of spurious correlation [160], therefore
similar to Guo, Lev and Zhou [129] paper, this study uses the average abso-
lute bid-ask spread as one of the dependent variables.
The models are estimated in two basic econometric framework. First, they
are estimated to exploit the cross-sectional contemporaneous covariances,
with explanatory variable and control variables all from the same time period
to find out if the assumption of joint normality of the information restrictions
in anyway reduces the informativeness of the primary explanatory variables
— News or Analysts. Second, the time-series of the primary explanatory
variables with at the least two time lags are explored to find out if they are
able to explain the information environment with the delayed effect. The
basic econometric framework is as follows;
yi,t = αi,t + βxi,t + ϑi,t...(1)
y is the dependent variable
x is the exogenous independent variable
α is the slope coefficient
β is the beta of the independent variable
i is the individual firms where i = 1, 2, 3, ..., N
t is the time period measured in years
ϑ is the exogenous and independent error term distributed i.i.dϑ ∼
N(0, σ2ϑ)
The estimation methodology used in the study is Generalized Least Square
with Random Effect (GLS-RE) error distribution. In Ordinary Least Square
(OLS) method, the estimates of the α is treated as a constant. Since the
data in this study are in a panel of firms, there is a need to model the
covariances of the firm panels so that that vector estimates are robust and
efficient. Therefore ,with GLS-RE estimation α is given by;
α = β1 + υi...(2)
Here the υ is distributed i.i.d υ ∼ N(0, σ2υ). Therefore with this substitution
in the basic econometric model 1;
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yi,t = β1 + βxi,t + υi + εi,t...(3)
Here the error term is combined of two factors, (i.) εi,t varies across
individual firms and time and (ii.) υi that varies only across the individuals
18.
The main reason to estimate the models using GLS-RE is based on the
assumption that the independent variables are assumed to be uncorrelated
to the individual error term εi.
4.3.5 Information Environment — Structural Break
The years around 2000, 2001 and 2002 had been quite volatile for the whole
of American economy. The problem started with a dotcom bubble and a
few high profile accounting scandals it soon culminated to other parts of the
economy. Since pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and life science industry are
considered to be hi-tech — the sector experienced downturns (see graphs:
Appendix B.2.1-4). All these problems in the American economy led to
the two back-to-back regulatory changes which are the focus of this study:
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) in 2000 and Sarbanes-Oxley act of 2002
(SOX).
Both these changes impact the information environment in the US equity
markets where company insiders give out information to external parties
and intermediaries. The first regulation, Reg FD discourages discrimination
disclosures or selective disclosures and the second standardizes and prescribes
financial and non-financial disclosures. These disclosures happened in quick
succession therefore there is no way to study the information environment
focusing on just one of the factors. Therefore, this study hypotheses that
theses regulatory changes collectively changed the information environment.
To model the information environment the study uses two measure — (i.)
the bid-ask relative spread and (ii.) the absolute spread. The first measure
of information environment is based on the dollar difference in the bid and





ask is the asking price of stock charged by the seller
18For more information see Gujarati [128].
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bid is the buying price of stock at which a market maker purchases
the stock
lnSR is the natural log of bid-ask spread ratio
The second measure of information environment is given by the absolute bid
ask spread itself.
S = ask − bid...(5)
S is the bid-ask spread
This study utilizes the Chow Test19 [64] to explore if the regulatory changes
that happened between 2000-2002 changed the information environment. To
perform a Chow Test one needs to know the approximate dates on which the
expected structural break happened. The Reg FD was implemented in 2000
and SOX was adopted in the year 2002, the year 2002 is chosen to be the
year in which the structural break is to be tested. This gives sufficient time
for the Reg FD to have an effect on the environment and SOX regulation
to be known to the market. Additionally, Reg FD was implemented in the
later part of 2000 giving it no time to shape the information environment in
that year therefore the effect realistically can be expected to happen only in
2001 and 2002 onwards. Therefore, the study time period is sub-divided in
additional two time period: 1990-2001 and 2002-201020.
To study the information environment the study uses two main variables
– (i.) the news articles and (ii.) analyst following. Both these variables are
exogenous information intermediaries. They use publicly available informa-
tion to analyze and disseminate processed information. This study therefore
models the information environment measure of bid-ask spread using news
and analysts to find out their role in explaining asymmetric information risk.
Below is the empirical model that tests the information environment and
the possible structural break using a dynamic model with news and analysts
following as additional explanatory variables:
19The Chow Test formula for F-test is as follows (see Gujarati [128], p. 276);
F =
(RSSR −RSSUR)/k
RSSUR/(n1 + n2 + 2k)
∼ F[k,n1+n2+2k]
20The break is also tested for the 2001 and 2003 and the results are found to be same.
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lnSRt = α + lnNewsi,t + lnNewi,t−1 + SRi,t−1 + lnAFi,t + εi,t...(6)
lnNews is the annual news articles data collected by Factiva database
lnAF is the annual analyst following of a firm captured by the number
analysts producing forecasts
ε is the error term distributed i.i.d ε ∼ N(0, σ2ε)
In the first attempt to understand the impact that News and Analyst have on
the dependent variables the whole time period is estimated using Ordinary
Least Square (OLS). Although the data is in a panel, OLS estimator is used
to find out the slope coefficients ignoring the heterogeneity between firms
assuming that there is no difference between the estimates throughout the
time period. The estimates show that News and its first lag have statistically
significant explanatory power as the t-value of the coefficients -0.24 and -0.11
are both lower than minus two standard deviation away from mean. The first
lag of bid-ask spread is also statistically significant. Additionally, Analyst
following in the model can also explain the current information environment
but the lag has no explanatory power, therefore ignored. The R2 is approxi-
mately 49% which means that these variables are able to explain the around
half of the covariances of the bid-ask spread in the model.
When the estimates are calculated for two sub-divisions of the time pe-
riod, some fluctuations are found. For example the coefficient estimate of
News from the whole time period 1990-2010 and 1990-2001 is about one-
third higher. The bid-ask spread ratio of 1990-2010 and 2002-2010 is more
than 50% less. Although, not much changes are found the estimates of ana-
lyst following. However, the explanatory power of these variables decreases
significantly in the fractured time periods. ranging from 38% and 18%.
Therefore following the Chow Test — residual sum of squares (RSS) and
degrees of freedom (Df) are tabulated in the Table 4a. Using the formula
presented in the footnote 19 of this chapter the Chow F-stat is calculated
from the regression of the period 1990-2001 and 2001-2010 and the pooled
regression period of 1990-2010. The Chow F-Stat is found to be 20.30 which
is statistically significant following the F-distribution table (see table for 5,
929 — where 5 is the number of estimates in the model and 929 being the
number of estimates adjusted degrees of freedom). This can only mean there
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is a structural break in the information environment as measured by bid-ask
spread which is a result of the regulatory changes of Reg FD and SOX. This
break in the information environment represents the information asymmetry
risk caused by regulatory and legislative efforts. In the following sections,
who benefited and who lost from the regulatory changes will be analyzed in
the greater detail21.
Insert Table 4a — Appendix A.2.2
4.3.6 Adverse Selection Model
This section is divided into two sub-sections. In the first section the role
played by the News Articles data in the information environment is analyzed.
In the second section the informational role played by analysts is explored.
4.3.6.1 News Articles
Many papers have previously explored the information environment using
various sources of News data [206, 57, 236, 235, 237], which includes Factiva.
In this study the News data is collected for each firm in each year from the
Factiva database to study in a panel setting, if the information environment
can be explained by this News Articles data, and if so what difference does
the regulatory reforms had ever since. Therefore, in this section there are
two basic questions that are being explored — (i.) do News Articles data
from the Factiva database have an impact on the information environment,
and (ii.) do regulatory reforms (Reg FD and SOX) change the impact of
news on both bid-ask spread models?
In the Table 4b the Generalized Least Square Random Effect (GLS-RE)
estimates of the dynamic panel model with relative spread ratio SR and
average absolute spread S as dependent variables are presented with News
as the key explanatory variable. The basic empirical model is given as follows:




Yi,t + υi + εi,t...(7)
lnNews is the natural log of News Articles data from the Factiva database
21The model is estimated for Spread S as a measure of information environment as well,
and no change is found from the established conclusion from the measure SR, therefore
the estimates of S are not reported in the interest of space. The estimates are available
from the author on request.
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X are the dynamic control variables such as first and second lag of
lnNews
Y contemporaneous control variables such as:
lnEPS is the natural log of earnings-per-share
lnME is the natural log of market equity
lnMM is the natural log of the number of market makers
lnPrc is the natural log of the average price of the stock
lnRet is the natural log of the annualized value-weighted
returns calculated from monthly market equity data
lnV ol is the natural log of the trading volume
lnV ola is the natural log of annualized volatility of the stock
prices observed monthly
lnTURN is the natural log of the trading volume by shares
outstanding ratio
υi is the error term that captures the covariance across individual
firms, assumed to be i.i.d distribution; υ ∼ N(0, σ2υ)
εi,t is the error term that captures the covariance across firms and
time periods, assumed to be i.i.d distribution; ε ∼ N(0, σ2ε)
In the Panel i. the GLS-RE estimates are for the whole period, assuming
there is no impact of the regulatory changes on the information environment.
To that effect two models are estimated, (i.) where the dependent variable
is the relative spread ratio SR and (ii.) the other is the average absolute
bid-ask spread S. Additionally, a dynamic auto-regressive panel data model
is also estimated with both dependent variables.
In the first type of model (see SR. i. and S. iii.), the only restrictions that
have been imposed are the previously known information control variables
[249, 129]. In this model the magnitude of News Articles is found to be nega-
tive and statistically significant. Therefore, it means that with a percentage
increase in the number of news articles the relative bid-ask spread reduces by
14% and the absolute bid-ask spread reduces by 11% respectively. The model
is able to explain 72% and 62% variations in this model using the coefficient
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of determination R2. When the dynamic auto-regressive model is estimated
with one contemporaneous and two lag variables of News (see SR ii. and
S. iv.), the model can explain relatively less of the cross-sectional variation,
however using the magnitudes of the variables one can deduce that the pre-
vious years of news have statistically significant explanatory power when it
comes to relative spread ratio. This power does not appear when the model
is estimated of the average absolute spread, making the evidence weak.
In the Panel ii. the information environment of the sub-sample 1990-2001
is GLS-RE estimated because of the previous evidence of structural break (see
section 4.3.5). The News is not found to be statistically significant except
when the model is estimated in the dynamic auto-regressive mode (see SR.
vi. and S. viii.). Even then the evidence is weakened as only the relative bid-
ask spread ratio (SR. vi.) is the only one significant contemporaneously and
not the average absolute bid-ask spread (S. viii.). The explanatory power
of the model is weakened by the coefficient of determination R2 reducing to
21.9% and 9.6% respectively.
Panel iii. tabulates the sub-sample information environment which is
estimated for 2002-2010. This is the period after the implementation of
regulatory reforms Reg FD and SOX. The evidence from the estimates show
(SR. ix. and S. xi.) that the explanatory power of News have further reduced.
However, the control variables, such as the number of market makers, the
price of the stocks and average annual volatility of the assets are found to be
statistically significant. When the relative spread ratio (SR. x.) is estimated
in the dynamic auto-regressive model with two lags of News, the variables are
found to be statistically significant with p-value<0.05. The R2 have further
reduced from the previous model estimates to just 14%.
This analysis shows that with the regulatory reforms the ability of news
to influence the liquidity of the assets have reduced over the years. One ex-
planation of this outcome is because of the emergence of new technologies
and platforms on which information is consumed and shared with increas-
ing speed. Additionally, the regulatory reforms have sped up the process
tremendously.
Insert Table 4b — Appendix A.2.3
4.3.6.2 Analyst Coverage
In this section the Analyst coverage is used as the primary explanatory vari-
able to explain the information environment. Analysts are obviously an im-
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portant intermediary in the stock markets, they research stocks and follow
them on a short or long term. Here, due to modeling necessity, due to
dealing with annual data, any analyst that produces an earnings forecast
about a firm are ex-post assumed to be following the firm for the whole
year. Many papers have previously studied Analysts, their personal and in-
stitutional motivations, compensation and career concern in following a firm
[137, 21, 147, 194]. In this study the objective is to understand their role
in the information environment of high-tech firms and the changes to that
effect due to the regulatory reforms of Reg FD and SOX.
Therefore, in this section two questions are explored in great detail, (i.)
do analysts have an impact on the information environment of high-tech firms
in the Pharmaceuticals sector, and if it does, (ii.) what happened to it since
the implementation of regulatory reforms that was expected to change the
information environment. From the previous sections, it has been established
that the information environment did go through a structural break and the
impact of news to influence the asset liquidity has subsequently diminished.
In the Table 4c the GLS-RE estimates of the dynamic panel model with
relative spread ratio SR and average absolute spread S as dependent variables
are presented with News as the key explanatory variable. The basic empirical
model is given as follows:




Yi,t + υi + εi,t...(8)
lnAF is the natural log of Analyst Following data from the I/B/E/S
database that captures the number of analysts producing earn-
ings forecasts
X are the dynamic control variables such as first and second lag of
lnAF [see previous section for all other variables]
In the Table 4c the GLS-RE estimates of adverse selection model with An-
alysts coverage as the primary explanatory variable is tabulated in three
panels — (i.) in the Panel i. the estimates from the whole time period is
tabulated ignoring the effect of the regulatory changes, (ii) in the Panel ii.
the sub-period 1990-2001, before the implementation of regulatory reforms
are estimated and, (iii.) finally, the sub-period 2002-2010 is tabulated in the
last panel (see Panel iii.).
In Panel i. the evidence shows that Analysts coverage have a weak ex-
planatory power when the regressand is either relative bid-ask spread ratio or
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the average absolute bid-ask spread. In the first model with relative spread
ratio (SR. i.) the coefficient of analyst is 0.27 and statistically significant with
p-value < 0.05. However, in the dynamic auto-regressive model (SR. ii.) the
explanatory power of analysts is conspicuously missing. Although the sec-
ond lag of analyst follows is found to be negative and statistically significant
(p-value<0.05). When the dependent variable is average absolute spread (S.
iii.), the Analyst coverage does not seem to have an impact. However, in
the dynamic auto-regression panel data model (S. iv.) with absolute bid-ask
spread as a depended variable all the AF variables, the contemporaneous AF,
first and second lag AF are statistically significant (p-value<0.05). Although
the coefficient of determination R2 appears to have reduced to 2.9%.
In the next Panel (ii.) the models are estimated for the sub-period 1990-
2001. In this period, the first model with the relative bid-ask spread ratio as
dependent variable (SR. v.) the Analyst coverage appears to be statistically
significant with p-value <0.05. When the magnitude of the variable is com-
pared to the previous time period, it has increased by 6 basis points to 33%
where the coefficient of determination is around 71%. However, when the
same model is estimated with the absolute average bid-ask spread (S. vii.)
as the dependent variable the coefficient is not significant, which dilutes the
empirical evidence. When the dynamic auto-regressive panel data models
are estimated (SR. vi. and S. viii.) the evidence that AF could predict or
explain the liquidity factors are more scarce.
In the last Panel (iii.) the ability of AF explain the relative or absolute
bid-ask spread is very weak (see SR. ix. and S. xi.). The coefficient of de-
termination when compared to the previous models with similar restrictions
have also diminished from as high as 85% to 51%.
Overall, the evidence show that analysts were better placed in having an
impact on the bid-ask spread based liquidity factors before the implementa-
tion of regulatory reforms. Since the reforms of Reg FD and SOX the ability
of Analysts to produce ‘new information’ in order to have an impact on the
liquidity based information environment factors appears to have significantly
reduced.
Insert Table 4c — Appendix A.2.4
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4.3.7 The Case for Difference in Firm Size
Most studies in accounting and finance, study the relations between informa-
tion environment using the market equity as a measure of firm size [129, 54].
This is a problem, especially when regulatory size as defined by the US
government categorizes firms based on the number of employees22. This dis-
tinction is important to consider as the regulatory cost of small-medium en-
terprises (<500 emp.) is not expected to be the same as large firms, therefore
the compliance cost of small firms is expected to be different (i.e. higher) [63].
A firm’s information environment is partly formed by mandatory disclosures
which is regulatory requirement. SOX is part of that mandatory-requirement
regime. This study divides the sample firms into smaller sub-samples with
firms that are (i.) regulatorily ‘large’ (with >500 emp.) and (ii.) firms that
are regulatorily SME (<500 emp.). Since all firms in the sample are listed
in the US stock markets (NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ) the assumptions
are — (a.) the regulatory framework is uniform although the cost might be
different, (b.) insiders are self-serving23, and (c.) investors are risk-averse
and have uniform expectations.
One of the key argument for this size distinction is that — firms are not
expected to change their disclosure behavior solely because of the fluctuations
in the market equity as determined by the stock market, but a regulatory
requirement including measure of size as understood by the government can
be expected to have a cost. Therefore, in this section the information en-
vironment of hi-tech firms (Pharmaceuticals, etc.) are explored with News
Articles as the key explanatory variable with the imposition of size factor to
the dataset in all three time period as identified earlier.
4.3.7.1 Firm Size & News Articles
In Table 4d and 4e the GLS-RE estimates the liquidity based information
environment model with (i.) relative bid-ask spread ratio and (ii.) absolute
average bid-ask spread ratio as dependent variable. The basic econometric
models for large and SME asset portfolios is given below:
22Firms are categorized as Large when they exceed 500 employees. Conversely the
small-medium enterprises (SME) are the ones with less than 500 employees.
23The hypothesis is that insiders of small-medium enterprises would want to improve
the information environment by providing more information as compared to a large firm
so that they can attract more analysts, diversify the investors base and lower the risk of
extreme volatility.
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Yi,t + υi + εi,t; If, Empi,t > 500...(9)




Yi,t+υi+εi,t; If, EMPi,t < 500...(10)
Empi,t is the number of annual employees of firm i in year t from the
Compustat database
In Table 4d the estimates are presented for the regulatorily large firms in all
three time period. In the Panel i. assumption is that there is no impact of
the regulatory reforms on the information environment as explained by the
News Articles, i.e. the hypothesis is, no impact of News Articles in explaining
the liquidity measure, and even if the alternate hypothesis is correct, then
there is no change that happened after the regulatory reforms of Reg FD and
SOX.
In all four models of Panel i. (see i. ii. iii. and iv.) the News is found to
have a statistically significant effect (p-value<0.05) with negative coefficient.
It means that, with 1% increase in news articles the bid-ask spread (average of
relative SR. i. and absolute S. iii.) reduces by 32%. However, this evidence
does not follow through when the assumption is of ‘no-impact’ because of
regulatory reforms dropped.
In the Panel ii. the empirical evidence is tabulated of the effect of News
on the information environment for the large firms before the regulatory
reforms 1990-2001. The estimates show that the explanatory power of News
have completely evaporated during this period. None of the estimates, from
the model with information restrictions such as lnEPS, et al. (SR. v. and
S. vii.) or the model with dynamic auto-regressive panel data model (SR. vi.
and S. viii.), are statistically insignificant.
In the period after the regulatory reforms the News appear to have an
improved outlook on its effect on the information environment created by the
liquidity factor of bid-ask spread. With relative bid-ask spread (SR. x.) as
the dependent variable in the dynamic auto-regressive panel data model only
the contemporaneous News have a statistically significant impact (p-value <
0.05). For the model with information factors as restrictions (SR. ix.), lnEPS
and lnV ola is found to be statistically significant but not the News variable.
However, when the absolute bid-ask spread is the dependent variable (S.
xi.), in addition to lnEPS, lnV ola does appear to have a significant effect
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on the information environment. In sum, one can say that the effect of News
articles effect if measured for the whole period 1990-2010 would be entirely
misleading. The impact of News is marginally better in the 2002-2010 than
having no-effect before the regulatory reforms in 1990-2001 period, are signs
of improvement.
The estimates of the portfolio with SMEs firms are tabulated in the Table
4e. From the Panel i. it is observable that the ability of News to explain
the liquidity measure of information environment is non-existent especially
for the full period of 1990-2010, for both model with relative bid-ask spread
ratio and average absolute bid-ask spread as dependent variable (see SR. i.
and S. iii.). However, when the dynamic auto-regressive panel data model
are estimated (see SR. ii. and S. iv.) the News in all three time period are
statistically significant (p-value < 0.05). This could be because there are
other information factors, which are not included in the model, that could
better explain the information environment rather than News, at least for
small firms.
In 1990-2001 which is before the regulatory reforms, independent variable
such as lnEPS is found to be statistically significant, rather than News
variable (see SR. v.). In the same period the dynamic auto-regressive panel
data model found that News is statistically significant contemporaneously
and in its second lag (see SR. vi.). When the dependent variable is changed
to average absolute bid-ask spread this evidence is diluted because none of
the variables appear to be significant (see S. vi.). However, the News variable
in the dynamic auto-regressive model that too at the second lag is found to
be statistically significant (see S. viii.).
From the Panel iii. it is observable that News does not fare any better
after the regulatory reforms especially for the small firms. However, other
variables such as volatility variable is found to significant, which reaffirms the
suspicion that there are other explanatory variables that are not included in
the model that could be important towards the explanation of the informa-
tion environment of small firms, just not News variable (see SR. ix. and S.
xi.). Again, news is found to be significant in the dynamic auto-regressive
panel data model with both dependent variables (see SR. x. and S. xii.).
In sum, the evidence from this section goes on to show that News is a
better explanatory variable for large firms and not small firms. Additionally,
the ability of News to explain the information environment have increased
after the regulatory reforms not diminished. However, there are unexplained
variables that could have a better impact on the information environment
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which are not included in the model.
Insert Table 4d — Appendix A.2.5
Insert Table 4e — Appendix A.2.6
4.3.7.2 Firm Size & Analysts Coverage
Despite the importance of researchers with interest in analysts and their
performance in the stock market as information intermediaries [27] there is
hardly any study done on the effectiveness of analysts in having an impact
on the wider information environment with the exceptions of Gintschel &
Markov [115] and Heflin et al. [140]. Even so these studies have ignored
the impact that analysts could have on the information environment by their
ability to uncover ‘new information’. In this section the impact of analyst
converge is explored using the liquidity factors of information environment
using relative bid-ask spread and average absolute bid-ask spread as depen-
dent variables. Analyst’s earnings forecast is used as a measure of Analyst
following of a stock captured for a firm i in the year t. The analysis fur-
ther sub-divides the sample into assets that are there before the regulatory
reforms and after with size being one of the determining factors for them
to be included in the analysis. The determination of size based on the US
governments regulatory measure of size, which is based on the number of
employees (Large > 500 Emp. and SME < 500 Emp.). The below given
econometric model represents the same ideas mathematically;




Yi,t + υi + εi,t; If, Empi,t > 500...(11)




Yi,t + υi + εi,t; If, EMPi,t < 500...(12)
In the Table 4f the GLS-RE estimates of the model number 6 is tabu-
lated where the dependent variables are relative bid-ask spared and average
absolute bid-ask spread. The estimates are for the regulatorily large firms
and the principle explanatory variable is annual logarithmic analyst cover-
age of stocks. In the Panel i. the estimates are calculated for the whole
time period ignoring the effect of the regulatory changes to the information
environment. When the relative bid-ask spread is the dependent variable
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(see SR. i.) the Analysts does appear to have a statistically significant ef-
fect (p-value < 0.05) on the liquidity measure of information. However, in
the dynamic auto-regressive panel data model only the second lag of analyst
following seems to have any significant effect (see S. ii.). This evidence gets
diluted when the dependent variable is average absolute bid-ask spread (S.
iii.). Here the Analyst does not seem to have any impact on the information
environment when many information based factors are placed as restrictions
to the model. Although, the dynamic auto-regressive panel data model does
confirm that the second lag of Analyst coverage is still significant in effecting
the information environment (see S. iv.). This can only mean that persis-
tence and experience of the analysts in following a firm does pay off in the
longer term even though the short term effect are not readily visible.
In the Panel ii. the estimates are tabulated for the large firms before the
regulatory reforms in the information environment. The evidence shows that
the variable Analysts is able to statistically significantly (p-value < 0.05)
explain the liquidity factor of information environment using both depen-
dent variables (SR. v. and S. vii.) and the information restrictions such as
lnEPS et al. The magnitude of the coefficient of Analyst is 0.32 and 0.35
for the respective models which is in fact positive. This can only mean that
a 1% increase in analyst following increases the bid-ask spread by 32% or
35% respectively, thereby contributing to the information asymmetry risk.
However, when the dynamic auto-regressive model is estimated (SR. vi. and
S. viii.) only one model could produce a statistically significant evidence of
Analysts having a significant impact that too at a second lag level.
In the Panel iii. the estimates of the impact of Analysts to the information
environment especially for large firm is tabulated. The evidence show that
the effect Analysts had before the regulatory reforms, has completely been
washed away as there are no significant explanatory factors found that can
explain the information environment (see SR. ix. x. and S. xi. xii.). As
found in the previous sections the variable of volatility is significant in this
model set-up as well.
In the Table 4g the GLS-RE estimates of the asset portfolio of SME firms
are tabulated where the dependent variables are relative bid-ask spread and
average absolute bid-ask spread. The estimates are tabulated for all three
time period, 1990-2010 which is the full sample time period and 1990-2001 is
the before the regulatory reform time period and 2002-2010 is the after the
regulatory reform time period.
From the Panel i. it is observable that for small firms Analysts ability to
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impact the information environment is very weak. Except for the dynamic
auto-regressive model with average absolute bid-ask spread as the dependent
variable (see S. iv.) no other model has Analysts displaying any significant
impact. Furthermore, in the next Panel (ii.) the evidence does not get any
better for Analysts. Here only the dynamic auto-regressive model could be
estimated before the regulatory reforms because of lack of data (see SR. v.
and S. vi.). The Panel iii. also shows that the ability of Analysts to explain
the information environment using the liquidity measure of bid-ask spread is
not significant (see SR. vii. and S. viii.).
Overall, from this section the evidence points that even though for large
firms Analysts were able to produce ‘new information’ to have an impact on
the information environment, especially before the regulatory reforms, for
small firms the evidence is particularly weak. This is especially true when
the sample time period is dividend between before and after the regulatory
reforms.
Insert Table 4f — Appendix A.2.7
Insert Table 4g — Appendix A.2.8
4.3.8 The Case for ‘New Firm Effect’
In this section a new variation of the previous tests are estimated to find out
how the information from News Articles and Analysts play out with firms
that are ‘new’ and ‘old’.
As noted earlier, the sample firms in this test are from the hi-tech indus-
try such as Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology and Life sciences listed in the
United States. Many researchers such as Amir, Lev, and Sougiannis [9] have
speculated if the financial industry understands such firms and if the analysts
are capable of producing convincing and accurate forecasts because of the ac-
tual and perceived complexities associated with the firms, their products and
services. Therefore, some have argued that even if there are additional “man-
dated” disclosures, the possibility is scant that the information environment
will be any better [155, 202]. In this section, this line of reasoning is exploited
further and hypothesized that firms at different ages have a different ability
or necessity to disclose financial and non-financial information. With that
in mind firms are categorized on the amount of time they have spent in the
stock markets as a determinant of their age and an analysis is done on their
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respective information environment with News and Analysts as explanatory
factors. Therefore the research question is – can news or analysts explain
the information environment, which is measured by the liquidity factor of
bid-ask spread when the firms are newly listed in the stock markets or when
it is in the stock market for a number of years? If so, what are the effects
and how different or similar they are?
To model this idea, the listing year in the stock market (NYSE, AMEX,
NASDAQ) is considered as Y ear0. For the next five consecutive years the
firm is considered to be ‘new’, therefore;
tnewn = Y ear1, Y ear2, Y ear3, Y ear4, Y ear5...(13)
Consequently, the firms that consecutively listed in the stock market for over
5 years are considered to be ‘old’24;
toldn = if, n > 5...(14)
After the stock is listed the firms try to grow rapidly wherein they raise
capital in the stock market, hire new employees, bring new products to mar-
kets, clock growing revenue, etc. When the firms grow older in the stock
market it is expected to have achieved a certain level of reputation with its
financial earnings and stock performance and several other factors. There-
fore, the hypothesis in this study is that the information disclosure necessity
and regulatory requirement and cost are very different from the ones that
are in the stock market for at least five years25. The econometric model
to explain the information environment of ‘New Firm Effect’ for News and
Analysts is given below;




Yi,t + υi + εi,t; If, Agei,t < 5...(15)




Yi,t + υi + εi,t; If, Agei,t >= 5...(16)




Yi,t + υi + εi,t; If, Agei,t <= 5...(17)




Yi,t + υi + εi,t; If, Agei,t > 5...(18)
24The firm’s actual age is not factored in, just its listing age because of lack of data.
25The cut off age of five years would appear arbitrary but that amount of time in the
stock market will give a firm a certain maturity time in terms of accounting and stock
market performance. The model has been tested with lower and higher ages with similar
results.
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4.3.8.1 ‘New Firm Effect’ and News Articles
In the Table 4h the GLS-RE estimates are tabulated for the ‘New Firms’ in
all the three time periods as identified in the previous sections. As usual, to
model the information environment two dependent variables are used here,
(i.) the relative bid-ask spread and (ii.) average absolute bid-ask spread. In
the Panel i. the time period for the estimated model is 1990-2010 which is the
full sample period under study. The evidence from this panel, which ignores
the impact of the regulatory reforms on the information environment shows
that News is unable to explain the liquidity measure of bid-ask spread. Which
means that News does not effect the information environment. However, the
only bright side of this panel is that, in the dynamic auto-regressive panel
data model the second lag of News is found to be statistically significant
(p-value < 0.05) (see SR. ii.).
In the Panel ii. the story does not see any improvement. Here the esti-
mates are for the effect News have had before the regulatory reforms on the
information environment just for the new firms. As it turn out, very little
impact. The estimates on three out of four model in this time period is not
statistically significant (SR. v. and S. vii. viii.). The only model that has a
statistically significant for the News is the dynamic auto-regressive panel data
model (see SR. vi.) with relative spread ratio as the dependent variable with
-0.18 as the magnitude of the coefficient. The coefficient of determination or
the R2 is found to be only 13.1%.
In the last panel of this table (Panel iii.), the estimates are for the time
period after the implementation of the regulatory reforms Reg FD and SOX.
The evidence does not show any improvement (see SR. ix. and S. x.). Which
leads to the overall conclusion from this section that News for the ‘New Firms’
does not have any statistical impact on the liquidity measure of information
environment. It means that News does not produces enough new information
for the market to lower the information asymmetry risk.
Next, in Table 4i. the estimates of the firms that are modeled to be ‘Old
Firms’ are tabulated. From the Panel i. two things are observable, first is
that news have an explanatory power in the time series dynamic model in all
lags (see SR. ii and S. iv.). However, this power is lost with the imposition
of other information intermediary control variables whereas market makers
and volatility are found to be statistically significant (see SR. i and S. iii.).
From the Panel ii. the period before the regulatory reforms, the overall
significance of News has further reduced. In the dynamic auto-regressive
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panel data model with relative spread ratio as the dependent variable (SR.
vi.) only the contemporaneous and the second lag of News variable is found
to be significant. In the other model with information controls, lnEPS is
found to have a significant impact on the information environment (SR. v.).
In the final panel of this section, since the regulatory reforms the ability
of News to impact the information environment has marginally improved
than before the regulatory reforms (see SR. x. and S. xii.). However, there
could be other reasons for this effect where exogenous technological changes
and updates can’t be completely ruled out. Overall one can deduce from this
section that News have a better ability of impact the information environment
if the firms are old and mature in the stock market because the evidence from
the ‘New Firms’ is abysmal to say the least.
Insert Table 4h — Appendix A.2.9
Insert Table 4i — Appendix A.2.10
4.3.8.2 ‘New Firm Effect’ and Analysts
In this section the impact Analysts have over the information environment
on ‘New Firms’ and the ‘Old Firms’ will be explored. In the Table 4j. the
information environment of the ‘New Firms’ is explored in three time periods
— 1990-2010, 1990-2001 and 2002-2010. Due to the lack to sufficient data
only the dynamic auto-regressive panel model is estimated in the Table 4j.
In the Panel i. Analysts in models with relative spread ratio and average
absolute bid-ask spread as dependent variables are found to be significant
at the second lag level (SR. i. and S. ii.). The evidence in the Panel ii.
gets better and the Analysts are able to explain the information environ-
ment formed by the liquidity measure of relative bid-ask spread (SR. iii.).
However, the alternate model of average absolute bid-ask spread dilutes the
evidence wherein Analysts are significantly explaining the information envi-
ronment (S. iv.). In the panel iii. where the models are estimated after the
regulatory reforms, the evidence of Analysts having an impact on the infor-
mation gets inconsistent. One model with dependent variable as relative bid
ask spread (SR. v.) shows that Analysts are able to explain the contempo-
rary information information with all three time series variables. However,
with average absolute bid-ask spread as dependent variable (S. vi.) Analysts
do not show any effect whatsoever. At best the evidence is weak and unclear
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for the impact of Analysts on the information environment for New Firms
both before and after the regulatory reforms.
In the Table 4k the GLS-RE estimates of Analysts impact on the infor-
mation environment of the ‘Old Firms’ are tabulated. The results from Panel
i. shows that from three out of four model estimates Analysts do not have
any statistically significant impact on the liquidity measure of information
environment (see SR. i. ii. and S. iii.). However, when the average absolute
bid-ask spread is used as a dependent variable the Analysts and its first lag
are significant (S. iv.).
The Panel ii. and Panel iii. of the same table shows even less evidence of
the Analysts having any explanatory power when it comes to the older and
mature firms in contributing to the information environment.
Overall, this set of two tables show that Analysts had some explanatory
power for new firms especially before the regulatory reforms were enacted
because of the discriminatory policy of allowing firms to provide private in-
formation to few analysts. Since the implementation of Reg FD, the effect of
Analysts have significant gone down. This is an evidence in favor of the reg-
ulation that it is in fact democratizing the information environment rather
than letting it to be monopolized by a few Analysts.
Insert Table 4j — Appendix A.2.11
Insert Table 4k — Appendix A.2.12
4.3.9 The Case for Causality
Lang and Lundholm [164] have argued in their study whilst presenting ev-
idence that analysts have an incentive to follow firms with higher quality
of disclosures, which allows for more number of analyst following for firms
with robust disclosure policy. If one assumes there is a linear relationship
between the disclosures of firms and News Articles it produces, there can
there be a relationship between News and Analysts, causal or otherwise? In
this section, this line of reasoning is explored further to test if there is a
causal relationship between News and Analysts following.
The case for a causal relation26 rests on two different studies. The first
study by Lang and Lundholm [164] which argues “firms with more infor-
26At first, in order to find if there exists any co-integration between the variable News
and Analysts an Engle-Granger Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for co-integration is per-
formed [96]. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test with a single lag of the residuals without
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mative disclosure policies have a larger analyst following” (pp. 467). Since
they study the disclosure policy of American firms using a database that no
longer exists (FAF reports) and the methodology of scoring the disclosure
by this report is unclear or unknown, there lies a heavy burden on the real
causal relation between information and any subsequent analyst following
because of the technological changes in information technology and overall
ways in which news travel in stock markets. Moreover, the FAF reports are
only used to score the published data from the firms such as quarterly re-
ports, press releases and proxy statements [164] (pp. 468) which are under
the managements discretion and therefore subject to manipulations in their
benefit.
The second study is by Barth Kasznik and McNichols [21], they studied
the incentives of the analysts to follow or un-follow firms and found that
analysts follow firms that have higher investments in research and develop-
ment which means that the decision to follow firms are based on the firm’s
intangible-intensiveness. This argument presents a contrarian perspective on
the causality of the source of information and the decision of the Analysts
to follow them. This study therefore explores the causal relation between
the real information coming out of the firms through the News reports and
Analyst’s decision to follow the firms.
Granger causality test27 has been quite a popular choice of methodology
used to test the causal relationship between two panel data variables. Below
mentioned is the basic econometric framework for the test;
lnNewsi,t = α + lnNewsi,t−1 + lnAFi,t−1 + υi + εi,t...(19)
lnAFi,t = α + lnNewsi,t−1 + lnAFi,t−1 + υi + εi,t...(20)
In this Vector Auto-regressive Model (VAR), which is an extension of the
Granger’s unidirectional causality test, assumes to have two panel data vari-
ables — lnNewsi,t and lnAFi,t, where the potential causal relationship be-
tween the variables is in question. The following procedure is fundamental
to the Granger causality test running from LnNews to lnAF [128]: if, while
trend [231] (pp. 695) shows that the residuals are stationary. This could only indicate that
the variables are in fact co-integrated. Please note, additional tests such as Johansen [153]
could not be performed for further evidence of co-integration as the test is not suitable for
an unbalanced panel dataset as has been used in this study.
27For detailed information see Granger [121] and Sims [222].
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controlling for other information contained in the past (lagged) values of
lnAFi,t−1, lagged values of lnNewsi,t−1 add significantly to the current ex-
planation of lnAFi,t, then lnNews is said to be the Granger’s cause for lnAF .
Another test symmetric to the previous could be performed to test for causal-
ity running from lnAF to lnNews. If the finding shows that any one of these
relationship is true, it provides support for unilateral causation. However,
if the causality from both sides is found to be true then it is a support for
a bilateral relationship. If neither relationship is found then the evidence
would suggests that there is no relationship between the variables.
For this section the assumption is that News Articles captures the essence
of the information environment created by the firm through its mandatory
and voluntary disclosures along with soft disclosures, which are characterized
by ‘cheap talk’28. Additionally, the causal relation is analyzed within the
framework of the regulatory changes that happened with the implementation
of Reg FD and SOX.
From the previous results in the chapter it is evident that there is a struc-
tural break in the information environment around the year 2002 therefore
the time period is sub-divided for the comparison of before-and-after the im-
plementation of regulatory reforms of Reg FD and SOX. That creates time
periods of causal tests based on time period of 1990-2010, 1990-2001 and
2002-2010.
In the Table 4l the GLS-RE estimates of Granger causality test are tab-
ulated. Estimates from the Panel i. shows the lagged News significantly
effects the News in the current time period in all sub-periods. However, the
coefficients of Analysts is only significantly different from zero in the time
period after the regulatory reforms. From the Panel ii. when the dependent
variable is the Analysts, the coefficients show that lagged value of Analysts
and News are both significant in all the sub-periods of estimation. Therefore,
overall the evidence shows a clear benefit of the regulatory reforms since 2002.
To elaborate, when the disclosure regime was discriminatory before the im-
plementation of the regulatory reforms especially Reg FD wherein selective
disclosure is outlawed, as soon as information is available to the Analysts it
reaches the News as well, which was absent before the implementation of the
regulatory reforms.
Insert Table 4l — Appendix A.2.13
28See Gigler [114] for more information about ‘Cheap Talk’ models.
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4.3.10 Robustness Check
The robustness of a models are checked with implementing alternative es-
timation procedures such GLS-Fixed Effect and 2SLS29. Obviously, the as-
sumptions of the model changes with each of the estimation methodology.
Nevertheless general conclusion from the additional estimates are found to
be inline with the conclusions reached here in the analysis. Additionally all
model assumptions such as a White test of heteroscedasticity [250] is per-
formed on the models and the results are found to be robust.
4.4 Discussion
Change in any regulation or enactment of new laws with the same inten-
tion always causes concerns to the investors and uncertainties in the market.
Regulatory framework of a country or a state is a macroeconomic intangi-
ble therefore any changes to it is a potential risk in terms of expertise and
expenses. Reg FD and SOX were two significant regulation and legislation
respectively that had an impact on the information environment of the US
stock markets. In this study the liquidity measure of bid-ask spread is used
to model the information environment. To explain the information environ-
ment two information intermediaries are used — (i.) the first is News Articles
from the Factiva database and (ii.) the second is the number of Analysts fol-
lowing a firm calculated using the earnings forecast put out by the Analysts
collected from the I/B/E/S database.
Looking at the content of the News Articles it is not surprising that there
is a decreasing dependence on financial figures (See Appendix B.2.5.1 – Graph
1 and B.2.5.2 – Graph 2). From the investors point of view they cannot wait
until the firms produce financial reports and then make decisions about their
investments in firms. With the advancements of new technologies during the
sample period and emergence of new platforms of News gathering it is quite
evident that information in the News itself is becoming more focused on the
intangible side of the firms. By modeling the liquidity measure of bid-ask
spread using News as an explanatory variable the evidence shows negative
and statistically significant coefficients, which means that News is able to
reduce information asymmetry. Plainly put, it means that News Articles are
29The estimates are not reported in the interest of space. They are available from the
author on request.
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able to produce ‘new information’.
Many papers have studied the impact of Analysts on the information en-
vironment especially after the regulatory reforms [140]. Analysts use their
research and networking skills to produce information that they sell for a
fee to their clients in the form of Analyst reports, forecasts and stock rec-
ommendations. Based on that information certain investors make financial
decisions which are informative to the smaller investors who don’t have ac-
cess to these forecasts and recommendations. Using the liquidity measure
of bid-ask spread this study finds that the analysts do have an impact on
the information environment, although the evidence is stronger in the years
before 2001, when Reg FD and SOX have not yet been implemented. Does
this mean that analysts produced previously unknown ‘new information’ for
the general benefit of the entire market? The evidence from this study under
the assumptions inherent in the model, the estimation process and with due
caution, yes.
However, the information environment have had a significant change since
the implementation of Reg FD in 2000 and SOX in 2002. The information
environment became bimodal, at least for pharmaceuticals, biotechnology
and life science, and there is no reason not to expect the same for other
sectors and industries because these regulatory and legislative changes are
uniform throughout. Previous studies [3] have found that analysts forecast
have become less reliable since the implementation of Reg FD. This study
finds that the impact of Analysts following the firm’s have also declined since
the regulatory reforms. It basically means that the ability of an analysts
covering a new firm to uncover ‘new information’ have declined since the
regulatory reforms.
Most studies in accounting and finance use the market equity ME as the
indicator of size of the firm. For this study the US regulatory indicator of
size — the number of employees has been used as a measure of firm size.
The simple reason for this classification is that, market equity is volatile and
dependent on current financial position and future strategic outlook of the
firm, therefore a sustainable and plausible way of forming company’s disclo-
sure policy is guided by regulatory requirements [88]. The results from the
study show that News Articles have an impact on the information environ-
ment only when the firms are large, and most effectively after the imple-
mentation of Reg FD and SOX. For SMEs the evidence is weaker. However,
for smaller firms, Analysts have a significant impact, especially before the
implementation of Reg FD and SOX. For large firm analysts do not have an
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impact.
Furthermore, this study explored the information environment of firms
based on their age. In this chapter it is called the ‘New Firm Effect’. The age
is determined by time a firm has spent listed in a stock market. For example,
in the first five years of a public listing the firm is considered to be a ‘New
Firm’. In the Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology and Life Sciences sectors most
firms are under pressure to go public as soon as possible to raise capital so
that the investors can hedge risks and diversify. The results indicate that
News Articles produces ‘new information’ for the large firms and its evident
that they are able to reduce information asymmetry. However, for SMEs the
evidence is weak, i.e. News Articles do not produce enough ‘new information’.
When it comes to the information environment of New Firms as modeled
by the Analysts, for SMEs they are able to produce ‘new information’ for the
market. However, the information impact of Analysts for the large firms are
weak and uncertain. Also, after the implementation of Reg FD and SOX,
the ability of analysts to produce new information has been visibly reduced,
as noted in previous sections [3].
Finally, in a bi-variate analysis, this study finds that News Articles and
Analysts following have a causal relationship. This analysis is made pos-
sible by using a Granger causality test [121]. The evidence shows that, as
more and more analysts follow firms, the insiders are compelled to produce
more information that is then consumed by the News Articles. Therefore,
according to this study the causal direction of information is from Analysts
to News. That raises some doubts about the findings of Lang and Lundholm
[164] wherein they used an industry data on the quantification of qualitative
data of firms and claimed that Analysts follow firms that produces superior
quality disclosures. Evidence from this study shows that company insiders
are producing more information because more analysts are following their
firm and demanding additional data, and since there is a regulation against
selective disclosure, the information becomes public leading to News Articles.
This result therefore confirms and adds to the evidence from previous studies
by Barth, Kasznik and McNichols’s [21] and Walker and Tsalta’s [247] study
of UK based firms in a different setting.
Overall the benefits of implementing Reg FD and SOX are quite visible
from this study. The information environment with the help of News and
other types of new media platforms has become, post these regulatory and
legislative reforms, more open and accessible to a large number of investors
which is expected to disproportionately benefit the small investors.
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4.5 Conclusion
The focus of this chapter is information regulatory regime which is a macroe-
conomic intangible. Any change in the regulatory regime is a potential risk
to the investors. The main question this study tried to answer is: what
did Reg FD and SOX do to the information environment of the firms op-
erating in the Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology and Life Sciences sectors in
the United States? The firms in these sectors are known to invest heav-
ily in structural intangibles such as RND. Using the liquidity measure of
bid-ask spread as proxy for information asymmetry, this chapter studied the
information environment using News and Analysts. Both these variables are
exogenous information intermediaries. The evidence from this chapter shows
that since the regulatory reforms of Reg FD and SOX there is a structural
break in the information environment. It means the ability of Analysts and
News to influence the information environment have changed forever. Com-
paratively, the impact of Analysts has diminished and News has increased,
albeit marginally. Finally, the study finds an unidirectional causal relation





In this chapter1 a new theory is presented in support of organizational
capital. A firm needs two types of basic inputs – (i.) tangible capital2 and
(ii.) intangible capital3. This chapter focuses on a third type of input called
(iii.) organizational capital. This term has been fluttering around in the
academic literature, especially in management sciences without any clear di-
rection or purpose [156]. Here in this chapter, an attempt has been made
1Previous version(s) of this chapter have been presented at the 11th International Ac-
counting Conference held in Kolkata, India on 5 - 6 January, 2013, 8th Interdisciplinary
Workshop on Intangibles, Intellectual Capital & Extra-Financial Information in Greno-
ble, France on September, 27 - 28, 2012, and Giornata in Ricordo del Professor Antonio
d’Atri, a dieci anni dalla sua scomparsa, a workshop held in University of Ferrara, Italy
on November, 30, 2012. The feedback and suggestions from the participants is gratefully
acknowledged. Special thanks to the respective session chairs Prof. Ashok Banerjee, Dean,
Academics, Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, Kolkata, India, Prof. Yosra Be´jar,
Institut Mines Telecom, Paris, France, Prof. Salvatore Madonna, University of Ferrara
and Prof. Paolo Andrei, University of Parma for their valuable feedback.
2Widely known and commonly accepted tangibles capital is investments in property,
plant and equipments.
3Numerous studies [119, 142, 185, 169] have highlighted that firms need intangible
capital as inputs, which are in the form of human resources, trade secrets, trademarks,
patents, and other forms of intellectual properties. Additionally, a distinction is made by
using the term intangible and intangible capital.. Intangibles — is a super-set of all types
of intangibles, intellectual capital and human resources, treated not only as an asset but
also as risks. By using the term intangible capital the study refers to the asset inputs that
are intangible by nature.
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to renew the definition of ‘organizational’ capital primarily to address two
problems: (a.) to provide suitable measurement variables as it is necessary
in financial accounting and economics literature by taking a uniquely func-
tionalist view, and (b) to provide an utilitarian framework to understand
organizational capital which was previously known for the crude generaliza-
tions found commonly in the management sciences or strategic management
literature [203, 230].
The main thesis of this chapter is this — if there is such a thing called
‘organizational capital’ then it must have an impact on the ability of an as-
set to generate cash streams, given there is a method to credibly measure it.
Since organizational capital is a fluid concept in the management sciences4,
the measurement has been almost non-existent. However, in financial ac-
counting attempts have been made to measure organizational capital, most
prominently by the paper of Lev and Radhakrishnan [171].
The theory presented in this chapter argues that organizational capital
is essentially an endogenous productive efficiency factor created within the
boundaries of the firm and idiosyncratic because of its people, material and
strategy. Stated another way, in a financial time period the productive ef-
ficiency with which a firm employs all its resources to produce an optimal
output, if found to produce the same output in the next period, with some
variations which constitutes its riskiness, is called the organizational capital.
This makes the productive efficiency, a combined product of its tangibles
resources, intangibles resources, the training and knowledge of its human
resources and their combined effort in a competitive market to achieve the
best possible productive outcome, an organizational capital. Therefore the
most significant question this chapter will try to answer is if this productive
efficiency can be used in explaining the cross-section of returns. This pro-
ductive efficiency5 that is calculated mainly from the output produced in one
time period and if it serves as an input in the next time period, that can be
explained as the assets organizational capital.
The empirical findings from this paper indicates that the organizational
capital can be explained using a measure of its past productive efficiency.
4Everything that cannot be separately identified and credibly measured are generally
attributed to organizational capital [156].
5There are many ways to measure the productive efficiency. As explained later in this
chapter, the productive efficiency models used in this chapter are Cash-Flow/Price, Sales
Growth, Asset Productivity, Tobin’s Q, Investment Growth and Profitability (Return on
Assets).
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The sales growth is found to be the best measure of this productive efficiency.
The result is very intuitive because by growth in sales it normally means that
the asset is acquiring new cash flow sources or efficiently using its existing
one. In either case, it demonstrates that the firm’s collective performance is
improving with respective to the previous one.
In the following section (5.2), the background of the literature is pre-
sented, followed by the section (5.3) in which the model to capture orga-
nizational capital is developed. The next section (5.4) provides the details
about the data and portfolio formation methodology. Additionally, that sec-
tion (5.4 contd.) will summarize the various empirical models and estimates.
The last section (5.5) will close with some conclusions remarks.
5.2 Background
5.2.1 Theoretical Framework
Assuming perfect foresight an investor buys into a stream of cash flow by
“choosing the most desirable time shape” [107]. When the assumption of
perfect foresight is dropped, the risk to the projected cash flow stream is in
it’s variation. This variation in the cash flow stream is dependent on the
asset inputs, both tangible and intangible. This study models a third input
factor that could have an effect on the cash flow variability — here it is called
organizational capital.
At an asset level there could be many idiosyncrasies because of the tangi-
ble and intangible inputs that could be a reason for the risks associated with
the projected cash flow streams. Many financial economists since Markowitz
[182] have argued that with ‘diversification’ of portfolios all idiosyncratic risks
can be eliminated and then the investor can just worry about the system-
atic risk. This view has been most forcefully argued using the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM) by Sharpe [221], Lintner [179] and Mossin [192]. Ide-
ally in this scenario the maximum risk to the investment portfolio of present
value of expected returns E(R˜i) can be benchmarked to the risk-free US
treasury bonds6. However, empirical literature does not support these theo-
6Early literature theorized that returns are stochastic and therefore unpredictable,
which is an inference from the efficient market hypothesis and the theory of random walk
[100]. Later on, some financial economists found that returns are partially predictable
using publicly available data such as Market Value (size) [17, 101], Price/Equity ratio
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retical predictions of absolute diversification, even at a portfolio level [111].
Therefore, it is critically important to understand all types of idiosyncratic
risks associated with portfolio assets, one such risk is organizational capital.
Organizational capital has been a subject of interest in the management
science literature7 but sufficient attention has not been given to it in the
financial accounting and economics literature. The key problem lies in the
inability of researchers in measuring organizational capital. It is because the
definition organizational capital, especially in the financial accounting and
economics literature is vague to say the least. To address this problem Lev
and Radhakrishnan [171] proposed publicly available selling, general and ad-
ministrative (SGA) expenses as a measure of the “firm-specific organizational
capital.” This view hinges on the incentives of the insiders that are tied to
their compensation. The main shortcoming of this view is that it argues
organizational capital is wholly dependent on a firm’s human capital.
This is clearly not a sufficient definition for a much wider concept of
organizational capital because of a simple reason – human resource alone
is not a measure of an assets organizational capital. This chapter argues
that organizational capital lies in the ability of an asset to create a level
of productive efficiency with its tangible, intangible, human and strategic
performance. This efficiency of performance reflects in the ability of an asset
to benefit from its tangible, intangible, human and strategic resources to
endogenously create organizational capital and impact the variation of the
cash flow streams.
5.2.2 Organizational Capital
The idea of “organization capital” — an intangible that describes the all en-
compassing unmeasured non-financial resource is a fairly recent one. Prior to
this study many researchers have tried to visualize or measure the phenomena
in very many ways.
[22], Leverage [29], etc. A critique on the entire debate on efficient market hypothesis is
found in Malkiel [180].
7Pioneering work by Penrose [203] in the filed of Strategic Management laid down the
founding principles of Resource-Based View of the firm. In her view, a firm should not only
be viewed as “bundle of productive resources”, but its economic performance depends on
the “administrative framework”. This Resource-Based View has been further developed
by Barney [18] and Porter [204].
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Prescott and Visscher [205] argued in favor of considering “information”8
as the most significant organizational capital. Hall [133, 132] treats the pro-
ductivity achieved by the college educated and non-college educated human
resources as a form of organizational capital naming it “e-capital”.
Black & Lynch [33] argued that a firm’s human capital development pro-
grammes (training, work design and employee voice) could be the factors
that produces organizational capital.
Organizational theorists such as Spender [230] argued for Organizational
Capital to be treated as a “social good” available to firms in the form of a
“soft” capital that is allocated by its managers”. Similarly, Carlin et al. [53]
argued that a firm’s organizational capital can be explained by its intrafirm
communications. They theoretically show that “richer internal language have
lower employee turnover.”
Atkeson & Kehoe [14] have argued that organizational capital is a “plant-
specific capital good” and a result of its endogenous operations over the years
that builds up plant specific “knowledge” that is measurable and transferable
and from this the owners extracts rents in the future once an investment has
been made in the past.
Other views on Organizational Capital are as a result of a firm’s idiosyn-
cratic human capital [117] and/or as a result of its intellectual capital [154].
van Rens [242] argued that the organizational capital is a simple matter of
fluctuating labor cost management.
Last but not least, Lev and Radhakrishnan [171] have proposed that a
firm’s organizational capital can be measured by the accounting disclosure
of Selling, General and Administrative expenses (SGA). This measure of
organizational capital is further explored by Papanikolaou & Eisfeldt [201]
arguing broadly that the organizational capital is “embodied in the firm’s
key employees.” Needless to say, this chapter sees organizational capital
differently.
The main thesis of this chapter is — organizational capital is not a “capi-
tal” in its traditional sense but it is a stochastic productivity efficiency shock
to the future performance measurable using the fundamentals of the asset
performance variables. This type of capital is a result of the management’s in-
vestment strategy, marketing and selling capability and its employee’s train-
ing, knowledge, efficiency and ingenuity in allocating tangible and intangible
8The paper modeled the information about its ‘personnel’ as a measure of organiza-
tional capital.
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resources to produce the most efficient cash generating output.
5.2.3 Cross Section of Risk & Return
The main goal of the asset pricing literature is to explain the stochastic re-
turns (Rt) of a security. In that endeavor, CAPM is one of the most important
contribution by [221], Lintner [179], Mossin [192] and Black [31]. They pos-
tulate that the returns can be best explained by the covariance of assets (Ri)
and the market (Rm) divided by the variance of the market
9 which measures
the systematic risk to each individual asset assuming absolute diversification
of idiosyncratic risks.
This model was found to be deficient in the face of mounting evidence
[101, 102, 52] and there are other factors that could better explain asset
returns. The idea that the stochastic returns can be explained by factors
other than that by the systematic risk represented by the market beta found
initial evidence as early as in 1968 through the paper of Fama & Babiak
[97], although the findings were based on very weak theoretical foundations.
Later Basu [22] found similar evidence using earnings-to-price ratio and then
Banz [17] using size as one of the factors that can explain the risk-adjusted
returns. Bhandari [29] showed that debt-to-equity ratio is also related to
the returns, controlling for beta and asset size. Fama & French [101, 102]
made a significant contribution to the financial accounting literature with
their papers in which they explained the futility of using market beta and
produced explanatory variables based on size and book-to-market equity that
mimic the underlying risk-return relationship of the securities.
Gradually the focus shifted to additional factors that could explain the
cross section of stock returns. Key among others was the interest in intangi-
bles, as it’s importance started growing in the market equity [169]. Interest-
ingly, Chan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis [56] found in their empirical study
that securities that invest in RND, and those who do not, have similar risk-
adjusted returns. In fact, the market seemed to be skeptical of asset that
invests heavily in RND. Some researchers have argued that this could be an
indication of a systematic ‘mispricing’ [65] or that these assets are inherently
risky because of the uncertainty associated with the investment10.
9The βis given as: β = cov(Ri,Rm)
var(Rm)
;where Rit = α+ βRm + εit
10Evidence from United Kingdom [5] also show that RND explains the cross section of
returns when RND is capitalized and amortized for the purpose of the study [56].
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Some advances have also been made in the field of organizational capital
in its role in explaining the cross-section of asset prices. Lev and Radhakr-
ishnan [171] promoted the idea that SGA could be used as a measure for
organizational capital11. Taking the analysis further Papanikolaou & Eis-
feldt [201] modeled organizational capital using the SGA and argued that
“key employees” of a firm are responsible. Their evidence shows that firms
with higher investments in their “organizational capital” (SG&A) is more
risky than the firms with more physical (tangible) capital.
This paper therefore attempts to join the two threads of literature, or-
ganizational capital and asset pricing [69], and hypothesizes using a new
model, that this unique type of resource/asset could be employed to explain
the cross-section of risk-adjusted returns.
5.3 Model
This chapter attempts to derive a new model to explain the organizational
capital. From the onset it must be made clear that a firm’s intangible capital
or human capital is not the same as its organizational capital. Obviously
there could be bidirectional synergies, but the same can be argued in favor
of tangible capital12.
11This study differs from the insight of Lev and Radhakrishnan [171] into SG&A, which
arguably encapsulates an assets organizational capital. The main reason behind the dis-
agreement is that — SGA is used to expense all human resource related costs of a firm.
Obviously human resource expense alone cannot be a measure of organizational capital
since human resource themselves are classified as a separate input for the firm. Therefore,
one can argue that human resource can be treated either as an input on a stand alone
basis and their contribution can be measured by the per-capita expense of SGA by the
firm or be considered as a organizational capital. The argument on considering human
resource is still weak because organizational capital can be achieved not only by human
resources, but strategic placement of a factory in a cheaper cost country, a brand de-
velopment, marketing and selling techniques or a unique distribution system, and many
more such examples can be given that could go on to explain that none of these can be
achieved by human resources expenses alone. Therefore an alternate definition is needed
to visualize and subsequently measure organizational capital.
12A firm could benefit from its strategic placement of factories, shops, retailers, etc.
which are all tangible investments but benefit from the intangible geographic closeness to
their customers, suppliers, etc. These strategic decisions have impact on the cost of labor,
capital, supply-chain and other organizational needs that could have an impact the firm’s
performance efficiency.
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Take an example of a firm XYZ, Inc. in a two period setting (in discrete
time). The firm sets-up its business at a time period t0 produces first output
at t1 and second output at t2. For the sake of simplicity assume that the firm
is financed using only equity13 and it is liquidated at t2 and return funds to
the equity holders.
At time t0 the firm XYZ, Inc. invests in tangible assets in the form of
property, plant and equipment and hires human capital (mangers and asso-
ciates) to run the business on behalf of the stockholders which is expensed
through SGA14. The expense of RND between the time period t0and t1 de-
velops the structural intangibles, such as patents, trademarks, etc. SGA
expenses is mostly in lieu of services provided to the firm by people, both in-
ternally and externally. The combination of the intangible capital and human
capital creates tacit knowledge, know-how and other such ‘soft’ intangibles.
An output is produced (yt) at time t1 with the productive efficiency %. In
the next time period the firm again invests in tangibles, or amortize pre-
vious investments. The firm then incurs expenses towards intangibles and
also bring forward the productive efficiency from the previous time period
in the form of organizational capital. Therefore, the organizational capital
is argued to be the endogenous productive efficiency of the asset by using
the tangible capital, intangible capital and the ability of its human resources
to coordinate all the available inputs to produce an optimal output in the
time period t21. This performance efficiency when used as a model input in
the next time period could be termed as organizational capital. This organi-
zational capital can be measured using a number of performance indicators
and statistically it is assumed to be stochastic, independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.). Another way to put it, the organizational capital is a
result of the investments and sunk expenses of the previous time period, the
productive efficiency benefits which are enjoyed by the firm in the present
time period15 if all the assets16 are available from the previous time period
13Debts involves legal liens on the assets of the firms in the face of liquidation, unnec-
essarily increasing the complexity of the economic model.
14Managers and associate’s compensation is included in the SGA expenses which are
payable at time t1.
15Note that in the next time period the expectations [E(Rt+2)] can readjust based on
the current output, the availability of the managers (since they can leave the firm or let go
based on their performance or the organizational needs) and the investments in intangibles
and the resulting organizational efficiency produced by the firm.
16Its tangible assets could be sold off and intangible capital in the form of SGA and RND
could be realized as inefficient or wasteful because of an exogenous technology shock (new
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to the present time period t2.
The economic model can be expressed mathematically using the below
mentioned Cobb-Douglas production function. Here, the output (yt) of a
firm is the function (f) of labor (Lt) and capital (Kt). Some recent papers
[178, 201, 80, 53, 14, 56] have argued that firms invest in intangible capital
(KIt ) along with tangible capital (K
T
t ) that contributes to the output. This
paper postulates that a firm’s inputs are not only the result of tangible
capital, intangible capital and labor but also a stochastic “organizational
capital” (%t) that is produced by the performance efficiency shock measured
using the accounting fundamentals from the previous time period. Therefore,







θ is the exogenous technology shock with i.i.d distribution; θ ∼
N(0, σ2θ) (assumed constant because of the lack of data)
It is difficult to visualize, measure, transfer, store or sell when organizational
capital is not in productive use[257]. However, in this study the organi-
zational capital is measured as the function of its productive efficiency17
measured by — Sales Growth, Profitability (ROA), Productivity (Sale/BE),
Cash Flow (CF/P) and Tobin’s Q. Therefore, the organizational capital, in






The data for this study is collected primarily from two sources, (i) Standard
& Poor’s Compustat database [73], and (ii) The Center for Research in Secu-
rity Prices database (CRSP) [79], both available at Wharton Research Data
technology or management know-how) therefore not contributing to the firm’s output.
17The same investing principles apply when the asset is a portfolio instead of an indi-
vidual firm.
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Services (WRDS)18 website [254]. The firms are listed in the three main
stock exchanges of United States, (a) New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),
(b) American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and, (c) NASDAQ Stock Market
(NASDAQ). Since the study deals with RND expenses the study period is
restricted to 1975-201119.
To avoid survivor bias20 all firms in the Compustat and CRSP databases
are included in the dataset between 1975 and 2011 except for the following
exclusionary criteria. (1) All duplicates observations are removed from the
dataset. (2) All firms that were incorporated in countries other than the
United States are deleted. (3) All Firms whose fiscal year doesn’t end in
December of each year is eliminated. (4) All firms in the financial and utilities
sector are removed21 from the dataset using the two digit SIC codes22. (5)
All firms that do not have accounting or market data available in one of the
databases, Compustat or CRSP, are also removed from the dataset. (6) Firms
that have just one year of data are removed from the dataset. These selection
criteria leaves the dataset with 7,799 firms and 100,929 annual Compustat
observation years in an unbalanced panel23.
5.4.2 Portfolio Selection Methodology
One of indirect benefits of the 1993 Fama and French paper [102] is, that
it produced for academic researchers a benchmark set of portfolios at the
intersection of Size ME and book-to-market ratio of the assets against which
various asset pricing theories can be tested. With the motive of keeping the
evidence comparable, 25 portfolios are created at the intersection of market
18The access to WRDS is provided by Manchester Business School, United Kingdom
and it is gratefully acknowledged.
19The FASB Statement 2 concerning financial accounting and reporting of RND ex-
penses issued in 1974. According to this statement all financial costs related to RND
should be expensed when incurred. [178]
20Delisted asset returns are included in the dataset for the time period available. The
portfolios are rebalanced to the delisting at the end of the time period.
21Firms in the financial sector are removed because of high leverage concerns [101].
Firms in the utilities sector are removed since the structural and regulatory environment
of such firms are ‘different’ [195].
22Deleted all firms that are in the SIC code range of 4900 - 4999 for utilities and 6000 -
6999 for financial firms.
23Stata/SE 11.2 [77] is used to estimate the parameters, which has the ability to handle
large unbalanced panel dataset.
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equity24 (ME) and book-to-market (BE/ME) in a method similar to Fama
and French paper [102] as explained below in greater detail.
5.4.2.1 Portfolio and Returns
The dependent variable or the regressand used in this study are the risk-
adjusted value-weighted portfolio returns Rp otherwise known as excess port-
folio returns25. The set of 25 portfolios are created at the beginning of July
of year t− 1, using the industry specific26 deciles intersection of ME, which
is calculated in the month of June of year t and BE/ME ratio, which is cal-
culated using the book equity disclosed in the year t−1 divided by ME from
December t− 1. The portfolios are reformed annually at the end of June of
each year to account for the change in size or book-to-market deciles.
Since the study deals with annual fundamentals the returns are calculated
annually between July t − 1 and June of t. The portfolios are based on the
buy-and-hold strategy wherein the contribution of each asset to a portfolio is
100%, the monthly MEi of each individual asset i is averaged between July
of t − 1 and June of t and an aggregate MEp of the portfolio is calculated.
Annual continuously compounded value-weighted returns27 are calculated
using theMEp of the portfolio assets between t−1 and t. An investor worries
only if the returns are unable to exceed the risk free rate, therefore, the
portfolio returns are risk-adjusted by subtracting by annualized one month
treasury interest rate to the value-weighted portfolio returns.
24Market Equity = share outstanding (#shrout) x stock price (#prc), corrected for
stock splits and adjustments.
25The risk-free rate of return is the One Month Treasury interest rate available from the
WRDS database [254].
26The industry classification is based on the Fama and French paper of 1997 [99].
27The value-weighted returns Rp, where the subscript p denotes the portfolio asset is
in the form of natural log of market equity (ME) increment between two time periods
t− 1 and t. There are clear econometric benefits of using a logarithmic returns, for more













5.4.2.2 Fundamental Explanatory Variables
There are two types of model setups that are used in the asset pricing studies,
(a.) that are based on portfolio returns of an asset in time series which are
intended to highlight a specific type of hypothesis such as size, momentum,
etc. [102, 52] and (b.) others are based on the economic fundamentals of the
assets [161]. In this study a set of specific performance based economic factors
are being tested in addition to other fundamental factors already established
in the literature in a cross-sectional model. Return based factors as proposed
by Fama and French [102] such as SBM and HML are not being used because
of the various shortcomings and the perceived lack of clarity associated, as
highlighted by its many critics including Lewellen, Nagel & Shanken [177].
Moreover, the accounting fundamentals have an established history in the
asset pricing literature and any risk loading found in the models can be clearly
associated with those fundamentals to assess its economic importance.
Once the set of 25 portfolios is created at the industry specific deciles of
ME and BE/ME of the each individual assets, the following fundamentals
are created for the same portfolios; (i.) dividend yield, (ii.) earnings-per-
share, (iii.) size ME, (iv.) BE/ME ratio, and (v) RND/BE. Additionally, the
risk-adjusted market return Rm is used as one of the explanatory variable.
The fundamental factors, with the exception of ME, are calculated for
each of the Size-BE/ME portfolio in the year t − 1 so that the variables
can have a lagged effect on the expected returns. In this econometric setup
models are expected to find out the best predictor of the cross-section of
risk-adjusted stock returns. Size ME is the only variable that is calculated
in the year t for each of the portfolios.
Dividends of an asset i is calculated by adding the dividend per share
between July of year t − 1 and June of year t. The dividend per share
between July t − 1 and June t is adjusted for its cash equivalent market
value using the shares outstanding. The dividend yield DY of the portfolio
is calculated by aggregating the assets i in a portfolio p with n assets then
dividing the cash equivalent market value of dividend announced between
July t− 1 and June t by the market equity ME calculated in December t− 1
of the portfolio sorted at the end of June t− 1. The portfolios are reformed





Earnings-by-price ratio is another key variable that has been used in the
models as an independent variable. To calculate the earnings-by-price ratio of
a portfolio, the earnings calculated of an asset i in the year t−1 is aggregated
in the portfolio in which the asset is allocated at the end of June t− 1, it is
divided by market equity of the portfolio from December in the year t − 1.




Size ME and BE/ME ratio are also used as independent variables. Size
ME is the market equity of a portfolio calculated in June of year t by aggre-
gating the market equity of individual assets i sorted in the portfolio p at the
end of June t − 1. Whereas BE/ME is calculated by dividing book equity




Last but not the least, RND is used as an independent variable normalized
by BE. RND of the portfolio is created by adding all the individual RND i
in the year t− 1 to the portfolio p which are sorted on Size-BE/ME deciles.
RND/BE ratio is calculated by dividing RND of the portfolio aggregated in




5.4.2.3 The Market Portfolio
The value-weighted market portfolio is created using all the assets in the
sample including the ones with negative book equity. The value-weighted
monthly returns are annualized between January and December28 of the year
t−1, which is incidentally the fiscal year for all the assets in the sample. The
value-weighted annualized returns is adjusted with the annualized one-month
treasure returns, a measure of risk free asset. To check the robustness of the
market return measure created using the sample assets, it is correlated with
28Note that only those equity assets are in the sample whose financial year end in
December.
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the annualized market return found in the Compustat database 29 using the
Pearson’s correlation. The Pearson correlation coefficient is found to be 93%
with a Spearman’s rho confirmation (p-value < 0.000).
5.4.2.4 Organizational Capital Variables
In addition to the fundamental factors several measures of the hypothesized
organizational capital are used as explanatory variables. There are six main
measures of productive efficiency factors that are used in this study which
are — (a.) Cash Flow ratio30, (b.) Investment Rate31, (c) Productivity32,
(d.) Return on Assets (ROA)33, (e.) Sales Growth34 and (f.) Tobin’s Q35.
29The value-weighted market portfolio return in the Compustat database is under the
header ‘vwmretd’ [73].
30The Cash Flow ratio is calculated by dividing Cash Flow (oibdp#13 - txt#16 -
∆txditc#35 - xint#15 - dvp#19 - dvc#21) calculated in the year t− 1 by Market Equity




31Investment Rate (Physical) is calculated by dividing the Capital Expenditure





32Productivity of the asset is calculated by dividing the Sale (sale#12) in the year t− 1




33Profitability or Return on Assets (ROA) is calculated by dividing Income before Ex-




34Sales Growth is the rate of growth in Sale (sale#12) between the year t − 2 and
t− 1;(Salep,t−1 − Salep,t−2)/Salep,t−2
35Tobin’s Q is calculated by adding Market Equity from Dec in the year t − 1 to the
Book Value of Total Debt (Long term debt dltt#9 + Current Liabilities dlc#34) plus
book value of preferred stocks (pstk#130) minus the Inventories (invt#3) and divide it
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The selection of these six variables as a measure of productive efficiency,
which in turn are factors that represent the theorized organizational capital
might appear random to some extent but all of them have an established
economic rationale in the literature and researchers have devoted significant
time and journal space to these measures36. Therefore, the basic structure
of the econometric asset pricing test is structured as follows:
E(Rt)−Rf = α + β
∑
Xt + γ%t−1 + νt
where,
X is the fundamental factor, for e.g. size, etc.
% is the productive efficiency factor, a measure of organizational
capital, for e.g. cash flow ratio, etc. assumed to be i.i.d distribu-
tion; θ ∼ N(0, σ2θ)
To start with, Cash Flow ratio represents how the free cash flow produced by
the asset with respect to book equity. By using this variable as an explana-
tory factor, the hypothesis that study will test is weather the cash flow with
respect to the book equity of an asset can explain the risk-adjusted variability
of the portfolio returns in addition to other factors that are pre-established
in the literature. Moreover, many papers have explored the role of free cash
flow in issues related to disclosure and corporate governance which makes it
an interesting measure of an assets performance [165, 83, 248].
Investment rate is an unusual measure of performance but quite an effec-
tive one. The theory behind this variable is that an asset will receive renewed
capital investments only when the investors are satisfied with the previous
returns or they expect better future returns, in both cases the investment
itself makes it an indicator of asset performance [238, 178]. Additionally
capital investments are generally considered to be a tangible investment in
most of the cases, therefore this variable will go on to show, if significant
at all, that organizational capital is not just in the domain of unexplained
by the Book Equity (ceq#60 + txditc#35 - pstk#130) from the year t− 1
36It must be noted that there could be other performance measures that could be better
suited to explain the cross-section of stock returns. The emphasis here is on finding
evidence that can justify a theory in which a lagged efficiency measure can improve the
explanation of expected stock returns, that could justify the existence of a much illusive
organizational capital.
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or unmeasurable intangibles as previously imagined in much of management
sciences literature.
Productivity is a much more straight forward measure of productive ef-
ficiency which is measured using sales with respect to the book equity of
an asset. Similarly profitability or ROA is a measure of how well the asset
performs financially.
Sales growth is the rate of growth of sales between two points in time.
Since a lagged variable measure is being used for organizational capital, the
sales growth is calculated between t − 2 and t − 1, which is obtained at
t− 1. This variable is then used to explain the risk-adjusted cross-section of
portfolio returns. Sales growth have been used in the literature, particularly
in the asset pricing to explain the portfolio performance should the stock
selection be based on a ranked sales growth [161] which is a substitute of
momentum-strategy [52], except it is based on the asset fundamentals.
Last but not least, lagged Tobin’s Q have been used as a measure of or-
ganizational capital. Here the Tobin’s Q is calculated by adding the total
debt to the market equity and preferred stock less the inventories, which is
then divided by the book equity, a measure of replacement cost. Obviously
Tobin’s Q has been of interest to researchers with interest in intangibles [244]
because of the unique setup that the ratio provides. The numerator of the Q
ratio gives the market value, that includes a premium on intangibles, which
is normally discounted in the book value because of measurement and re-
porting requirement37 which is calculated for each asset with respect to its
replacement value (book equity). Therefore researchers such as Villalonga
[244] have argued that the ratio provides the performance of the “intangibil-
ity” of an asset, therefore in this study its lagged value is used as a measure
of organizational capital to explain the risk-adjusted expected returns of the
portfolio.
The method of calculating these organizational capital factors are similar
in nature for each individual one. After stock are sorted in 25 industry
specific Size ME and BE/ME deciles portfolios, the factors are then created
by aggregating each fundamentals in its respective time structure for each
portfolio. There are two main reasons of doing this, first is that it removes
the heterogeneity of each single equity asset and focuses on the collective
portfolio based on the Size and BE/ME deciles characteristics, second the
37Investments on structural intangibles and wages of human capital are expensed and
therefore unaccounted for in the book equity.
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investment in each equity asset is 00 per cent38. The efficiency factors are
then calculated in year t−1 for each portfolio based on the aggregated values
of the fundamentals as given in their respective formula.
5.4.3 Estimation Methodology
The asset pricing models are econometrically based on pricing error repre-
sented by the model α and the ‘coefficient of determination’ represented by
R2 in a hypothetical linear model. With a large amount of data there could
therefore be suspicions of data dredging. To avoid this risk, the equity assets
in the sample are divided into 25 portfolios at the intersection of deciles,
sorted on industry median Size (ME) and BE/ME ratio39.
The regression models are estimated using Fama-MacBeth estimation
procedure [103] using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) with White-Huber stan-
dard errors (SE)40. Many researchers have questioned the validity of this
estimation technique and called to implement alternate methods of estima-
tion especially when portfolio returns are being used as an explanatory vari-
able [210, 134, 177] so that the economic interpretations are not diluted
mainly because of inefficient or ineffective econometric tests. Shanken [220]
in his paper advocated for the use of maximum-likelihood estimation method
for the beta-estimation with the correction of SE of Fama-MacBeth [103].
Jagannathan-Wang [151] derived the SE when the assumption of conditional
heteroscedasticity is breached and therefore recommending the use of Gener-
alized Least Square (GLS) estimation method. In addition of Fama-MacBeth
R2FM , asset pricing error αFM the Jagannathan-Wang R
2
JW estimates and
asset pricing error αJW are reported separately. In this chapter the factors
are created by aggregating the market value of each individual assets i in
a portfolio p sorted on industry-specific deciles Size ME and BE/ME which
attempts to make the portfolios homogenous.
38The contribution of the equity asset in the portfolio is nevertheless based on its market
equity with respect to the collective size of the aggregate portfolio.
39The assets are sorted into 25 portfolios at the intersection of Size and BE/ME deciles
20%, 40%, 60%, 80% and 100% creating a 5x5 matrix. The Size and BE/ME are based
on the asset’s industry median to accommodate for idiosyncratic effects of an industry on
the Size and BE/ME ratio.
40White-Huber SE are calculated to account for the observable and unobservable het-
eroscedasticity. Under conditions of absolute homoscedastic the White-Huber SE is the
same as under standard OLS estimation.
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5.4.4 Portfolio Summary
In Table 5a the summary of the portfolios returns, that is the fundamental
dependent variable, and other independent variables are presented. As stated
earlier, 25 portfolios are created in a 5x5 matrix41 along the incremental 20%
industry-specific deciles intersection of Size ME and BE/ME ratio reformed
each year at the end of June. The values reported here in the table are
averaged across BE/ME deciles in the interest of space42. The annual returns
on the portfolios varied across size, with the smallest set of five portfolios with
an average annual size $35.4 million producing 14.7% risk-adjusted value-
weighted returns. The largest set of portfolios with an average annual size
of $9,179.0 million produced a risk-adjusted value-weighted return of 11.9%
annually.
In the set of independent control variables, summary statistics are pre-
sented here for Size ME, BE per ME, dividend yield, RND per BE and
earnings-to-price ratio. Even with the astronomical increase in the Size ME
across small-to-large portfolios deciles the ratio of BE/ME does not show a
very significant change. However, it must be noted that, as assets grow in
Size ME the ratio of BE to ME reduces which can only mean that increas-
ing portion of the value of the assets are becoming intangible or forward
looking [169]. Except for the initial fall in the dividend yield, from the sec-
ond deciles onwards the yield shows an increasing trend which is consistent
with the view that large firms disburse more dividends. The average RND
41The portfolio matrix is as follows;

Size1BEME1 . . . Size1BEME5.
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
Size5BEME1 . . . Size5BEME5.














{Size5BEME1 + ...+ Size5BEME5}


Tables with complete results are available with the author on request.
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spending with respect to BE has a very distinct U-shaped Kuznets curve43.
RND per BE is found to be increasing across size till the third deciles and
then goes down to about 6% in the fifth deciles. E/P shows an increasing
trend from small to large in conformity of the view that large firms are able
to produce more earnings per share capital. The portfolio returns are not
found to be significantly auto-correlated AR(1) except for portfolios in the
second deciles of size. Natural log of ME and BE/ME ratio is found to be
highly (first-order) auto-correlated. On the other hand dividend yield seems
to be completely independent. RND per BE and E/P are somewhat (first-
order) auto-correlated where some of the portfolios are showing evidence of
significant auto-correlation.
That brings to the summary statistics of measures used to model organi-
zational capital – cash flow per BE, investment rate, productivity, return-on-
assets, sales growth and Tobin’s Q. The mean CF per BE as expected grows
with the size of the assets. Investment rate looks stationary in the below
listed figures, but when explored deeply using the entire set of 25 portfolios,
the general trend shows small assets attracting more capital investment per
tangible capital. When the trend of observed horizontally, across the BE/ME
ratio portfolios, the rate of investment decreases as the ratio of BE/ME in-
creases. This goes on to show that as the intangibility44 of assets decreases,
the rate of investment decreases. The productivity of an asset is calculated
by dividing the sales by BE. The trend on the evidence presented here shows
that the productivity of an asset decreases with the increase in size, i.e. small
assets are more productive when calculated with respect to its fixed assets.
However, the return-on-assets is positively related to size. The rate of growth
of sales is found to be highest in the smallest portfolios, i.e sales growth is
inversely proportional to size. The trend across the horizontal BE/ME ratio
portfolios shows that as the ratio increases the sales growth decreases. To-
bin’s Q which is a much used measure of an asset’s intangiblity [244] is found
to be growing with size and decreasing across the BE/ME portfolios. Most of
the measures used as organizational capital does not show high (first-order)
auto-correlation. However, investment rate and return-on-assets are found
with substantial number of portfolios with (first-order) auto-correlation.
43Kuznets curve hypothesized that the economy of a country grows in a U-shaped man-
ner, where it grows, matures and then declines.
44The ‘intangibility’ of an asset decreases when the BE increases to match the ME in a
BE/ME ratio.
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Insert Table 5a — Appendix A.3.1
5.4.5 Dividend Yield Model
Dividends have been of interest to financial accountants and economists for
some time in the asset pricing literature both theoretically and empirically
[97, 22, 125]. One of the main reason of this interest is because of the ability
of this variable to predict stock returns [98, 49]. Since dividends can be
argued to be the long term returns on an assets, Campbell and Shiller [49]
have argued that risk-loading or the equity premium on dividend yield45 can
be used as a discount rate, assuming absolute return foresight. This makes
dividend an important measure to be used as a control in this study where
a theory is being tested, where the performance indicators are used to find
the best possible fit to explain endogenous organizational capital.
In the Table 5b Fama-MacBeth estimates the cross-sectional organiza-
tional capital asset pricing model with dividend yield as a common control
variable. In the first model, however, the estimates are of a dividend yield
model without any organizational capital variable. In the Fama and French
study on dividend yield [98] they found by regressing the full sample dividend
yield from the years 1941-1986 using real data on the CRSP value-weighted
returns on NYSE that the yearly DY has a risk loading of 4.40% whose t-value
is more than two standard deviation (2.29) from mean and the model fit is
9% (see Table 3 in Fama and French study [98], p. 12). The evidence in this
study show that the portfolios in the second deciles showing similar evidence
where the risk loading on dividend yield when regressed on value-weighted
real returns as 5.20 although the t-value is not significantly away from mean.
However, the model fit using the Fama-MacBeth estimation showing R2FM 7%
and Jagannathan-Wang estimation showing R2JW 10% respectively. Portfolio
assets in other deciles show a negative risk loading on dividend yield with
larger model fit that ranges from R2FM 13% to 21% using the Fama-MacBeth
estimation and R2JW 8% to 26% using the Jagannathan-Wang estimation.




where, Dt is calculated by adding the CPI adjusted market value of dividends distributed
between t− 1 and t, and Pt−1is the CPI adjusted market value of the asset calculated in
December of year t− 1
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However, the model fit is inversely related to the size of the portfolios, i.e.
the smaller portfolio are producing better model fit estimates.
In the next model, cash flow normalized by book equity is used as a
measure of performance efficiency. This ratio measures the ability of an
asset to generate cash flow with respect to the book equity of the portfolio.
Using the measure of cash flow performance the organizational capital asset
pricing model with dividend yield shows the risk loading on neither of the
factor are significant enough. The model fit estimated by the Fama-Macbeth
estimator find the range of R2FM 4% to 10.3% and the Jagannathan-Wang
model fit estimate ranges from R2JW 4.6% to 20. 5% where the portfolio
assets in the second deciles are performing the best.
In the following model the rate of investment is used as a measure of
hypothesized organizational capital. This ratio measures the investments in
capital investments per tangible capital already available to the asset. An
investor only makes an investment with the expectation of positive cash flow
streams therefore investments rate serves as a unique measure of performance
efficiency. The empirical evidence from using investment rate in the organi-
zational capital asset pricing model with dividend yield as a control variable
does not show any improvement from the previous model. Investment rate
itself is not statistically significant and the model fits as estimated by the R2
are almost same as the previous model.
Productivity of an asset is calculated by dividing sales by book equity.
Using this as a measure of performance efficiency shows marginal improve-
ments from the earlier models. Productivity is not found to be significant,
however, the model fit estimated using Jagannathan-Wang estimator ranges
from R2JW 24.5% for the assets in the third deciles to R
2
JW 5.7% in the fifth
deciles.
Return on assets or profitability is calculated by dividing income before
extraordinary items by total assets of the portfolio. When the organizational
capital asset pricing model is estimated with ROA and DY as explanatory
variables the evidence is mixed bag. Using the Fama-MacBeth estimator the
model fit for the smallest to the largest assets does not show any significant
improvement from the previous models. The risk loading on ROA is also
not found to be statistically significant. However, when the assumption of
homoscedasticity is dropped in the Jagannathan-Wang estimator the smallest
portfolio model fit is found to be as high as R2JW 59.2%.
Sales growth is the next variable to be used as a measure of productive
efficiency hypothesized as the organizational capital. In this model SG along
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with DY is used to model the organizational capital asset pricing model.
Although dividend yield is not found to have a significant impact on the
model, sales growth on each of the size deciles are found to be significant
where the risk loading ranges from 0.63% to 0.95% per annum where t-value
is more than six standard deviation away from the mean in the smallest
size portfolios. The model fit has increased dramatically and pricing error is
reduced. According to the Fama-MacBeth estimator the R2FM ranges from
51.9% for the smallest asset to as high as 86.8% for the largest asset portfolio.
In the last measure of performance efficiency Tobin’s Q is used which is
calculated by dividing the market value of equity and debt by its replacement
value measured by book equity. The organizational capital asset pricing
model is estimated with Tobin’s Q and DY as explanatory variables and it
is found to be statistically significant in the fourth deciles. The model fit is
found to be best in the same deciles using both estimation techniques.
Insert Table 5b — Appendix A.3.2
5.4.6 Earnings Model
Basu [22] found that earnings-to-price ratio46 was able to explain variation in
the stock returns, it was met with considerable surprise because of the past
work by Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin model in developing CAPM [221, 179, 192]
that viewed only systematic risk as the sole explanatory variable47. Earn-
ings have even been found to have information effect as studied by Chari,
Jagannathan and Ofer [58]. In this section the organizational capital asset
pricing model is estimated using EP as a control along with a measure of or-
ganizational capital. In the first attempt, the model is estimated without the
organizational capital as a variable. The findings of the model show that risk
loading on EP factor decreases with size except for the portfolios in the sec-
ond deciles which showed an initial growth. However, none of the estimates
46Earnings to price ratio is calculated as follows;
Et−1
MEt−1
where, CPI adjusted earnings (ib#18 + txdi#50 - dvp#19) from the year t− 1 is divided
by CPI adjusted market equity (share outstanding #shrout x stock price #prc, corrected
for stock splits and adjustments) from December t− 1
47The evidence with respect to CAPM is however very weak [210, 101].
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are statistically significant. The Fama-MacBeth model fit estimates ranges
from 8.4% in the smallest size deciles to 0.8% in the largest size deciles port-
folio assets. However, when the assumption of homoscedasticity is dropped
the model fit of the smallest size deciles portfolio increase to as high as R2JW
40% using the Jagannathan-Wang estimates.
Table 5c tabulates the estimates of the organizational capital asset pricing
model with earnings-by-price as a control variable. In the first model of
organizational capital asset pricing model — cash flow by book equity ratio
is used as a measure of organizational capital. In this model the t-value of
risk loading estimates of the EP in the smallest size portfolio is found to
be more than two standard deviation away from mean. However, the risk
loading on the cash flow by book equity ratio is found to be statistically
insignificant. The Fama-MacBeth estimates of the model fit is also found to
have improved from 8.4% to 12.3%. However, the risk loading of the larger
sized portfolios are found to be statistically insignificant even though there
are some improvements in the model fit.
In the next model investment rate is used as a measure of performance
efficiency hypothesized as organizational capital. The risk loading on the EP
in the smallest size portfolios are again found to be more than two standard
deviation away from mean. However, investment rate again fails to have any
significant impact on the organizational capital asset pricing model. There
are marginal fluctuations on the asset pricing model fit using both estimation
techniques, but the evidence is still weak with investment rates.
The results are not an improvement with productivity as a measure of
organizational capital. The risk loading on productivity, which measures the
sales per book equity, is not statistically significant. The regression asset
pricing model fit as estimated by the Fama-MacBeth estimates ranges from
R2FM 16.9% for the smallest asset size portfolio to R
2
FM 6.1% for the largest
asset size portfolio. The Jagannathan-Wang estimates of the model fit ranges
from R2JW 20.7% to 5.2% respectively.
In the next model, return on assets (ROA) or profitability is used as a
measure of performance efficiency. Both independent variables EP and ROA
are found not to have a statistically significant impact on the cross-section
of stock returns across the size deciles. However, the model fit as estimated
by the Jagannathan-Wang estimator is found to be as high as R2JW 63.8%
under the assumption of heteroscedasticity.
Sales growth is again found to be the best performer in explaining the
cross-section of portfolio asset returns. Even though EP is not found to be
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significant in the model, the t-value on the risk loading on SG is found to be
more than five standard deviation away from mean. The asset pricing model
estimated using Fama-MacBeth estimator ranges from 56% to 86.8% from
small to large sized portfolios.
In the last model of this section, Tobin’s Q is used as a measure of organi-
zational capital in the asset pricing model. The t-value of the risk loading is
found to be more than two standard deviation away from mean only on To-
bin’s Q estimates in the fourth deciles portfolio assets. The R2JW is found to
be 21.9%. On all other deciles EP and Tobin’s Q are found to be ineffective.
Insert Table 5c — Appendix A.3.3
5.4.7 Dividend Yield and Earnings Model
In this section the analysis is further advanced by modeling the organizational
capital asset pricing model using dividend yield and earnings-by-price as con-
trols. In the Table 5d the estimates of organizational capital asset pricing
model is constructed using dividend yield and earnings-by-price ratio of the
portfolio as control variable in addition to various performance efficiency fac-
tors hypothesized as organizational capital. In the very first model the esti-
mates are of dividend yield and earnings-by-price without the organizational
capital variables. The risk loading on both dividend yield and earnings-by-
price ratio on each of the size deciles portfolios are not statistically significant.
However, the coefficient of determination or the Jagannathan-Wang R2JW is
found in the range of 63.7% for the portfolio assets in the smallest size deciles
to 4.9% for the assets in the largest size deciles.
Cash flow by book equity ratio is used as the first measure of performance
efficiency which is hypothesized as organizational capital. The evidence from
the model suggests that none of the variables are statistically significant in
explaining the cross section of portfolio asset returns. However, except for
the smallest size all other size deciles R2FM appear to have increased the
model fit. Under the assumption of heteroscedasticity the performance of
the regression is improved ranging from R2JW 34.4% for the smallest size
deciles to 6% for the largest size deciles.
The evidence from investment rate model, productivity model and ROA
models are not any significant improvement from cash flow model. None of
these variables have any significant impact on the asset pricing model and the
model fit is correlated inversely to the size ranging R2FM 17% and 6% with
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Fama-MacBeth estimates and R2JW 30% and 7% with the Jagannathan-Wang
estimates. However, there is one exception — Jagannathan-Wang estimate
of the smallest portfolio in the first deciles has a R2JW of 85%.
Sales growth is still one of the best performing measure of organizational
capital. In this model SG is found to be significant across size deciles with a
risk loading ranging from 0.62% to 0.95% per annum with t-value over five
standard deviation away from mean. The Fama-MacBeth R2FM ranges from
53.1% to 87% growing with size. The pricing error of the model is also found
to be approaching zero especially in the third deciles of size portfolio.
In the last model of this segment, Tobin’s Q is used to model the perfor-
mance efficiency which is hypothesized as organizational capital. As in the
previous segments on dividend yield, the fourth deciles on size appears to
have a t-value greater than two standard deviation on the risk loading for
Tobin’s Q. The control variables dividend yield and earnings-per-share does
not appear to have any significant effect on the asset pricing model.
Insert Table 5d — Appendix A.3.4
5.4.8 Size
Banz [17] in his seminal paper found initial evidence of size of the assets
explaining the cross-section of stock returns. This finding was later confirmed
by Fama and French [101, 102] using a portfolio selection methodology based
on Size and BE/ME ratios and then using them to create returns based
factors and naming then small-minus-big (SMB) and high-minus-low (HML)
respectively which were able to explain about 90% of the stock variations. In
the Table 5e the organizational capital asset pricing model is presented with
size as a control variable.
In this study the portfolios are sorted on the Size ME and BE/ME deciles,
however, unlike Fama and French [102] paper a return based asset pricing
model is not being used. The log of ME calculated in the year t is used as
a measure of size and as an independent variable in a organizational capital
asset pricing model.
In the first model only size is used as an explanatory variable of asset
pricing model. The risk loading on the size is found to be statistically signifi-
cant from the second deciles onwards with t-value of the size equity premium
found to be larger than two standard deviation away from the mean. The
Fama-MacBeth estimates of the coefficient of determination is R2FM ranges
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from 10% to 12% from smallest size portfolio assets to the largest size port-
folio assets. The Jagannathan-Wang estimates of the R2JW is found to be no
different and they range from 9.6% to 12.2% respectively.
When cash flow by book equity is added to the model there is a marginal
improvement in the model fit as demonstrated by the Fama-MacBeth R2FM
which ranges from 13.3% to 18.3%. However, the Jagannathan-Wang es-
timates show a marked improvement from the previous model as the R2JW
ranges from 25.1% to 18.6%. However, the risk loading on the cash flow is
not statistically significant whereas size is still significant from second deciles
onwards.
In the next three models investment rate, productivity and ROA are used
as a measure of organizational capital in an asset pricing model. The risk
loading on none of these variables are found to be statistically significant
in any of the size deciles. The model fit in terms of Fama-MacBeth R2FM
ranges for all of the model in the range of 12% and 23% across size and
model deciles. When the estimates are calculated using Jagannathan-Wang
estimator the R2JW ranges from 12% and 30% with the exception of ROA
smallest portfolio. In the ROA portfolio the smallest size deciles model fit
goes as high as 70% which stands out from the lot.
When sales growth is used as a measure of productive efficiency which
is hypothesized as organizational capital the model evidenced to perform
the best among the lot. Using size as a control SG explains in the range of
R2FM 55% and 86.5% of cross-sectional variation of the risk adjusted portfolio
value-weighted asset returns.
Last but not least, Tobin’s Q is also used as a measure of organizational
capital in the asset pricing model. The statistical significance of the vari-
able is not found in the estimates. The model fit according to the Fama-
Macbeth estimator found the model fit to range from 12.3% to 23.6%. The
Jagannathan-Wang estimates of the model fit are of similar range.
Insert Table 5e — Appendix A.3.5
5.4.9 Size and BE/ME
The importance of Size and BE/ME ratio is in the spotlight since the Fama
and French paper of 1993 [102]. Many papers have since focused on the Size
and BE/ME ratio as explanatory variables of cross-section of asset returns
[52]. The unifying factor in previous studies has been the use of returns based
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models to capture the risk loading on BE/ME ratio of the portfolio assets.
In this study, however, returns based factors are not used to capture BE/ME
risk. The BE/ME used in this study is the portfolio ratio of book equity in
the year t− 1 dividend by the market equity calculated in the December of
year t− 1.
In the Table 5f the estimates of the organizational capital asset pricing
model is tabulated with size ME and BE/ME ratio as independent vari-
ables along with measure of organizational capital. In the first model size
and BE/ME ratio is modeled without the organizational capital variables.
The estimates from the Fama-MacBeth show that the t-values of the risk
loading on size and BE/ME ratio are not sufficiently away form the mean
therefore not statistically significant. The model fit estimates using both
Fama-MacBeth and Jagannathan-Wang estimator are evidenced to be in the
range of 12% to 19%.
Size models of performance efficiency are tested in the organizational
capital asset pricing model in addition to Size and BE/ME ratio. Of the six
models five (cash flow by book equity, investment rate, productivity, ROA
and Tobin’s Q) are found not to have any significant impact on the cross-
section of value-weighted asset returns across size deciles. The Size and
BE/ME ratios as a factor are also not found to have any significant impact
on the asset pricing model. The coefficient of determination or the R2 under
both estimators Fama-MacBeth and Jagannathan-Wang ranges between 12%
and 36% with a few exceptions.
The only model that is found to be of statistical significance is sales
growth. With the Size and BE/ME in control the risk loading on sales
growth ranges from 0.65% and 0.95% per annum with t-value more than six
standard deviation away from the mean. The model fit ranges from 55% for
the smallest size deciles portfolio to as high as 86.5% across both estimator.
Insert Table 5f — Appendix A.3.6
5.4.10 Size, BE/ME and RND
Many studies have focused on the RND as an explanatory variable of the
cross-section of asset returns [175, 56]. Over the last few decades the invest-
ments in RND have increased exponentially and Lev [169] is among the first
researchers to point out the trend. Increasing these investments are having
an impact on the valuation of the asset. Therefore the key ingredient into a
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firm has given way from being predominantly tangible asset to increasingly
intangible. Therefore, when organizational capital is being studied empiri-
cally one needs to accommodate RND in the model to understand its impact
on the cross section of stock returns. In the Table 5g the estimates of the or-
ganizational capital asset pricing model is tabulated along with size, BE/ME
ratio and RND/BE ratio as control variables.
The very first model is estimated without the organizational capital vari-
ables. From the estimates only the size of the portfolio assets appear to
be statistically significant in explaining the cross-section of asset returns.
The Fama-MacBeth and Jagannathan-Wang coefficient of determination R2
ranges from 18% to 29% moving in a u-shaped manner across size deciles.
Five out of six variables used as a measure of organizational capital do
not have any impact on the cross-section of stock returns. The organizational
capital factors are cash flow by book equity, investment rate, productivity,
ROA and Tobin’s Q. The Fama-MacBeth and Jagannathan-Wang estimates
of the coefficient of determination is found to range from 21% to 47%. One
of the key reason why the factors are found to be statistically insignificant
is because they are in ratios rather than in returns normally used in other
models [102, 52, 56].
However, the last variable — sales growth is found to be statistically
significant and the risk loading on the factor ranges from 0.65% to 0.94% per
annum. The Fama-MacBeth coefficient of determination ranges from R2FM
58% to 87% and by using Jagannathan-Wang estimates the model fit ranges
from 47.4% to as high as 89.8%.
Insert Table 5g — Appendix A.3.7
5.4.11 CAPM
No discussion is complete in asset pricing literature without sparing a thought
for CAPM model and how any new evidence compares itself with its much
famous cousin. Here in this section the various measures of productive effi-
ciency which has been theorized as an assets organizational capital, is added
to the CAPM model to compare if the risk-adjusted cross-section of stock
returns are explained any better. In CAPM as proposed by Sharpe-Lintner-
Mossin [221, 179, 192] they argued that in a fully diversified portfolio only
the systematic risk can explain the cross-section of expected stock returns.
In the models presented in the previous sections the systematic risk is not
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considered while discussing the effect of other fundamental factors such as
Size and BE/ME ratios.
In the Table 5h, the estimates of the organizational capital asset pricing
model is tabulated. In the first model the two-step Fama-MacBeth estimates
of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is presented. Similar to the
evidence from the Fama and French [101] the CAPM does not perform well
and the model firm ranges from R2FM 13% to 16% fluctuating across size
deciles. When the assumption of homoscedasticity is dropped according to
the Jagannathan-Wang estimates the model fit deteriorates and ranges from
R2JW 5% and 11% across size deciles.
With the inclusion of five out of six factors based on cash flow by book
equity, investment rate, productivity, ROA and Tobin’s Q it is evidenced
that these factors do not have any significant impact on the cross-section
of asset returns. The Fama-MacBeth and Jagannathan-Wang coefficient of
determination ranges from 15% to 35%. However, the sixth factor which is
based on the sales growth has a tremendous impact on the cross section of
stock returns. In addition to the systematic risk factor measured by the index
returns on market the model fit increases linearly with size starting from R2FM
62.4% to as high as 87.2%. This is testament that the relatively innocuous
factor based on sales growth can be of importance in the asset pricing models.
However, this also goes on to serve as a measure of organizational capital
because sales growth is a performance indicator of an asset. The ability of
an asset to generate new cash flow from new customers or getting repeat
customers to buy more services and products is how the asset pricing model
in this chapter is predicted.
Insert Table 5h — Appendix A.3.8
5.4.12 Robustness Check
The robustness of a model estimate hinges on many factors, some of which
are – (a) the accuracy of the returns and ratio calculation, (b) validity of the
assumptions made during the estimation procedure, and (c) significance of
the statistical and economic factors48. In order to address the first concern,
48There are other factors effecting the model estimates that predates the estimation
process in search of an economic meaning, such as accuracy in data gathering and storage
in the various databases. All data that has been used in this study are from standard
databases listed on the WRDS website [254] such as CRSP [79] and Compustat [73],
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the value-weighted returns are calculated using the methodology given in the
previous sections. However, to meet the stylized fact of January-effect [75]
the changes in market equity in the month of January is eliminated to cal-
culate the value-weighted returns and the same methodological asset pricing
models are repeated. In terms of empiricism, no difference has been found
using the Fama-MacBeth or Jagannathan-Wang estimation of the asset pric-
ing models. In order to address the assumptions that the Fama-MacBeth
estimation methodology makes during the estimation, White test [250] and
Breusch-Pagan test [43, 128] for heteroscedasticity are performed. No het-
eroscedasticity found in the returns model, however, White-Huber SE are
estimated for the Fama-MacBeth models to address unobserved heteroscedas-
ticity. The reading of the results show that no matter what estimates are
used the final conclusion reached on the model are robust. Finally, there is an
obvious difference between statistical significance and economic significance,
and the presence of one does not guarantee the other. In the inference and
the conclusion economic significance have been accommodated.
5.5 Discussion
This chapter attempted to explain a fluid concept of organizational capital
that is much talked about in the management science literature [203, 230].
However, in financial accounting literature the concept has received very
scant interest because of lack of commonly agreed definition or measurement
variable. Lev and Radhakrishnan [171] have argued that SG&A could be a
measure of organizational capital since human capital is important to func-
tioning of a firm, therefore the better the quality, better will be the organi-
zational outcome. This analysis is insufficient because organizational capital
and human capital are two separate concepts, there are obvious synergies,
but they cannot be equated absolutely. Moreover, focusing on organizational
capital and just measuring human capital is an insufficient way of understand-
ing what can only be described as a much complex issue. It is argued here
that a firm creates organizational capital not only because of its investments
(reported as expenses in the financial reports) human capital, but also its
investments in tangible and intangibles, which are both structural such as
access provided by Manchester Business School, UK. Therefore, the accuracy of the final
estimates are subject to the accuracy of storage and transmission of the financial data
from these sources.
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RND and sometimes unmeasurable, just like corporate culture. Therefore,
it is proposed in this chapter that organizational capital can be measured
using the productive efficiency of one time period as an input for the next
time period, should the organizational structure remains almost same over
time49.
Asset pricing serves as a very effective empirical framework to test the
voracity of the theory proposed in this chapter. Some of the key reasons
to test this hypothesis using risk-adjusted returns is because of the econo-
metric reliability of tests, the established precedence in the literature and
easy comparability of available evidence. Moreover, returns are something
that investors are most interested in as it serves as a suitable measure of
growth of their investments. Here portfolio returns are used to reduce the
heterogeneity of each individual assets and test how different measure of
performance efficiency, theorized as a measure of an asset’s organizational
capital can explain the mean-variance of the cross-section of the expected
stock returns. The null hypothesis of the entire study is that none of the
measure of efficiency can predict the cross-section of stock returns. In order
to test this hypothesis six separate measures of performance are used, which
are randomly selected, albeit academic interest of the measures in other fields
of study being one indicator of importance. The measures of performance ef-
ficiency that independently serves as a measure of organizational capital are,
Cash Flow, Investment Rate, Productivity, Return on Assets, Sales Growth
and Tobin’s Q.
To test the theory the empirical framework is setup on previous theory
and evidence in the field of asset pricing. Size and book-to-market ratio has
emerged as a major explanatory variable of the cross-section of the stock
returns, among the plethora of factors that have mushroomed subsequently
[101, 102, 56]. Therefore, the factors developed in this study as a measure
of organizational capital are tested to see if they are able to improve the
explanation of the cross-section of risk-adjusted stock returns. In the first
test the organizational capital measures are compared with the dividend yield
of the portfolios. The findings show that on an average all the measures
improve the model fit, especially sales growth which improves the model fit
by 16 times as compared to dividend yield. Others are not as good, but
49It is acknowledged that an organization is a dynamic being and there is a constant
change in it, however, often these changes are gradual and measured. Nevertheless, this
change is accounted in the assumption of the independent and identical (i.i.d) distribution
of the productive efficiency factors.
129
on average better than dividend yield being the explanatory variable. In the
second model dividend yield is replaced by earnings-to-price ratio, a common
explanatory variable to model returns [161]. Here as well the findings show
that on average the measures of organizational capital have increased the
cross-section explanation of the expected stock returns. The same pattern is
repeated in all other models as well as listed and explained in the previous
pages.
The bottom line of the exercise undertaken in this study shows that there
are lagged performance efficiency factors that help explain the risk-adjusted
returns. Is this just co-incidence or econometrically spurious? When checked
with other estimation methodologies the evidence remains the same, and
in some cases provides a better fit to the models. This can only then boil
down to one conclusion that there are productive efficiency factors that are
theorized as organizational capital that improves the returns explanation.
Obviously not all model performs the same, but to various extent almost all
of the factors are useful in improving the models fit.
5.6 Conclusion
Organizational capital is a special type of intangible that is discussed at
length in management science literature, but its visualization and measure-
ment in financial accounting was questionable at best. In this chapter a new
theory is proposed along with some empirical evidence to support the theory
of organizational capital. Most previous explanations of organizational capi-
tal used subjective interpretations such as “language” [53], know-how [133],
social values [230] or human capital in its various forms [205, 33, 117, 171].
Organizational capital is much larger than just being a measure of a firm’s
human capital. It is not only human capital but strategy, tangible and in-
tangible investments, etc. and many other things collectively, and all that
can be called a firm’s organizational capital. The final benefit from all these
resources a firm or an asset can realize is it economic performance, and the
efficiency with which it has performed is a measure of its organizational
capital. This study used various measure of asset performance efficiency to
model organizational capital, such as Cash Flow, Investment Rate Growth,
Productivity, Return on Assets, Sales Growth and Tobin’s Q. Evidence is
found that Sales Growth is one of the best measure of performance efficiency
to explain the risk-adjusted value-weighted cross-section of stock returns,
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hence the optimal measure of organizational capital.
Chapter 6




Two of the main non-tradable1 assets are human capital and structural
capital2, yet the risks associated with these factors are not sufficiently un-
derstood in asset pricing literature. Studies that focus on intangibles explore
the risks on RND most exclusively [56, 174, 172], on the other hand, human
capital risk is generally modeled at a macroeconomic-level [150, 48] or at
most meso-economic level [95]. The objective of this chapter is to increase
the scope of intangibles to include human capital and structural capital, in-
dividually and collectively, using the micro-economic financial data.
The view wherein intangibles constitute human capital and structural
capital is not entirely unfamiliar. Lev [169] writes in his book that “there
are three major nexuses of intangibles, distinguished by their relation to the
generator to the assets: discovery, organizational practices, and human re-
sources.” Most of the studies in the field of financial accounting and eco-
1This chapter is selected to be presented at the Marie Curie ITN - Conference on
Financial Risk Management & Risk Reporting to be held in Konstanz, Germany in April,
11 - 12, 2013.
2In this study structural capital is the investment in research and development (RND).
They are defined as structural capital because firms invest in RND with the explicit reason
to create intangible assets (patents, chemical formula, etc.)
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nomics, intangibles are limited to “discovery”, denoted by RND [56, 174,
172]3. Studies focusing on “human resources” or human capital are gener-
ally out of scope of intangibles discourse [104, 95]4. Although human capital
and structural capital are arguably divergent in their utility, value and risk,
there are some unifying factors, (i.) the accounting treatment of SGA and
RND are similar – expense when incur, and (ii.) both are intangible assets
that are non-tradable5.
Human capital has been used in many studies relating to empirical asset
pricing with various degrees of success [104, 150, 139, 95]. Most studies
that explored human capital used macro-economic or meso-economic income
data6 to model asset prices. A firm needs heterogeneous portfolio of human
capital that is suited to its economic needs. The quality of the human capital
depends on the compensation the firm is ready to offer. People can join and
quit the services of the firm based on the employment contract enforceable
in a legal jurisdiction. The main risks associated with human capital are
(i.) ready availability , (ii.) perfect replaceability and, (iii.) costless ‘firing’
of excess labor. In this chapter the micro-economic financial data available
from the Compustat database [73] with the variable name called SGA is used
to model human capital returns7. Human capital is indeed a very important
3There are other ways of estimating returns based on intangibles. Daniel and Titman
[80] have used the cross-sectional regression residual of book-to-market ratio and book
value returns on stock market returns as the measure of returns on intangibles.
4Most papers study human capital using industry level labor income to measure returns
[183, 150, 95].
5Mayers [183, 184] is credited with developing the equilibrium mean-variance capital
asset pricing model under the condition of uncertainty where there are two sets of assets,
one tradable and liquid and another non-tradable and illiquid, with and without the
assumption of a risk-less asset.
6Fama and Schwert [104] used “wage and salary disbursements plus the proprietors’
income portion of seasonally adjusted personal income, as computed by US Department
of Commerce and reported in the Survey of Current Business.” Jagannathan and Wang
[150] used the personal income and population data to calculate the returns on human
capital using data from “National Income and Product Account of the U.S.A. published
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce.” Heaton and Lucas
[139] used the National Income and Product Account data to calculate the labor income
growth. Last but not least, Eiling [95] used “labor income” to calculate the human capital
returns.
7Lev and Radhakrishnan [171] have argued in their paper that “organizational capital”
is “embedded in people” and therefore they used SGA as its measure. This view is very
restrictive and does not encompass the much wide-ranging concept that is organizational
capital. See Chapter 5. for more details on organizational capital.
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idiosyncratic risk [139] that could be priced in an asset pricing model, if they
are not theoretically diversified away in a portfolio. The existing evidences
on the impact of human capital risks are scarce and unclear to say the least
[104, 150, 48, 166, 95]. Additionally, the intangible nature of human capital
and its accounting treatment has a unique feature that has not been explored
under a wider context of intangibles. Therefore, in this chapter the analysis
of human capital is two-dimensional, (i) as a human capital and, (ii.) in the
wider context of intangible capital, that is an extension of structural capital.
It is no secret that in the past most studies dealing with intangibles
have only focused on RND as a measure of intangible [174, 175, 56]. This
study challenges this solitary view on intangibles and argues that a firm
has two basic types of intangibles which are essential in producing superior
returns, (i) structural intangibles — RND and, (ii) enabling intangibles —
human capital. Structural intangibles are produced when a firm invests in a
project solely for the purpose of creating intangible assets, for e.g. patents,
chemical formulas, trademarks, etc. However, without a skilled bench of
human capital the firm cannot produce anything. It makes human capital
an enabling factor. In 1974 Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
issued the Statement No. 2 [105] that standardized the RND recognition and
mandated its expense when incurred8. Chan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis
[56] produced one of the most significant study on the subject in which they
empirically found that stocks that invested in RND did not produce any
better returns than other brick-and-mortar firms. Researchers [172, 174]
have criticized the accounting standards for its conservative and mandatory
expensing regulation and claimed that there could be “mispricing” of the
stocks that invest in RND9. Lev and Sougiannis [174, 175] capitalized and
amortized RND expenses to study if that would increase the informativeness
of RND. In this chapter a five year capitalization and amortization period is
selected to model human capital, structural capital and intangible capital10.
The empirical evidence from this chapter shows that the idiosyncratic risk
associated with human capital is indeed priced in an asset pricing model. The
pricing model shows the best result when micro-economic data is used instead
of industry level data. Indeed there is room for improvement as the study did
not take into account the heterogeneity of human capital in different indus-
8Before 1974 there was no mandated standard for RND and firms used to report on
their discretion [175].
9Although this view has been challenged [202].
10Intangible capital is an amalgamation of human capital and structural capital.
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tries which could indeed produce better results [95]. Structural capital still
produces the best asset pricing estimates because of its sheer riskiness that
are priced in the models. However, when human capital and structural capi-
tal are integrated to create a new variable called intangible capital, the asset
pricing estimates suffered. One of the key reason for this result is that human
capital and structural capital although show key synergies such as they are
both non-tradable and are both expensed in the financial accounts, they are
still two different types of risks and therefore discount differently. This het-
erogeneity in the different type of intangibles is ignored in the amalgamated
intangible capital model and therefore the risks associated with these factors
are underestimated.
In the following section (6.2), the background of the literature is pre-
sented, followed by the section (6.3) in which the model to capture human
capital, structural capital and intangible capital is developed and explained.
The next section (6.4) provides the details about the empiricism methodol-
ogy and data. The following section (6.5) will present some discussion on the
theory and empirical evidence found in the research setup. Finally (6.6), the
chapter will close with some conclusions and directions on future research
prospects.
6.2 Background
Studies on human capital and structural capital have been ongoing in par-
allel for many years without any convergence. This chapter theorizes that
the cross-sectional variation of the asset prices can be modeled using human
capital and structural capital. Finally, this study increases the scope of in-
tangible capital by including structural intangibles (RND) along with human
capital — and it is hypothesized to improve the cross-sectional explanation
of asset prices.
6.2.1 Human Capital
Human capital is at the center of any production process, arguably, even in
the contemporary mechanized production period. The key reason in favor of
this view is the portfolio of human capital that a firm employes and trains
determines the production process, quality and efficiency of the output. It
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should also be noted that the quality11 of human capital a firm employs
depends on the remuneration it is ready to shell out which is decided ex-
ogenously in a competitive job market [229]. This could only mean that
human capital should have a significant effect on the asset prices. Many
researchers in the past have modeled human capital, both theoretically and
empirically [190, 215, 23, 104, 251]. Empirically, human capital have been
of most interest to researchers in macroeconomic consumption based asset
pricing. Fama & Schwert [104], Jagannathan & Wang [150] and Campbell
[48] and most recently, Eiling [95] among others have empirically studied the
effect of human capital in asset pricing models using macro-economic labor
income 12. Undoubtedly none of the studies have found a significant relation-
ship between the hypothesized risk loading of human capital, as measured
by the macro-economic data, on the asset pricing models and therefore the
empirical evidence remains weak at best, even after correcting for industry
level idiosyncrasies.
One of the glaring shortcoming of these studies is the dependence on
macroeconomic data13 or labor income to explain the cross-section of asset
prices. In order to meet the challenge of data, a micro-economic alternative
readily available is in the form of selling, general and administrative (SGA)
expenses reported by firms on its annual report. Lev and Radhakrishnan
[171] have used the variable to model organizational capital, however, the
previous chapter (see Chapter 5.) has presented the shortcomings of this
view. The SGA expenses14 encapsulates the expenses of a firm in purchasing
11The quality of a Human Capital on average would entail – education, previous em-
ployment, skill sets, etc.
12Also see [251, 139, 199, 200]
13Some of the problems associated with macroeconomic data, even at the industry level
is that it ignores the heterogeneity association with firm level data. [123]
14As per S&P’s Compustat User’s Guide [228], SGA consists of the following expenses:
Accounting, Advertising, Amortization of research and development costs, Bad debt ex-
pense, Commissions, Corporate expense, Delivery expenses, Directors’ fees and remuner-
ation, Engineering expense, Freight-out expense, Labor and related expenses (including
salary, pension, retirement, profit sharing, provision for bonus and stock options, employee
insurance, and other employee benefits when reported below a gross profit figure), Legal
expense, Marketing expense, Strike expense, Stock-based compensation when reported
below a gross profit figure. All of these expenses involve some form of Human Capital,
weather they are in the firm internally or they are external service providers, providing
knowledge based service such as accounting or marketing. There are also some expenses
that do not directly relate to human capital, such as Parent company charges for admin-
istrative services, Recovery of allowance for losses, Restaurants’ pre-opening and closing
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a portfolio of labor and human expertise and the cost to train them, both
directly or indirectly for a period of time. Given that this SGA expense is at
the firm-level, it captures the heterogeneity associated with each individual
firm. Therefore, one of the main hypothesis of this study is to find out if
creating portfolios based on Size-BE/ME can diversify away the risk loading
associated with human capital or it can be priced in model.
6.2.2 Structural Capital
This chapter defines structural capital as the capitalized and amortized RND.
Academic interest in RND manifests because of the increasing contribution,
perceived or real, they are having on the asset valuation over the past 30 -
40 years [169]. Firms invest in RND with a conscious decision to produce
assets such as patents, chemical compound, trademarks, etc. The belief that
intangible produces positive future benefits are based on empirical studies
such as by Sood & Tellis [226] and Eberhart, et al.[93], which finds that the
news about a new innovative project or investments in intangibles produces
a significant abnormal returns for the assets, even in the long term. However,
not everyone is so convinced by this evidence. Chan, Lakonishok & Sougian-
nis [56] found in their study that there are no significant difference in the
returns on the assets that invest in RND versus the ones that do not. Some
have argued that the returns do not capture the impact of RND investments
because of the stifling financial disclosure regime that mandates the expens-
ing of RND as soon as incurred thereby causing asset “mispricing” [55, 65].
However, the argument of mispricing hinges on ‘information’ and ‘timing’
of the information. Penman [202] has argued that the information on in-
vestments available to the stock market through the income statement, and
therefore lobbying for more mandatory disclosure on the subject of structural
intangibles such as RND, is misplaced or unnecessary.
In this study an attempt has been made to explore the cross-section of
stock returns of portfolios based on Size and BE/ME. RND is capitalized and
amortized using a similar methodology as proposed by Chan, Lakonishok &
Sougiannis [56] so that the results are comparable. In an asset pricing model
RND is considered to be an idiosyncratic risk because according to the Sharpe
[221], Lintner [179] and Mossin [192] model of CAPM all risk are systematic
costs, Retail companies’ pre-opening and closing costs and rent expense, but these are
exceptions rather than the norm.
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and can be explained by its measure, often returns on the index stock market.
Therefore, the hypothesis in this chapter for this section is that structural
capital does not have any explanatory power in an asset pricing model.
6.2.3 Intangible Capital
Studies on intangibles in the financial accounting and economics literature
are oddly limited to exploring the structural intangibles measured by the
RND expenses, at the firm or industry level. There are precious few studies
wherein intangibles are explored in a wider context, thereby focusing on
variables and assets other than RND. Advertising [119, 142], marketing [223]
and science & technology [85]15 are some of the other fields .
Interest in intangibles is not limited to the field of asset pricing, but value-
relevance, and financial accounting have researched the effect with equal
enthusiasm. Studies have looked into RND [122, 142, 143, 131] from a val-
uation16 perspective, earnings as a measure of performance [227] and even
systematic risk [145] generally measured using the returns on the index stock
market.
Finally, this chapter hypotheses that, with the amalgamation of human
capital and structural capital into one variable called intangible capital, the
new variable will be more informative than each of variables individually.
The main reason behind this amalgamation is because of the non-tradable
nature of both assets and accounting treatment of the variables are identical.
Therefore, collectively they represent the super-set expense that a firm incurs
to create intangible assets.
6.3 Model
In this simple Cobb-Douglas model the output f(y˜) of an asset is a function








15“Patents”, “citation index”, “technology cycle time”, etc. being some of the factor
taken into research consideration. [85]
16Also known as value-relevance studies.
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θ is the exogenous technology shock with i.i.d distribution; θ ∼
N(0, σ2θ)
% is the endogenous productivity shock with i.i.d distribution; θ ∼
N(0, σ2%)
Extending the model prescribed by Sharpe [221], Lintner [179] and Black
[31], Mayers [183, 184] argued that portfolio assets are not only made up of
tradeable assets but also non-tradeable ones. Human capital is one such non-
tradeable asset. It is essential not only for the production process but also
creates hedge for the investors. Since the study proposes to use the expenses
on SGA as a measure of the human capital, the implicit assumption is that
it is a measure of the portfolio human capital.
6.3.1 Human Capital
Fama and Schwert [104] demonstrated the model in which the return on
tradeable and non-tradeable assets are to be calculated empirically in ex-
tension of Mayers [183]. Jagannathan and Wang [150] used a lagged labor
income to calculate the return on the human capital which is also similar to
Fama & Schwert [104] and Eiling [95]. In this study the non-tradeable return













RHCp,t−1 is the return on human capital of asset i at time t
17Here the assumption is that the rate of growth rHC of human capital is constant (rate
of growth in SGA expense) and it follows the first order auto-regressive model;
SGAt = (1 + g)SGAt−1 + εt; ε ∼ N(0, σ
2
ε)





HC is the capitalized and amortized selling general and administra-
tive expenses using the method recommended by Chan, Lakon-
ishok & Sougiannis [56];
HCt = SGA+ 0.8 ∗ SGA+ 0.6 ∗ SGA+ 0.4 ∗ SGA+ 0.2 ∗ SGA
6.3.2 Structural Capital
In this chapter RND is defined as structural intangible. The main reason
behind treating RND expense as a measure of structural capital (SC) is
because firms actively invest in activities which under the FASB Statement
No. 2 [105] can be expensed. SI creates some of the main entities that can
largely be described as intellectual assets, however, they are non-tradeable
as modeled by Mayers [183]. Here, in this Cobb-Douglas model the output is
a function of tangible capital and structural capital. Human capital is held



















RSCp,t−1 is the return on structural capital of asset i at time t




To simplify the initial Cobb-Douglas model lets assume that human capital
is just another intangible in the larger scheme of things. This can only mean
that the output f(y˜) is a function of investments on tangible capital and







One of the main reason to model intangibles capital that includes ex-
penses on human capital is because of the accounting treatment. According
to the Financial Accounting Standard Board Statement no. 2 [105] all in-
vestments related to RND are to be expensed when incurred. The treatment
of expenditure incurred in hiring a portfolio of human capital at a time t is no
different. In a dynamic real world the impact of human capital is not static.
But the accounting treatment of cost incurred on hiring and training human
capital makes it appear to be static. Therefore, the key unifying factors
in both structural intangibles (RND) and human capital is their accounting
technique at time t and that they are non-tradeable assets. Therefore, the
returns on this non-tradeable asset class should be similar to Mayers [183]













RICp,t−1 is the return on intangible capital of asset i at time t
IC is the intangible capital wherein the intangibles is made of RND
and SGA as follows;
I = RND + SGA
I is capitalized to form IC as follows;
ICt = I + 0.8 ∗ I + 0.6 ∗ I + 0.4 ∗ I + 0.2 ∗ I
6.4 Empiricism
6.4.1 Data
The data for this study is collected primarily from two sources, (i) Standard
& Poor’s Compustat database [73], and (ii) The Center for Research in Secu-
rity Prices database (CRSP) [79], both available at Wharton Research Data
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Services (WRDS)18 website [254]. The firms are listed in the three main
stock exchanges of United States, (a) New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),
(b) American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and, (c) NASDAQ Stock Market
(NASDAQ). The study period is restricted to 1975-201119.
To avoid survivor bias20 all firms in the Compustat and CRSP databases
are included in the dataset between 1975 and 2011 except for the following
exclusionary criteria. (1) All duplicates observations are removed from the
dataset. (2) All firms that were incorporated in countries other than the
United States are deleted. (3) All Firms whose fiscal year doesn’t end in
December of each year is eliminated. (4) All firms in the financial and utilities
sector are removed21 from the dataset using the two digit SIC codes22. (5)
All firms that do not have accounting or market data available in one of the
databases, Compustat or CRSP, are also removed from the dataset. (6) Firms
that have just one year of data are removed from the dataset. These selection
criteria leaves the dataset with 7,799 firms and 100,929 annual Compustat
observations in an unbalanced panel23.
6.4.2 Econometric Estimation
The asset pricing models are econometrically based on pricing error repre-
sented by the model α and the ‘coefficient of determination’ represented by
R2 on a hypothetical linear model. Large amounts of data cause specula-
tions of data dredging. To avoid this risk, the equity assets in the sample are
divided into 25 portfolios at the intersection of deciles, sorted on industry
18The access to WRDS is provided by Manchester Business School, United Kingdom
and it is gratefully acknowledged.
19The FASB Statement 2 concerning financial accounting and reporting of RND ex-
penses was issued in 1974. According to this statement all financial costs related to RND
should be expensed when incurred. [178]
20Delisted asset returns are included in the dataset for the time period available. The
portfolios are rebalanced to the delisting at the end of the time period.
21Firms in the financial sector are removed because of high leverage concerns [101].
Firms in the utilities sector are removed since the structural and regulatory environment
of such firms is expected to be ’different’[195].
22Deleted all firms that are in the SIC code range of 4900 - 4999 for utilities and 6000 -
6999 for financial firms.
23Stata/SE 11.2 [77] is used to estimate the parameters, which has the ability to handle
large unbalanced panel datasets.
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median Size (ME) and BE/ME ratio24.
The regression models are estimated using Fama-MacBeth estimation
procedure [103] using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) with White-Huber stan-
dard errors (SE)25. Many researchers have questioned the validity of this
estimation technique and called to implement alternate methods of estima-
tion especially when portfolio returns are being used as an explanatory vari-
able [210, 134, 177] so that the economic interpretations are not diluted
mainly because of inefficient or ineffective econometric tests. Shanken [220]
in his paper advocated for the use of maximum-likelihood estimation method
for the beta-estimation with the correction of SE of Fama-MacBeth [103].
Jagannathan-Wang [151] derived the SE when the assumption of conditional
heteroscedasticity is breached and therefore recommending the use of Gener-
alized Least Square (GLS) estimation method. In addition of Fama-MacBeth
R2FM and asset pricing error αFM the Jagannathan-Wang R
2
JW estimates and
asset pricing error αJW are reported separately. In this chapter, the factors
are created by aggregating the market value of each individual assets i in
a portfolio p sorted on industry-specific deciles Size ME and BE/ME which
attempts to make the portfolios homogenous.
6.4.3 Portfolios
Since the study deals with RND expenses the sample period is restricted to
1975-201126. A set of 25 portfolio are created at the intersection of industry-
specific deciles of Size ME and BE/ME. The regressand returns are created
from the same Size-BE/ME portfolios which is explained in greater detail in
the following section.
24The assets are sorted into 25 portfolios at the intersection of Size and BE/ME deciles
20%, 40%, 60%, 80% and 100% creating a 5x5 matrix. The Size and BE/ME are based
on the asset’s industry median to accommodate for idiosyncratic effects of an industry on
the Size and BE/ME ratio.
25White-Huber SE is calculated to account for the observable and unobservable het-
eroscedasticity. Under conditions of absolute homoscedasticity the White-Huber SE is the
same as under standard OLS estimation.
26FASB Statement No. 2 [105] was released in 1974 when the expensing of RND was
mandated and standardized.
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6.4.3.1 Portfolios and Returns
The portfolio value-weighted returns Rp are calculated for each of the 25
portfolios created at the intersection of industry-specific deciles27 of Size ME
and BE/ME ratios. The portfolios are created at end of June in year t− 1.
The returns are calculated from July of year t − 1 to June of year t. The
returns, however, are not calculated monthly but annually. The portfolios
are reformed in June of year t. Since the portfolios are based on the buy-and-
hold strategy wherein the contribution of each asset to a portfolio is 100%,
the monthly MEi of each individual asset i is averaged between July of t− 1
and June of t and an aggregate MEp of the portfolio is created. Annual
continuously compounded value-weighted returns28 are calculated using the
MEp of the portfolio assets between t − 1 and t. An investor worries only
if the returns are unable to exceed the risk free rate, therefore, the portfolio
returns are risk-adjusted by subtracting the annualized one-month treasury
interest rate from the value-weighted portfolio returns.
6.4.3.2 Independent Variables
There are three primary independent variables as a result of the earlier dis-
cussion29, (i.) human capital, (ii.) structural capital and (iii.) intangible
capital. Of the 25 portfolios created at the industry-specific deciles intersec-
tion of Size-BE/ME portfolios that are created at the end of June of year
t− 1, three variables – SGAi, RNDi and Ii of each individual asset are ag-
gregated to calculate the gross size of the variable in a portfolio SGAp, Ip
and RNDp. These variables are capitalized and amortized at fixed rate of
20% per annum to create capitalized variables HCp, SCp and ICp observ-




t−1on the variables are
calculated from t − 2 to t − 1 which are to be used in the year t − 1 in the
regression as an independent variable.
27The five deciles intersection points are 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 and 1.












29See Section 6.3. Model – of this chapter.
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6.4.3.3 Other Independent Variables
Other independent variables that are used as controls in various model esti-
mations are – dividend yield, earnings per share, risk-adjusted market port-
folio returns. They are calculated annually with all the stocks in the sample,
which includes the assets with negative BE.
Dividends of an asset i is calculated by adding the dividend per share
between July of year t − 1 and June of year t. The dividend per share
between July t − 1 and June t is adjusted for its cash equivalent market
value using the shares outstanding. The dividend yield DY of the portfolio
is calculated by aggregating the assets i in a portfolio p with n assets then
dividing the cash equivalent market value of dividend announced between
July t− 1 and June t by the market equity ME calculated in December t− 1
of the portfolio sorted at the end of June t− 1. The portfolios are reformed




Earnings-by-price ratio is another key variable that has been used in the
models as an independent variable. To calculate the earnings-by-price ratio
of a portfolio, the earnings of an asset i in the year t − 1 is aggregated in
the portfolio in which the asset is allocated at the end of June t − 1, it is
divided by market equity of the portfolio from December in the year t − 1.




Size ME and BE/ME ratio are also used as independent variables. Size
ME is the market equity of a portfolio calculated in June of year t by aggre-
gating the market equity of individual assets i sorted in the portfolio p at the
end of June t − 1. Whereas BE/ME is calculated by dividing book equity





The value-weighted market portfolio is created using all the assets in the
sample including the ones with negative book equity. The value-weighted
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monthly returns are annualized between January and December of the year
t−1, which is incidentally the fiscal year for all the assets in the sample. The
value-weighted annualized return is adjusted with the annualized one-month
treasure returns, a measure of risk free asset. To check the robustness of
the market return measure is created using the sample assets, it is correlated
with the annualized market return found in the Compustat database 30 using
the Pearson’s Correlation. The Pearson correlation coefficient is found to be
93% with a Spearman’s rho confirmation (p-value < 0.000).
6.4.4 Summary Statistics
A set of 25 portfolios are created at the intersection of industry-specific
deciles31 of Size ME and BE/ME ratio in a 5x5 matrix32. In the Table
6a the summary statistics of the portfolios are presented in the two panels,
however, in the interest of space the returns and other variables are aver-
aged across BE/ME ratio portfolios33. In the panel i. the summary of the
value-weighted returns are presented along with the standard deviation and
Sharpe ratio. Additionally, the first-order AR(1), second-order AR(2) and
third-order AR(3) auto-correlations of the returns are tabulated.
As expected the returns are inversely correlated with size, a stylized fact
that small assets produce higher returns. The returns are not highly auto-
30The value-weighted market portfolio return in the Compustat database is under the
header ‘vwmretd’ [73].
31The deciles are at an interval of 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% and 100%.
32The portfolio matrix is as follows;

Size1BEME1 . . . Size1BEME5.
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
Size5BEME1 . . . Size5BEME5.














{Size5BEME1 + ...+ Size5BEME5}


Tables with complete results are available with the author on request.
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correlated with only a few portfolios displaying a significant auto-correlation
with t-value two standard deviation away from the mean.
The returns on human capital HC measured using the 20% straight line
capitalization of selling, general and administrative expenses show a decreas-
ing trend across the size portfolios. This trend is reverse across the BE/ME
ratio portfolios. The ratio of BE/ME increases, the returns on human capi-
tal HC decreases. It is usually understood that with increase in the BE/ME
ratio the assets get distressed, with lower cash flow and earnings, following
the same trend the return on human capital HC also shows a sign of dis-
tress for the asset. The returns on human capital HC show some signs on
auto-correlation with the first-order AR process significant in the 3rd and
4th deciles.
The structural capital is measured using a 20% straight line depreciation
of the RND expenses expressed in year t− 1 and the returns are calculated
on a capitalized SC. The returns on the structural capital are higher for the
smaller portfolios and lower for larger portfolios with one key distinction –
when compared to the returns on human capital, the returns are higher in
each deciles points. In the smallest portfolio in the first deciles, the average
annual return across five BE/ME deciles are 20.8% which is over 9% points
higher than the return on human capital and about 16% points greater than
a combined intangible capital. Structural capital does not show a significant
first-order auto-correlation except for one deciles point. Higher order auto-
correlation is non-existent.
Last but not least, the return on intangible capital IC is measured by
aggregating SGA and RND, one expenses human capital and the other struc-
tural capital, and then capitalizes it over a period of five years in a straight
line depreciation effective in year t− 1. When the returns are calculated an-
nually on this variable, they are found to range within half and one-third of
human capital in each size deciles. Some degree of first-order auto-correlation
is also found in the 3rd and 4th size deciles which are averaged across BE/ME
portfolio.
Insert Table 6a — Appendix A.4.1
6.4.5 Human Capital
In Table 6b the Fama-MacBeth estimates [103] and the Jagannathan-Wang
[151] R2JW and pricing error of the cross-sectional human capital asset pricing
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model is presented. In the cross-sectional model some of the established
variables are used as controls, such as dividend yield, earnings-per-share,
systematic risk peroxided by the stock market index returns measured using
the assets in the sample, Size ME and BE/ME ratio. The theory presented
in Section 6.3.1 can be expressed in a empirical model as follows34:
E(Rp,t)−Rf = α + βHCt−1 + γXt−1 + φYt−1 + εt
The risk loading or risk premium on the human capital returns are found
to be significant with the t-value being two standard deviation away from
mean in the medium to large portfolios, represented here in the 3rd - 5th
deciles size portfolios. According to the Fama-MacBeth estimates which
assumes homoscedasticity the R2FM increases from 9% in the smallest set
of portfolio to 47% for the largest set of portfolios. The cross-sectional
Jagannathan-Wang estimate of the model fit is found to be increasing from
5.4% for the smallest set of portfolios to 31.8% in the largest set of portfolios.
When dividend yield is added to the model of human capital to explain
the cross-sectional covariance of the returns, the extreme fit of portfolios on
the extremes are not improved sufficiently. However, in the 2nd deciles Size
portfolio there is a marked increase from 26% in the human capital model to
47.1% in the human capital and dividend yield model using the Jagannathan-
Wang R2JW estimates. Although, there are only marginal increment found
between the two models when the estimator is Fama-MacBeth.
In the third model along with dividend yield earnings-per-share is added
to the human capital asset pricing model. In this cross-sectional model there
is a increasing trend on the model fit with size of the portfolio. Adding
another factor such as earnings-per-share does not make any significant im-
provement from the earlier model of dividend yield. However, marginal in-
crease in model fit is found throughout the size deciles even with the change
in estimator from Fama-MacBeth to Jagannathan-Wang.
In the next model dividend yield is eliminated and just earnings-per-share
is retained in the human capital model. The result of the most is quite similar
to the dividend yield and human capital model. There is an upward trend in
the model fit that increases with size, starting from 17.9% for the smallest
portfolio assets to 48.9% for the biggest using the Fama-MacBeth estimator.
The result is almost identical when the Jagannathan-Wang estimator is used.
34The model is an extension of the conditional CAPM or C-CAPM model proposed by
Jagannathan and Wang [150], Campbell [48] and most recently Eiling [95].
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In the CAPM model, all stocks from the sample are used to replicate the
market index returns. This model set-up was termed conditional CAPM by
Jagannathan &Wang [150], Campbell [48] and most recently Eiling [95]. The
Fama-MacBeth estimates show that the model explains 21.8% of the cross-
sectional variations of pricing factors with respect to portfolio returns of the
small assets. As the assets grow larger the cross-sectional model explanation
increases to about 61.7% for the largest set of portfolio assets. The risk
loading on the human capital factor is significant as the t-value is more
than two standard deviation away from mean starting the portfolios in 3rd
deciles. The Jagannathan-Wang estimator has the same set of results except
the variation of the cross-sectional variation ranges from 12.4% to as high as
66%.
In the next model, size of the asset is used as an explanatory variable
in addition of returns on human capital. The importance of size in asset
pricing model was highlighted by Fama and French [101]. Here the natural
logarithm of portfolio Size ME at t is used as an explanatory variable. The
risk loading on size that ranges from 0.17% to 0.18% per annum is significant
with t-values more than two standard deviation away from mean in the assets
from the middle deciles. The risk loading varies from 0.26% to 0.59% per
annum is also significant with t-values greater than two standard deviation
from mean from the 2nd deciles onwards. The model fit extends from 9.5%
in the Jagannathan-Wang estimates of R2JW in the smallest deciles asset to
46.9% for the highest deciles assets. The analysis is further extended by
adding a BE/ME factor of the portfolio assets into the final model. Fama
and French [102] were the ones who highlighted the importance of BE/ME
factors. Therefore, using the BE/ME factor in addition to Size ME factor
and human capital factor explains the range of 20.5% to 52% of the cross-
sectional variations of the factors with respect to conditional distribution of
the asset returns using the Fama-MacBeth estimators.
Insert Table 6b — Appendix A.4.2
6.4.6 Structural Capital
Many studies in the past have tried to model the RND expenses in an asset
pricing model. The main aim of all these studies is to find out how much of
the cross-sectional variations of the asset returns can be explained by RND
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[174, 175, 56]. Obviously the idea that investments in RND produces idiosyn-
cratic intangibles is not a novel one. Therefore, to model RND expenses in
the form of structural capital has two main purposes in this study. First, the
evidence on the impact of RND on the cross-section of stock return by Chan,
Lakonishok and Sougiannis [56] is old and needs renewal. Second, the RND
modeling in study serves as a control study with which the human capital
asset pricing model and intangible capital asset pricing model can be com-
pared. The theoretical model from the Section 6.3.2 is expressed empirically
as follows;
E(Rp,t)−Rf = α + βSCt−1 + γXt−1 + φYt−1 + εt
Structural capital is capitalized and amortized RND expenses over a pe-
riod of five years in a straight line 20% depreciation. The mean-variance
structural capital asset pricing model hypothesizes that the cross-section of
stock returns cannot be explained by the return on structural model. As
shown in the Table 6e the Fama-MacBeth estimates finds that the t-value
on the risk loading of the structural capital asset pricing model is more than
two standard deviation away from the mean but only for the assets with the
largest size. The R2FM is found to the 44% and R
2
JW is 53.4% respectively.
In the next model dividend yield is added to the structural capital asset
pricing model. The risk loading on dividend yield does not appear to have
any significant impact through the estimates. However, the model fit does
appear to improve when viewed through the prism of R2FM which is found to
be as high as 45.3% and R2JW is 60.2% respectively for the largest assets. For
the portfolios with smaller size the model fits are not quite as impressive.
When earnings-per-share is added to the structural capital asset pricing
model not much improvement is observed in the significance of the estimates
or the model fit. The pricing error remains almost at the same levels, and all
these observations are throughout asset size deciles. However, when dividend
yield is eliminated from the structural capital asset pricing model whilst
retaining the earnings-per-share as an explanatory variable, the estimates,
model fit and pricing error remains the same and this observation does not
change with the change in the estimation methodology.
In the next model, the systematic risk is priced using the measure of index
market returns calculated using the stocks in the sample including the ones
with negative BE. In this model the capital asset pricing model is extended
using the structural capital as a measure of idiosyncratic risks. The t-value of
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the risk-loading on the structural capital is found to be at least two standard
deviations away from the mean, in the largest asset size portfolio. Since the
estimates are regressed on the annualized value the t-value of the systematic
risk is two standard deviation away from the mean barring portfolios in one
deciles. The model fit according to the R2FM is found to be 56.2% and the
Jagannathan-Wang R2JW is as high as 74.7% for the portfolios with the largest
asset size.
As noted earlier, Fama and French pointed out in their papers [101, 102]
that Size ME and BE/ME ratios play a significant role in the explanation
of the cross-section of asset prices. Size ME is used as a measure of asset
specific idiosyncratic risk in addition to structural capital in an asset pricing
model. Under the assumption of homoscedasticity using the Fama-MacBeth
estimation the model fit ranges from 14.8% to 50% in the increasing order of
size deciles. The t-value of the risk loading on size is found to be two stan-
dard deviation away from the mean thereby showing significant effect on the
model along with structural capital. However, in the structural capital only
the largest size deciles assets are found to have any significant risk loading
effect according to the t-values. When the risk loading is of significance for
intangible capital in the largest size deciles it is found to be discounting at
0.40% per annum, whereas the size risk loading ranges from 0.19% to 0.22%
per annum.
When BE/ME is added to the model in addition to size and intangi-
ble capital in an asset pricing model, the BE/ME is found not to have any
significant impact. In this model even the significance of size seems to have
diminished, however, structural capital shows a similar amount of risk loading
when compared to other models and the t-value are found to be two stan-
dard deviation away from the mean for the assets belonging to the largest
portfolios. However, significant improvement is found when BE/ME is used
in the model R2 especially in portfolios with smaller asset size.
Insert Table 6c — Appendix A.4.3
6.4.7 Intangible Capital
Intangible capital is calculated by capitalizing SGA and RND that are ex-
pensed by a firm as soon as they are incurred. Both these expenses contribute
to the development of intangible capital of a firm, one in the form of human
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capital and the other contributes to innovation that produces structural in-
tangibles. Many papers have studied intangibles just by concentrating on
RND investment’s [174, 56] role in asset pricing. This chapter attempts to
model intangible capital using the capitalized expenses on human capital and
structural capital represented by the aggregated SGA and RND to explain
the cross-section of asset prices.
Many have argued in the past that intangible capital does have or should
have an impact in explaining the cross-section of asset prices since they are
an important part of the value creating process [50, 169]. The theoretical
model presented in the Section 6.3.3 can be empirically expressed as follows:
E(Rp,t)−Rf = α + βICt−1 + γXt−1 + φYt−1 + εt
Table 6d presents the Fama-MacBeth [103] estimates of the intangible
capital asset pricing model along with its model variations. Additionally as
Lewellen, Nagel, and Shanken [177] recommended the Jagannathan-Wang
[151] R2JW is also tabulated.
The returns on asset prices are regressed on the one time period lagged
return on intangible capital and the t-value of the model beta or the risk
loading on the factor is found to be greater than two standard deviation
away from the mean in most of the size deciles across size ME portfolios.
The R2FM is found to be increasing with size of the portfolios, whereas as
the portfolios move across the increasing BE/ME ratio portfolios35 the trend
decreases. This goes on to show that as the distress level increases of the
assets the investments in intangible capital becomes increasingly irrelevant
for the asset prices. Overall the R2FM ranges from 10.5% for the smallest size
deciles to 45.6% whereas if the model is estimated without the assumption
of homogeneity the R2JW ranges from 4.6% to 35.4%.
When dividend yield is added to the intangible capital asset pricing model
the fit ranges from 12% to 47% under the assumption of the homogeneity. It
must be noted that the pricing error in both type of estimates αFM and αJW
shows an increment with the addition of dividend yield to the asset pricing
model.
In the next step earnings-per-price is added to the model. Both dividend
yield and earnings-per-price do not seem to be significant according to the t-
values. However, the model fit does seem to increase in the asset with smaller
35Values not reported but available from the author on request.
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size. For example, in the smallest asset with dividend yield and earnings-per-
price along with intangible capital return as an explanatory variable, rises
from 10.5% (model with only intangible capital) to 18% under the assumption
of homogeneity. However, as the asset size grows larger the model fit does
increases but the joint distributional covariance between the returns and the
independent variable does not appear to show a significant improvement.
The R2FM model fit increases from 45.6% to just 47%. When in the next
model earnings-per-share is used as a sole explanatory variable in addition to
intangible capital the model fit does not diverge from the previous estimates
in any significant way.
In the next model the intangible capital asset pricing model is estimated
under the joint distributional assumption with the systematic risk measured
by the market index returns. The Jagannathan-Wang estimates of this model
for the large assets go up to 70% whereas the two-step Fama-MacBeth esti-
mates of this model is 60% for the largest set of assets. The improvements
in the model fit are observed for the smaller size assets.
In the last set of models, Size ME as independent variable and Size ME
along with BE/ME ratio of the assets are used in addition to intangible
capital in an asset pricing model. In both cases there is model fit observed
an increasing trend in correlation with size of the asset. There are however
significant asset pricing errors found in both models even with the increasing
level of model fit.
Insert Table 6d — Appendix A.4.4
6.4.8 Robustness Check
The robustness of a model estimate hinges on many factors, some of which
are – (a) the accuracy of the returns and ratio calculation, (b) validity of the
assumptions made during the estimation procedure, and (c) significance of
the statistical and economic factors36. In order to address the first concern,
36There are other factors effecting the model estimates that predates the estimation
process in search of an economic meaning, such as accuracy in data gathering and storage
in the various databases. All data that has been used in this study are from standard
databases listed on the WRDS website [254] such as CRSP [79] and Compustat [73],
access provided by Manchester Business School, UK. Therefore, the accuracy of the final
estimates are subject to the accuracy of storage and transmission of the financial data
from these sources.
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the value-weighted returns are calculated using the methodology given in the
previous sections. However, to meet the stylized fact of January-effect [75]
the changes in market equity in the month of January is eliminated to cal-
culate the value-weighted returns and the same methodological asset pricing
models are repeated. No difference has been found using the Fama-MacBeth
or Jagannathan-Wang estimation of the asset pricing models. In order to
address the assumptions that the Fama-MacBeth estimation methodology
makes during the estimation, White test and Breusch-Pagan test for het-
eroscedasticity are performed. No heteroscedasticity found in the returns
model, however, White-Huber SE are estimated for the Fama-MacBeth mod-
els to address unobserved heteroscedasticity. The reading of the results shows
that no matter what estimates are used the final conclusion reached on the
model are robust. Finally, there is an obvious difference between statistical
significance and economic significance, and the presence of one does not guar-
antee the other. In the inference and the conclusion economic significance
has been accommodated.
6.5 Discussion
This chapter took a fresh look into the role of non-tradable assets such as
human capital and structural capital in explaining asset prices. Empirical
studies on intangibles focus solely on RND. This empirical definition of in-
tangibles is however, insufficient to say the least and could be potentially
risky. In a theoretical asset pricing model of a fully diversified portfolio the
cross-sectional returns can only be explained by the systematic risk. The
empirical findings from this chapter show that human capital, as modeled,
has substantial explanatory power of the value-weighted cross-sectional stock
returns of portfolios sorted at the intersection of industry-specific deciles of
Size ME and BE/ME portfolios. Human capital or structural capital is an id-
iosyncratic risk, which is not completely diversified away and has substantial
explanatory power using R2JW going as high as 97%
37 in one of the portfolios.
This paper has argued and empirically demonstrated that SGA can be used
as a measure of assets measure of human capital, in expenses, and therefore
can be used in future research with sufficient caution.
37Portfolio number P5,4, where P is the portfolio code in the 5x5 matrix as listed in
footnote 26 of this chapter, where 5 is the code of the row and 4 is code for the column.
Not reported separately, available from the author on request.
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The structural capital is the capitalized and amortized RND expenses and
there are two basic objectives to perform this test. One, to renew the evidence
on the structural capital in the most recent years, and secondly, to create
comparative controls for the evidence from human capital and intangible
capital, when human capital is part of the latter. The evidence shows that
it is in fact structural capital that produces the best model fit R2 and it
can explain the cross-section of stock returns. Therefore, structural capital
is obviously not diversified away in the portfolios and is priced especially in
the assets with largest size.
Last but not least, Expenses on human resources and RND spending is
amalgamated to create a new variable called intangible capital. The pre-
diction of the value-weighted cross-section of stock returns are hypothesized
to significantly improve. However, the empirical results do not show any
improvement in the explaining the returns. In fact the cross-sectional ex-
planation is inferior as captured by the R2 model fit of the variables when
modeled separately. One explanation of this empirical results is that with
the amalgamation a lot of the heterogeneity of each individual factor, hu-
man capital and structural capital, is lost. This loss of heterogeneity among
human capital and structural capital undermines the risks associated with
the factors and does not fully price them. This highlights the importance
of the factors separately, even of they have similar attributes, such as non-
tradability and similar accounting treatment.
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter focused on the human capital and compared it with structural
capital in the form of capitalized RND expenses. Every firm invests in a
portfolio of human capital that is optimal for its operations. They are a non-
tradable asset similar to structural capital and the accounting requirements
of both are very similar — expense when incurred. However, the risks of these
variables are not fully understood especially for human capital. The main
problem with human capital is credible data. Many have studied it using
industry level macroeconomic data and found very weak evidence. Here in
this study capitalized SGA is hypothesized as a measure of human capital
since all the expenses a firm incurs in paying its human resources are reported
under this publicly available variable. Additionally, due to the similarity
between capitalized RND and SGA, a common variable on intangibles is
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created by adding them. The evidence found in this study confirms that
human capital has a significant explanatory power which is found to go up
to explain about 97% of the cross-section variances of returns. However,
overall structural capital has a better explanatory power when compared
to human capital. Surprisingly, the worst performer amongst all three was
intangible capital which is an amalgamation of human and structural capital.
One explanation for this poor show is the loss of heterogeneity of human and
structural capitals whose discount rates are found to be different, therefore
when these factors are added up, the resulting variable is a poor estimator
of risk associated with human and structural capitals.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
Intangibles is a complex research agenda. There are many manifestations
of intangibles — and in each of its form, management, investors and other
stakeholders have to deal with the risks. This study has demonstrated that
intangibles are available to firms at the microeconomic level (human capital,
RND, etc.) and at macroeconomic level (regulatory framework, etc.). There-
fore, as with any resource the risks associated with intangibles are sometimes
systematic or idiosyncratic.
To understand the risks associated with intangibles there are many ap-
proaches. This study is a collection of four approaches, looking at intangibles
in four different ways — they are, (i.) intangibles-intensive firms because of
their investments in structural intangibles such as RND, (ii.) macroeconomic
intangibles, (iii.) an intangible concept — organizational capital, and (iv.)
search for the measure of human capital and structural intangibles. How-
ever, at its foundation lies the same problem — what are the known-knowns
and the known-unknowns? These risks must be understood theoretically and
empirically because as it has been highlighted in the text earlier, firms are
investing rapidly in intangibles generating assets, resources and capabilities.
7.1 Problems
Investors demand compensation to hold risky assets. If intangibles and/or
human capital is making assets riskier then these risks need to be understood.
Management needs to raise capital and fund projects that could create poten-
tial intangibles. If intangibles or human capital are the source of information
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asymmetries between the insiders and the outsiders the cost of capital be-
comes expensive, projects unsustainable and sometimes unproductive and
the firms riskier. Do managers understand these tradeoffs and how are they
communicating with the investors in order to address concerns of information
asymmetries and cost of capital?
The researches relating to intangibles, especially in the accounting and
finance literature sometimes fail to acknowledge that there are assets and
resources that are not only microeconomic at the firm or individual level but
there are elements that are intangible and available to an entire industry or to
the economy. Regulatory framework is one such macroeconomic intangible.
Similar to any asset, there are known-unknowns and there are unknown-
unknowns that are a source of risk. These risk are sometimes idiosyncratic
and at times systematic in nature.
In the domain of intangibles there are many ideas and concepts that
are especially prominent in the management science literature — one such
concept is organizational capital. This concept is all encompassing and can
sometimes explain everything without measuring anything. Is there any such
things as organizational capital? Is it important to the portfolio holders? Are
there idiosyncratic risks associated with it and if so, what is the compensation
that investors receive on holding this risk? These are some of the question
that has been explored in this study.
Lastly, one of the most important problems of intangibles — how to
measure the factors such as human capital and structural intangibles? Many
studies have tried to model risk-loading on human capital using industry level
data. Most of these studies have not had encouraging findings. Therefore,
this study tries to find out if there is a microeconomic variable that is a
better explanation of human capital? If so, does that improve the results in
any way? Additionally, do human capital and structural intangibles, both
non-tradable assets, what are the risk-loading if these two are combined to
create one common variable that represent total investments in intangibles?
7.2 Findings
Findings from the Chapter 3, which is a study that looked into the non-
financial textual disclosures firms make in their annual report. The sample
of firms selected for this study are all in the Pharmaceuticals industry who
invest heavily into RND. Therefore the intangible character of the sample
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is tangential to the set-up of the study — which aims to find out if these
voluntary disclosure have any impact on the expected returns of the assets
in the sample portfolio. Here the expected returns are a measure of the cost
of capital because investors seek compensation to cover the risk of holding
an asset with private information. The intangible-intensive character of the
sample where little clarity is there about the ongoing RND and the potential
outcome, makes the obvious assumption that there are private information
which the insiders know and outsiders don’t. Non-financial textual infor-
mation in the MD&A section of the annual reports is a forward looking
disclosure which is used by the insiders to make private information pub-
lic. The study found that, in aggregate the non-financial textual disclosures
does not have any explanatory power when it comes to the expected returns.
However, when the disclosures are broken down to groups of communication
indicators, the results are encouraging. Factors such as Customer & Market
and Innovation & IPR are found to explain the expected stock returns which
means they have an impact on the firm’s cost of capital.
In the next chapter (4), the macroeconomic intangible risk of a chang-
ing regulation is studied with respect to Reg FD and SOX. These set of
regulatory reforms were implemented in the United States to reduce discrim-
inatory disclosures and promote financial and non-financial disclosures after
a spat of big accounting frauds that impacted the whole of the American
economy amid a strong political and social backlash. The study tried to find
out the following: (i.) did the regulatory reforms change the information
environment in any significant way? (ii.) does regulatory size play any role
in creating the information environment? (iii.) how does age of firms in
the stock market effect its information environment? and (iv.) is there a
causal relationship between analysts and news which are the key information
intermediaries? The findings show that there was indeed a change in the
information environment since 2002 as the regulatory reforms took effect in
the stock market. Regulatory size of firms does impact the information envi-
ronment as large firms attract more attention in the stock market. The study
also found that the age of firms in the stock market has a distinct impact
on the information environment and information intermediaries such as news
produce new information that has the ability to reduce information asym-
metry. Finally, the study found there is a causal relation between news and
analysts where analysts Granger cause news. This result is quite intuitive
as the number of analysts swell the competition to produce new information
increase amongst the analysts themselves, who are concerned about their
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career and with the quality of reports. They know that only quality and
accurate forecasts and recommendations will increase the business of their
brokerage and by extension themselves. Therefore, this demand pull by the
analysts is able to get firms to disclose more, and since discriminatory dis-
closure is outlawed by the regulatory reforms, information finds its way into
news and thereby increases the number of news articles.
The chapter following that (5) studies the intangible called organizational
capital. In management science literature many references are found that
discuss organizational capital, however, there are no commonly agreed upon
set of measurement variables for this “capital”. In this study it is theorized
that a firm’s or a portfolio’s past performance efficiency can be used as a
measure of its organizational capital. The risk-loading associated with this
capital can be estimated using a modified asset pricing model. To model the
performance efficiency six performance measures are identified which are —
(i.) cash flow by book equity ratio (ii.) investment ratio (iii.) productivity
(iv.) return on assets (v.) sales growth, and (vi.) Tobin’s Q. Each of these
factors are chosen as they highlight a different estimation of performance
efficiency and their established presence in the accounting and economics
literature. The study finds that among all the variables sales growth has the
best record in predicting future expected returns. Overall outcome of this
study was to propose a new method using which organizational capital can
be defined and modeled in the financial accounting literature.
In the last empirical study from the Chapter 6, the human capital and
structural intangibles are examined separately and then jointly. Human cap-
ital and structural intangibles have some similarities — they are both non-
tradable assets and the accounting treatment of both variables are similar.
Therefore, a separate variable is created by merging these two factors to
create a new one which measure most of the intangibles as expensed in the
financial accounts. The findings from the chapter shows that human capi-
tal, as measured in this chapter using the microeconomic accounting variable
called selling, general and administrative expenses, has substantial explana-
tory power when it comes to future expected stock returns which goes for a
portfolio as high as 97%. Structural capital is created using the capitalized
structural intangibles such as RND. It also does have explanatory power in
terms of expected returns. However, when it comes to intangible capital
which is an amalgamation of selling, general and administrative expenses
and research and development expenses, the predictive power of this vari-
able is found to be the lowest. This is a somewhat surprising result as the
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variable ideally should measure both human capital and structural intangible
and its risk-loading on the expected stock returns but adding these variables
the heterogeneity of the variables is lost and the economic meaning therefore
diminished.
7.3 Summary
In summation, there are many ways to study the risks associated with in-
tangibles and human capital as this topic is dynamic, young and growing
rapidly. The term intangibles itself could mean many things therefore there
is a necessity in the academic literature to keep the meaning of the word
open and dynamic similar to the economic variables and measure its repre-
sentation. Lastly, human capital is found to have a separate identity of itself
and it should not be mixed with the multiple variables or measures of intan-
gibles. All these go on to create assets for the firms and the portfolio stock
holders. The known-uncertainties and the unknown-uncertainties associated
with these variables are causes of risks. To further the literature — there is
a need to go after the unknown-unknowns risks associated with these factor
variables.
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A.1 Non-Financial Disclosures and Cost of
Capital
A.1.1 Information Indicators
Table i.: List of Indicators
1. Strategy 2. Human Resources, cont. 3. Customer and Market, cont.
Strategies Employee by religion Active customers
Focus, vision and mission Employee by type of contract Customer divided into categories
Strategic agreements Incentives by category Market analysis
Objectives Company benefit policy Industry analysis
Social Responsibility Employee policy Orders backlog
Environmental Policy Educational level New customers
Risk Management Average age Number of sales outlets
Strategic Position Seniority in company Distribution network
Regulatory Environment Training program Contacts
Value Drivers Number of male and female Level of customer satisfaction
Targets Employee target Registered users
Security program Number of apprentices Active users
Number of page visits on the site
2. Human Resources 3. Customer and Market Market served
Number of employees Total potential market Market penetration index
Employee by category Market position Competitive Environment
Employee by division Competitors Description of brands etc.
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Table i.: List of Indicators, continued
4. Innovation and IPR 5. Organization 6. Corporate Governance
RND capabilities Company Organization Chart Board members
Projects developed internally Legally protected IA Board Activities
New product development Company culture Ethical code
Technology used Info. system description Committee members
RND laboratory Desc. of organization change Committee activities
RND objectives Internal control
RND partnerships Description of firm bodies
Number of researchers Investor relations
Relationship between board
Combined code
Source: Zambon and Bergamini [256]




1 - 4 sentences 1
5 - 10 sentences 2
¡ 10 sentences 3
Source: Adapted from Zambon and Bergamini [256]
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A.1.3 Correlation Matrix
Table iii.: Correlation Matrix




Total InfoEx 0.09 0.04 1
Strategy 0.04 0.00 0.74* 1
Cust. and Market -0.07 -0.03 0.85* 0.57* 1
HR 0.23* 0.04 0.32* 0.10 0.25* 1
Organization 0.03 0.20 -0.33* -0.29* -0.40* 0.22 1
Innov. & IPR 0.10 -0.09 0.66* 0.43* 0.50* 0.13 -0.38* 1
Corp. Gov. 0.14 0.13 0.72* 0.47* 0.52* 0.20 -0.17 0.26* 1
MEt -0.13 0.01 -0.01 0.08 -0.04 -0.10 -0.06 -0.06 0.04 1
BE/ME -0.38* 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.08 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.13 -0.09 1
RND/BE 0.14 0.14 0.07 0.08 0.01 -0.02 0.07 0.16 0.08 -0.07 -0.20 1
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Table iii.: Correlation Matrix, continues




Total InfoQt 0.09 0.07 1
Strategy 0.00 0.03 0.86* 1
Cust. and Market -0.02 0.03 0.87* 0.73* 1
HR 0.18 0.01 0.27* 0.10 0.25* 1
Organization 0.10 0.16 -0.22 -0.20 -0.24* 0.36* 1
Innov. & IPR 0.12 -0.05 0.78* 0.67* 0.63* 0.09 -0.23* 1
Corp. Gov. 0.11 0.14 0.79* 0.55* 0.59* 0.25* -0.23* 0.44* 1
MEt -0.13 0.01 0.00 0.07 -0.02 -0.09 -0.06 -0.04 0.09 1
BE/ME -0.38* 0.05 0.11 0.16 0.13 -0.08 -0.08 0.06 0.00 -0.09 1
RND/BE 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.17 0.14 0.09 -0.07 -0.20 1
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A.1.4 Description of Variables
Table 3a: Description of Variables
In this table the qualitative non-financial and textual data from the annual reports are numerated. From Panel i. Ind. are the types of comm.
indicators. Obs. is the number of observations in the dataset. Tot. Ind. is the total number of sub-indicators per comm. indicator. “Information
Existence” section tabulates the comm. indicators in binary (0 , 1). “Information Quality” section tabulates the quality of information on 4 pt.
scale (0, 1, 2, 3). Abs. is the absolute number of comm. indicators found in the qualitative data. Ratio is the number of comm. indicator found per
total number of indicator for that type of comm. From Panel ii. Fin. Ind. is the accounting and market variables.
Panel i. Panel ii.
Ind. Obs. Tot. Ind.
Information Existence Information Quality (4 Levels.)
Fin. Ind. Mean Std. Dev.
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Abs. Ratio Abs. Ratio Abs. Ratio Abs. Ratio lnRet 0.17 0.43
Total 75 70 35.76 0.51 8.30 0.12 69.29 0.33 21.79 0.10 vola 10.66 22.34
Strategy 75 12 8.73 0.12 1.62 0.02 18.96 0.09 5.92 0.03 Rm−Rf 0.01 0.001
Cust. & Mkt 75 20 10.17 0.15 2.96 0.04 20.59 0.10 7.73 0.04 lnME 15.91 1.39
HR 75 15 4.45 0.06 2.63 0.04 7.21 0.03 5.57 0.03 BE 4.13 7.73
Org. 75 05 1.36 0.02 0.78 0.01 2.80 0.01 1.46 0.01 RND 0.70 1.47
Inv. & IPR 75 08 5.07 0.07 1.49 0.02 9.36 0.04 3.69 0.02 BE/ME 0.23 0.20
Corp. Gov. 75 10 5.97 0.09 1.61 0.02 10.37 0.05 3.62 0.02 RND/BE 0.32 0.78
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A.1.5 Returns Model
Table 3b: Returns Model
In this table the GLS-RE estimates of the Returns model is tabulated with the dependent variable as lnRet (β) calculated between Dec(t− 1) and
Dec(t). “Information Existence” section tabulates the comm. indicators in binary. “Information Quality” section tabulates the quality of information
on 4 pt. scale. Rm−Rf is the risk-adjusted market return from the year t− 1. lnME, BE/ME, RND/BE, InfoEx, InfoQt are natural log of market
equity, book-by-market ratio RND-by-book equity ratio, total information existence variable, total information quality variable respectively. Strategy,
Cust. & Mkt, HR, Org., Inv. & IPR , Corp. Gov. are the comm. indicators as identified by Zambon-Bergamini model. α is the pricing error
denoted by the slope of the regression line. R2 is the coefficient of determination. (* is sig. at 5% p-value < 0.05)
Information Existence Panel i. Information Quality Panel ii.
Sub-Panel i. Sub-Panel ii. Sub-Panel iii. Sub-Panel iv.
a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j. k. l.
Rm−Rf 10.83 28.24 32.97 8.00 27.50 33.97 10.78 27.89 32.53 8.85 25.76 33.34
lnME -0.01 -0.07 -0.02 -0.08 -0.01 -0.07 -0.02 -0.09
BE/ME -1.33* -1.22* -1.34* -1.24*
RND/BE 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.05
InfoEx 0.05 0.11 0.12
InfoQt 0.02 0.07 0.09
Strategy -0.03 0.01 0.29 -0.22 -0.31 -0.13
Cust. & Mkt -0.51* -0.82* -0.72* -0.22 -0.42 -0.40
HR 0.13 0.20 0.20 0.05 0.08 0.09
Org. -0.04 -0.10 -0.11 0.06 0.07 0.02
Inv. & IPR 0.21 0.36 0.21 0.25* 0.41* 0.31
Corp. Gov. 0.26 0.40 0.21 0.17 0.31 0.24
α 0.09 0.17 1.00 0.09 0.17 0.87 0.09 0.18 1.03 0.31 0.61 1.26
R2 0.42% 1.8% 19.6% 11.7% 13.5% 27.2% 0.34% 1.7% 19.6% 7.9% 9.5% 24.0%
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A.2 Regulatory Change: A Macroeconomic Intangible Risk
A.2.1 Summary Statistics
Table 4: Summary Statistics
Panel i. Pearson Pairwise Correlation Coefficients and Statistical Significance
lnSR lnS lnNews lnAF lnEPS lnME lnMM lnPrc lnRet lnV ol lnV ola lnTURN
lnSR 1.00
lnS 0.64* 1.00
lnNews -0.44* -0.40* 1.00
lnAF -0.20* 0.07* 0.19* 1.00
lnEPS -0.35* -0.13* 0.38* 0.11 1.00
lnME -0.72* -0.16* 0.44* 0.44* 0.41* 1.00
lnMM -0.70* -0.74* 0.50* 0.20* 0.32* 0.55* 1.00
lnPrc -0.50* 0.25* 0.22* 0.39* 0.39* 0.81* 0.17* 1.00
lnRet 0.07* 0.11* -0.05 -0.01 -0.25* -0.07* -0.11* 0.04 1.00
lnV ol -0.69* -0.56* 0.49* 0.32* 0.30* 0.75* 0.77* 0.38* 0.00 1.00
lnV ola -0.26* 0.16* 0.14* 0.29* -0.07 0.50* 0.10* 0.56* 0.21* 0.30* 1.00
lnTURN -0.52* -0.28* 0.32* 0.22* 0.09 0.48* 0.50* 0.43* 0.20* 0.79* 0.34* 1.00
Panel ii.
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
SR 2196 0.11 0.14 MM 2198 27.04 16.09
S 2206 0.16 0.21 Prc 2282 14.43 16.69
News 3162 136.05 242.75 Ret 2047 0.29 3.37
AF 3162 0.98 2.03 lnV ol 2206 10.54 1.46
EPS 2006 -1.61 7.82 V ola 2179 3.55 5.66
lnME 2206 19.21 1.55 lnTURN 2206 0.00 0.00
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A.2.2 Chow Test
Table 4a: Structural Break: Chow Test
1990-2010 1990-2001 2002-2010
Dependent Variable: lnSR
β t(β) β t(β) β t(β)
lnNewst -0.24 (-5.57) -0.16 (-3.27) -0.22 (-2.94)
lnNewst−1 -0.11 (-2.92) -0.14 (-3.23) -0.07 (-1.16)
SRt−1 0.56 (17.97) 0.55 (8.20) 0.21 (3.91)
lnAFt -0.42 (-7.61) -0.42 (-6.53) -0.47 (-5.78)
α -0.04 (-0.27) -0.11 (-0.63) -1.68 (-5.87)
Adj.R2 49.3% 38.7% 17.8%
N 939 441 498
Df 934 436 493
RSS 1015.10 326.45 588.65
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A.2.3 News Articles
Table 4b: News Articles
This Table is divided into three panels — i., ii., and iii. where the estimates are from the time period 1990-2010, 1990-2001 and 2002-2010, respectively.
SR is the relative bid-ask spread ratio. S is the average absolute bid-ask spread. Newst, Newst−1, and Newst−2 are the contemporaneous, first
lag and second lag of the natural log of News variable. lnEPS, lnME, lnMM , lnPrc, lnRet, lnV ol, lnV ola, and lnTURN are the natural log of
earnings-per share, market equity, market makers, stock price, annual asset returns, annual return, trading volume, volatility of the annual daily
equal-weighted returns, and trading volume per shares outstanding, respectively. α is the pricing error denoted by the slope of the regression line.
R2 is the coefficient of determination. N is the number of obs. (* is sig. at 5% p-value < 0.05)
Newst Newst−1 Newst−2 lnEPS lnME lnMM lnPrc lnRet lnV ol lnV ola lnTURN α R2 N
Panel i. 1990-2010
SR.
i. -0.14* -0.01 1.38 -1.31* -1.88 -0.04 -1.48 0.03* 1.42 3.87* 72.0% 209
ii. -0.44* -0.15* -0.16* 0.17 23.3% 1677
S.
iii. -0.11 0.01 2.12 -1.29 -1.56 -0.02 -2.24 0.02 2.11 1.50 62.7% 208
iv. -0.30 -0.09 -0.32 0.29 22.2% 1675
Panel ii. 1990-2001
SR.
v. -0.01 -0.01 1.18 -0.22 -1.49 -0.03 -1.64 -0.01 1.41 3.41* 84.1% 80
vi. -0.20* -0.06 -0.22* -2.13* 21.9% 717
S.
vii. 0.01 0.01 2.07 -0.19 -1.39 -0.04 -2.53 -0.02 2.28 3.14* 60.9% 80
viii. 0.03 -0.04 -0.20* -0.94* 9.6% 717
Panel iii. 2002-2010
SR.
ix. -0.06 0.08 1.76 -0.56* -2.61* -0.10 -2.00 0.07* 1.78 1.01 69.1% 129
x. -0.30* -0.25* 0.15* -3.53* 14.0% 728
S.
xi. -0.02 0.08 2.85* -0.45* -2.59* -0.03 -3.03* 0.04 * 2.71* -1.47 44.7% 128
xii. 0.02 -0.14* -0.04 -2.92 * 2.7% 729
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A.2.4 Analyst Following
Table 4c: Analyst Following
This Table is divided into three panels — i., ii., and iii. where the estimates are from the time period 1990-2010, 1990-2001 and 2002-2010,
respectively. SR is the relative bid-ask spread ratio. S is the average absolute bid-ask spread. AFt, AFt−1 and AFt−2 are the contemporaneous,
first lag and second lag of the natural log of Analyst following variable. lnEPS, lnME, lnMM , lnPrc, lnRet, lnV ol, lnV ola, and lnTURN are
the natural log of earnings-per share, market equity, market makers, stock price, annual asset returns, annual return, trading volume, volatility of
the annual daily equal-weighted returns, and trading volume per shares outstanding, respectively. α is the pricing error denoted by the slope of the
regression line. R2 is the coefficient of determination. N is the number of obs. (* is sig. at 5% p-value < 0.05)
AFt AFt−1 AFt−2 lnEPS lnME lnMM lnPrc lnRet lnV ol lnV ola lnTURN α R2 N
Panel i. 1990-2010
SR.
i. 0.27* -0.04 5.25 -1.41* -5.91 -0.11 -5.52 0.02 5.70 8.15 71.0% 142
ii. -0.13 0.11 -0.20* -3.30* 2.6% 552
S.
iii. 0.13 0.03 4.74 -1.53* -4.38 -0.06 -4.96 0.02 5.09 5.70* 62.9 142
iv. 0.21* 0.20* -0.18* -2.89* 2.9% 551
Panel ii. 1990-2001
SR.
v. 0.33* 0.01 4.31 -0.66* -4.98 0.02 -4.64 0.00 4.69 5.01* 85.3% 59
vi. -0.16 0.02 -0.24* -4.01* 11.9% 259
S.
vii. 0.35* 0.04 5.21 -0.67* -4.86 0.02 -5.54 -0.01 5.60 5.16* 63.3% 59
viii. 0.09 0.19* -0.12 -1.76* 1.2% 259
Panel iii. 2002-2010
SR.
ix. 0.00 0.12 -0.23 * -0.55 -0.65* -0.12 0.00* 0.06* -0.06 1.60 51.2% 83
x. -0.29* -0.08 0.00 -5.95* 8.5% 222
S.
xi. -0.12 0.15* 40.90 -0.44 -40.68 -0.06 -41.05 0.05* 40.96 -0.67 37.0% 83
xii. 0.04 -0.04 0.03 -3.85* 0.4% 223
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A.2.5 News Articles — Large Firms
Table 4d: News Articles — Large Firms
This Table is divided into three panels — i., ii., and iii. where the estimates are from the time period 1990-2010, 1990-2001 and 2002-2010, respectively.
SR is the relative bid-ask spread ratio. S is the average absolute bid-ask spread. Newst, Newst−1, and Newst−2 are the contemporaneous, first
lag and second lag of the natural log of News variable. lnEPS, lnME, lnMM , lnPrc, lnRet, lnV ol, lnV ola, and lnTURN are the natural log of
earnings-per share, market equity, market makers, stock price, annual asset returns, annual return, trading volume, volatility of the annual daily
equal-weighted returns, and trading volume per shares outstanding, respectively. α is the pricing error denoted by the slope of the regression line.
R2 is the coefficient of determination. N is the number of obs. (* is sig. at 5% p-value < 0.05)
Newst Newst−1 Newst−2 lnEPS lnME lnMM lnPrc lnRet lnV ol lnV ola lnTURN α R2 N
Panel i. 1990-2010
SR.
i. -0.22* 0.03 3.00 -1.42* -3.31 -0.05 -3.06 0.02 3.08 3.84* 65.1% 127
ii. -0.52* -0.11 -0.33* 0.83* 29.8% 470
S.
iii. -0.19* 0.08 3.67 -1.32* -2.89 0.01 -3.78 0.01 3.77 2.17 61.8% 126
iv. -0.36* -0.08 -0.31* 0.96* 17.5% 469
Panel ii. 1990-2001
SR.
v. 0.00 0.06 0.82 -0.09 -0.89 -0.06 -1.49 -0.01 1.26 5.70* 83.2% 54
vi. -0.10 -0.14 -0.32* -2.10* 25.2% 228
S.
vii. 0.02 0.09 1.69 -0.03 -0.74 -0.07 -2.41 -0.02 2.15 6.09* 66.4% 54
viii. 0.10 -0.13 -0.26* -0.30 19.0% 228
Panel iii. 2002-2010
SR.
ix. -0.25 0.35* 56.56 -0.69 -57.57 -0.13 -56.65 0.07* 56.55 1.02 39.4% 73
x. -0.24* -0.16 0.06 -4.93* 15.8% 184
S.
xi. -0.21* 0.36* 256.2 -0.56 -256.1 0.02 -256.2 0.05* 256.2 -0.79 40.2% 72
xii. -0.06 -0.01 0.07 -3.82* 0.1% 184
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A.2.6 News Articles — Small Firms
Table 4e: News Articles — Small Firms
This Table is divided into three panels — i., ii., and iii. where the estimates are from the time period 1990-2010, 1990-2001 and 2002-2010, respectively.
SR is the relative bid-ask spread ratio. S is the average absolute bid-ask spread. Newst, Newst−1, and Newst−2 are the contemporaneous, first
lag and second lag of the natural log of News variable. lnEPS, lnME, lnMM , lnPrc, lnRet, lnV ol, lnV ola, and lnTURN are the natural log of
earnings-per share, market equity, market makers, stock price, annual asset returns, annual return, trading volume, volatility of the annual daily
equal-weighted returns, and trading volume per shares outstanding, respectively. α is the pricing error denoted by the slope of the regression line.
R2 is the coefficient of determination. N is the number of obs. (* is sig. at 5% p-value < 0.05)
Newst Newst−1 Newst−2 lnEPS lnME lnMM lnPrc lnRet lnV ol lnV ola lnTURN α R2 N
Panel i. 1990-2010
SR.
i. -0.04 -0.05 -0.40 -1.01* -0.40 -0.02 -0.01 0.09* -0.05 8.09* 82.1% 82
ii. -0.32* -0.14* -0.10* -0.49 * 15.8% 1207
S.
iii. -0.02 -0.05 0.90 -0.99* -0.62 -0.04 -1.29 0.08* 1.14 5.00 73.7% 82
iv. -0.29* -0.09* -0.32* 0.13 29.1% 1206
Panel ii. 1990-2001
SR.
v. -0.01 -0.12* -63.69 -0.41 63.17 0.04 63.44 0.01 -63.74 0.34 91.7% 26
vi. -0.18* -0.04 -0.18* -2.32* 11.8% 489
S.
vii. 0.00 -0.10 41.57 -0.45 -41.10 0.04 -41.73 0.01 41.37 -1.19 79.0% 26
viii. 0.02 -0.02 -0.19* -1.07* 9.5% 489
Panel iii. 2002-2010
SR.
ix. 0.08 -0.04 -0.54 -0.14 -0.48 0.00 -0.06 0.12* -0.21 4.83 86.6% 56
x. -0.25* -0.25* 0.18* -3.62* 7.4% 544
S.
xi. 0.12 -0.03 1.14 -0.11 -1.03 -0.04 -1.69 0.08 1.32 2.84 70.6% 56
xii. 0.01 -0.17* -0.07* -2.58* 7.2% 545
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A.2.7 Analyst Following — Large Firms
Table 4f: Analyst Following — Large Firms
This Table is divided into three panels — i., ii., and iii. where the estimates are from the time period 1990-2010, 1990-2001 and 2002-2010,
respectively. SR is the relative bid-ask spread ratio. S is the average absolute bid-ask spread. AFt, AFt−1 and AFt−2 are the contemporaneous,
first lag and second lag of the natural log of Analyst following variable. lnEPS, lnME, lnMM , lnPrc, lnRet, lnV ol, lnV ola, and lnTURN are
the natural log of earnings-per share, market equity, market makers, stock price, annual asset returns, annual return, trading volume, volatility of
the annual daily equal-weighted returns, and trading volume per shares outstanding, respectively. α is the pricing error denoted by the slope of the
regression line. R2 is the coefficient of determination. N is the number of obs. (* is sig. at 5% p-value < 0.05)
AFt AFt−1 AFt−2 lnEPS lnME lnMM lnPrc lnRet lnV ol lnV ola lnTURN α R2 N
Panel i. 1990-2010
SR.
i. 0.33* 0.00 6.41 -1.47* -7.21 -0.16 -6.67 0.02 7.00 9.57 * 62.8% 102
ii. 0.02 0.20 -0.38* -3.94* 2.3% 276
S.
iii. 0.18 0.11 6.53 -1.60* -6.30 -0.06 -6.74 0.02 7.08 7.64* 57.9% 102
iv. 0.24 0.13 -0.28* -2.79 * 2.2% 276
Panel ii. 1990-2001
SR.
v. 0.32* 0.09 4.25 -0.66 -4.99 -0.04 -4.67 0.00 4.85 7.63* 82.1% 40
vi. -0.12 0.08 -0.32* -4.40* 13.1% 138
S.
vii. 0.35* 0.13 4.79 -0.64 -4.51 -0.04 -5.24 0.00 5.39 7.92* 68.7% 40
viii. 0.07 0.07 0.00 -1.73* 0.1% 138
Panel iii. 2002-2010
SR.
ix. 0.07 0.31* -325.5 -0.55 324.2 -0.09 325.3 0.07* -325.3 2.45 37.2% 62
x. -0.05 0.06 -0.06 -7.06* 0.7% 106
S.
xi. -0.01 0.45* 173.9 -0.48 -174.1 0.02 -174.0 0.06* 174.23 1.18 40.6% 62
xii. 0.06 -0.04 0.01 -3.90* 0.7% 107
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A.2.8 Analyst Following — Small Firms
Table 4g: Analyst Following — Small Firms
This Table is divided into three panels — i., ii., and iii. where the estimates are from the time period 1990-2010, 1990-2001 and 2002-2010,
respectively. SR is the relative bid-ask spread ratio. S is the average absolute bid-ask spread. AFt, AFt−1 and AFt−2 are the contemporaneous,
first lag and second lag of the natural log of Analyst following variable. lnEPS, lnME, lnMM , lnPrc, lnRet, lnV ol, lnV ola, and lnTURN are
the natural log of earnings-per share, market equity, market makers, stock price, annual asset returns, annual return, trading volume, volatility of
the annual daily equal-weighted returns, and trading volume per shares outstanding, respectively. α is the pricing error denoted by the slope of the
regression line. R2 is the coefficient of determination. N is the number of obs. (* is sig. at 5% p-value < 0.05)
AFt AFt−1 AFt−2 lnEPS lnME lnMM lnPrc lnRet lnV ol lnV ola lnTURN α R2 N
Panel i. 1990-2010
SR.
i. 0.13 0.00 -39.13 -1.63* 38.35 0.02 38.82 0.02 -38.70 9.64* 81.6% 40
ii. -0.04 0.21 0.19 -3.20* 2.2% 276
S.
iii. 0.15 -0.04 -77.84 -1.29* 78.23 0.00 77.42 -0.01 -77.42 7.44 80.2% 40
iv. 0.26* 0.33* 0.00 -3.04* 5.7% 275
Panel ii. 1990-2001
SR v. -0.02 0.12 -0.07 -3.96* 0.02% 121
S. vi. 0.16 0.36* -0.19 -1.85* 8.3% 121
Panel iii. 2002-2010
SR vii. -0.21 0.11 0.29* -5.63* 1.9% 116
S. viii. 0.06 0.00 0.07 -3.84* 0.24% 116
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A.2.9 News Articles — New Firm
Table 4h: News Articles — New Firm
This Table is divided into three panels — i., ii., and iii. where the estimates are from the time period 1990-2010, 1990-2001 and 2002-2010, respectively.
SR is the relative bid-ask spread ratio. S is the average absolute bid-ask spread. Newst, Newst−1, and Newst−2 are the contemporaneous, first
lag and second lag of the natural log of News variable. lnEPS, lnME, lnMM , lnPrc, lnRet, lnV ol, lnV ola, and lnTURN are the natural log of
earnings-per share, market equity, market makers, stock price, annual asset returns, annual return, trading volume, volatility of the annual daily
equal-weighted returns, and trading volume per shares outstanding, respectively. α is the pricing error denoted by the slope of the regression line.
R2 is the coefficient of determination. N is the number of obs. (* is sig. at 5% p-value < 0.05)
Newst Newst−1 Newst−2 lnEPS lnME lnMM lnPrc lnRet lnV ol lnV ola lnTURN α R2 N
Panel i. 1990-2010
SR.
i. 0.06 0.06 1.33 -0.36 -1.39 -0.18* -1.96 -0.01 1.77 7.58 74.8% 28
ii. -0.18* 0.05 -0.07* -1.42* 8.7% 389
S.
iii. 0.09 0.12 2.22 -0.30 -1.21 -0.17* -2.89 -0.02 2.65 5.72 60.7% 28
iv. -0.07 -0.02 -0.17* -0.85* 11.9% 389
Panel ii. 1990-2001
SR.
v. 0.08 0.11 0.52 -0.51 -0.92 -0.16* -0.98 0.00 0.82 4.70 77.0% 25
vi. -0.18* -0.05 -0.06 -2.52* 13.1% 300
S.
vii. 0.10 0.21 1.41 -0.59 -0.94 -0.18* -1.81 0.01 1.60 3.79 28.2% 25
viii. 0.05 -0.01 -0.13* -1.09* 5.6% 300
Panel iii. 2002-2010
SR. ix. -0.28 0.05 -0.15* -3.29* 1.4% 52
S. x. -0.09 -0.04 -0.16* -1.87* 6.4% 52
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A.2.10 News Articles — Old Firm
Table 4i: News Articles — Old Firm
This Table is divided into three panels — i., ii., and iii. where the estimates are from the time period 1990-2010, 1990-2001 and 2002-2010, respectively.
SR is the relative bid-ask spread ratio. S is the average absolute bid-ask spread. Newst, Newst−1, and Newst−2 are the contemporaneous, first
lag and second lag of the natural log of News variable. lnEPS, lnME, lnMM , lnPrc, lnRet, lnV ol, lnV ola, and lnTURN are the natural log of
earnings-per share, market equity, market makers, stock price, annual asset returns, annual return, trading volume, volatility of the annual daily
equal-weighted returns, and trading volume per shares outstanding, respectively. α is the pricing error denoted by the slope of the regression line.
R2 is the coefficient of determination. N is the number of obs. (* is sig. at 5% p-value < 0.05)
Newst Newst−1 Newst−2 lnEPS lnME lnMM lnPrc lnRet lnV ol lnV ola lnTURN α R2 N
Panel i. 1990-2010
SR.
i. -0.04 -0.05 -0.40 -1.01* -0.40 -0.02 -0.01 0.09* -0.05 8.09* 82.1% 82
ii. -0.32* -0.14* -0.10* -0.49* 15.8% 1207
S.
iii. -0.02 -0.05 0.90 -0.99* -0.62 -0.04 -1.29 0.08* 1.14 5.00 73.7% 82
iv. -0.29* -0.09* -0.32* 0.13 29.1% 1206
Panel ii. 1990-2001
SR.
v. -0.01 -0.12* -63.69 -0.41 63.17 0.04 63.44 0.01 -63.74 0.34 91.7% 26
vi. -0.18* -0.04 -0.18* -2.32* 11.8% 489
S.
vii. 0.00 -0.10 41.57 -0.45 -41.10 0.04 -41.73 0.01 41.37 -1.19 79.0% 26
viii. 0.02 -0.02 -0.19* -1.07* 9.5% 489
Panel iii. 2002-2010
SR.
ix. 0.08 -0.04 -0.54 -0.14 -0.48 0.00 -0.06 0.12* -0.21 4.83 86.6% 56
x. -0.25* -0.25* 0.18* -3.62* 7.4% 544
S.
xi. 0.12 -0.03 1.14 -0.11 -1.03 -0.04 -1.69 0.08 1.32 2.84 70.6% 56
xii. 0.01 -0.17* -0.07* -2.58 * 7.2% 545
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A.2.11 Analyst Following — New Firm
Table 4j: Analyst Following — New Firm
This Table is divided into three panels — i., ii., and iii. where the estimates are from the time period 1990-2010, 1990-2001 and 2002-2010,
respectively. SR is the relative bid-ask spread ratio. S is the average absolute bid-ask spread. AFt, AFt−1 and AFt−2 are the contemporaneous,
first lag and second lag of the natural log of Analyst following variable. lnEPS, lnME, lnMM , lnPrc, lnRet, lnV ol, lnV ola, and lnTURN are
the natural log of earnings-per share, market equity, market makers, stock price, annual asset returns, annual return, trading volume, volatility of
the annual daily equal-weighted returns, and trading volume per shares outstanding, respectively. α is the pricing error denoted by the slope of the
regression line. R2 is the coefficient of determination. N is the number of obs. (* is sig. at 5% p-value < 0.05)
AFt AFt−1 AFt−2 lnEPS lnME lnMM lnPrc lnRet lnV ol lnV ola lnTURN α R2 N
Panel i. 1990-2010
SR. i. -0.27 0.33 -0.33* -2.01* 6.2% 108
S. ii. 0.06 0.53* -0.28* -1.88* 16.4% 108
Panel ii. 1990-2001
SR. iii. -0.35* 0.17 -0.30* -3.34* 15.4% 91
S. iv. -0.07 0.28* -0.07 -1.39* 4.4% 91
Panel iii. 2002-2010
SR. v. -1.34* 2.21* -0.54* -5.34* 96% 7
S. vi. 0.04 0.72 0.09 -3.66* 38.9% 7
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A.2.12 Analyst Following — Old Firm
Table 4k: Analyst Following — Old Firm
This Table is divided into three panels — i., ii., and iii. where the estimates are from the time period 1990-2010, 1990-2001 and 2002-2010,
respectively. SR is the relative bid-ask spread ratio. S is the average absolute bid-ask spread. AFt, AFt−1 and AFt−2 are the contemporaneous,
first lag and second lag of the natural log of Analyst following variable. lnEPS, lnME, lnMM , lnPrc, lnRet, lnV ol, lnV ola, and lnTURN are
the natural log of earnings-per share, market equity, market makers, stock price, annual asset returns, annual return, trading volume, volatility of
the annual daily equal-weighted returns, and trading volume per shares outstanding, respectively. α is the pricing error denoted by the slope of the
regression line. R2 is the coefficient of determination. N is the number of obs. (* is sig. at 5% p-value < 0.05)
AFt AFt−1 AFt−2 lnEPS lnME lnMM lnPrc lnRet lnV ol lnV ola lnTURN α R2 N
Panel i. 1990-2010
SR.
i. 0.13 0.00 -39.13 -1.63* 38.35 0.02 38.82 0.02 -38.70 9.64* 81.6% 40
ii. -0.04 0.21 0.19 -3.20* 2.2% 276
S.
iii. 0.15 -0.04 -77.84 -1.29* 78.23 0.00 77.42 -0.01 -77.42 7.44* 80.2% 40
iv. 0.26* 0.33* 0.00 -3.04* 5.7% 275
Panel ii. 1990-2001
SR. v. -0.02 0.12 -0.07 -3.96* 0.02% 121
S. vi. 0.16 0.36* -0.19 -1.85* 8.3% 121
Panel iii. 2002-2010
SR. vii. -0.21 0.11 0.29* -5.63* 1.9% 116
S. viii. 0.06 0.00 0.07 -3.84* 0.2% 116
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A.2.13 Granger Causality Test
Table 4l: Granger Causality Test
Panel i. lnNewst
1990-2010 1990-2001 2002-2010
lnNewst−1 0.73* 0.77* 0.66* 0.76* 0.77* 0.75*
lnAFt−1 0.03 0.01 0.13*
α 1.20* 1.13* 1.40 1.05* 1.04* 1.33*
R2 71.1% 75.2% 64.9% 71.8% 72.0% 70.8%
F − Stat 3859.3* 1931.7* 1169.1* 687.3* 1911.2* 873.5*
N 2597 1173 1076 514 1360 569
Panel ii. AFt
lnNewst−1 0.04* 0.06* 0.05*
lnAFt−1 0.54* 0.53* 0.59* 0.55* 0.31* 0.35*
α 0.31 0.11 0.30* 0.06 0.39* 0.11
R2 29.8% 31.0% 34.7% 36.3% 24.2% 25.9%
F − Stat 358.2* 369.2* 215.9* 219.2* 43.0* 62.1*




Table 5a: Summary Statistics
Mean (µ) Std. Dev. (σ)
Rp −Rf ME BE/ME DY RND E/P Rp −Rf ME BE/ME DY RND E/P
Small 14.7% 35.4 0.67 0.021 0.05 -0.14 0.34 22.9 0.30 0.041 0.10 0.18
2 13.6% 122.4 0.71 0.015 0.05 -0.02 0.36 85.9 0.28 0.013 0.29 0.09
3 10.6% 309.4 0.70 0.018 0.11 0.01 0.30 188.5 0.26 0.013 0.35 0.09
4 10.5% 906.8 0.68 0.022 0.06 0.05 0.32 505.5 0.21 0.020 0.06 0.06
Big 11.9% 9,179 0.61 0.029 0.06 0.06 0.44 5271 0.20 0.013 0.02 0.04
CF Inv. R Prod. ROA SG Tobin CF Inv. R Prod. ROA SG Tobin
Small 0.01 0.11 3.21 -0.06 11.4% 1.17 0.24 0.04 8.57 0.06 0.39 2.69
2 0.02 0.12 1.56 -0.01 11.2% 0.78 0.47 0.04 5.91 0.04 0.39 3.54
3 0.21 0.12 4.45 0.00 9.4% 3.54 0.60 0.04 14.64 0.05 0.33 16.03
4 0.22 0.12 3.93 0.03 9.3% 3.11 0.18 0.03 2.95 0.03 0.33 3.39
Big 0.18 0.11 2.27 0.05 10.7% 2.69 0.05 0.03 0.49 0.02 0.42 1.00
AR(1) AR(1)
Rp −Rf lnME BE/ME DY RND E/P CF Inv. R Prod. ROA SG Tobin
Small -0.22 0.80* 0.73* 0.18 0.63 0.36 0.20 0.31 0.39 0.40* -0.28 0.27
2 -0.49* 0.85* 0.67* 0.23 0.49* 0.52* 0.10 0.29 0.38 0.41 -0.34 0.23
3 -0.37 0.86* 0.73* 0.49 0.55 0.59* 0.10 0.35* 0.27 0.51* -0.35 0.21
4 -0.40* 0.84* 0.73* 0.23 0.29 0.64* 0.26 0.52* 0.34 0.50* -0.31 0.30
Big -0.23 0.77* 0.72* 0.53 0.46* 0.70* 0.44 0.69* 0.71* 0.55* -0.14 0.77*
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A.3.2 Dividend Yield Model
Table 5b: Dividend Yield Model
In this table Fama-MacBeth estimates with White-Huber SE are presented along with Jagannathan-Wang coefficient of determination R2
JW
. DY is
the dividend yield of the portfolio where the dividend is calculated between year t − 1 and t. Org. Capital is modeled using Cash Flow (CFt−1),
Investment Rate (Inv.Rt−1), Productivity (Prod.t−1), Return on Assets (ROAt−1), Sales Growth (SGt−1) and Tobin’s Q (Tobint−1). 25 portfolios
are created at the deciles intersection of ME and BE/ME starting July 1975 till 2011. The portfolios are reformed annually in June of each year.
The risk-adjusted value-weighted portfolio returns is the dependent variable and it is calculated for each portfolio from July of t − 1 till June of t.
All variables are lagged one year. All values are calculated using the CPI adjusted fundamental of the portfolio assets.
Dividend Yield β Dividend Yield β(t)
Small -2.05 -2.96 -1.87 -1.95 -3.44 -1.43 -1.71 -0.62 -0.79 -0.48 -0.51 -0.98 -1.02 -0.50
2 5.20 4.16 5.41 5.86 4.06 1.31 4.82 0.42 0.28 0.46 0.59 0.35 0.35 0.41
3 -1.18 -1.48 -0.39 0.40 -3.60 -0.38 -1.17 -0.30 -0.55 -0.16 0.18 -0.69 -0.33 -0.29
4 -1.58 -1.77 -1.09 -1.17 -2.22 -0.72 0.87 -1.13 -1.12 -1.02 -0.93 -1.30 -1.07 -0.34
Big -3.01 -3.28 -2.46 -0.42 -4.42 -2.39 0.51 -0.44 -0.40 -0.35 -0.02 -0.66 -1.09 0.19
CF Inv. R Prod. ROA SG Tobin CF Inv. R Prod. ROA SG Tobin
Org. Capital γ Org. Capital γ(t)
Small 0.01 -1.37 -0.05 0.93 0.63 0.11 0.15 -0.89 -0.60 0.98 6.31 0.96
2 0.98 -2.30 -0.07 0.54 0.81 0.20 0.68 -1.40 -0.99 0.39 7.46 1.03
3 0.48 -1.64 -0.16 2.06 0.80 0.24 1.93 -1.03 -1.08 1.57 7.72 1.25
4 0.22 -1.03 -0.09 2.14 0.88 0.32 0.09 -0.71 -0.98 1.10 8.88 2.80
Big -2.15 -0.62 -0.20 2.41 0.95 0.02 -0.77 -0.13 -0.78 0.79 13.95 0.63
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Table 5b: Dividend Yield Model, continued
Please see notes from the previous page.




Small 2.5% 7.5% 7.4% 7.7% 7.9% 51.9% 7.2% 0.21 0.23 0.37 0.35 0.29 0.11 0.04
2 5.7% 10.3% 10.9% 8.7% 10.4% 74.1% 13.5% 0.07 -0.02 0.35 0.26 0.09 0.03 -0.17
3 0.3% 4.0% 3.8% 11.1% 6.1% 72.4% 8.2% 0.13 0.08 0.31 0.50 0.14 0.04 -0.11
4 2.1% 4.5% 5.1% 5.4% 6.1% 76.9% 19.6% 0.14 0.15 0.27 0.36 0.10 0.04 -0.33




Small 7.6% 14.5% 9.4% 13.3% 59.2% 52.3% 16.1% 0.26 0.29 0.32 0.40 0.10 0.12 0.05
2 5.1% 20.5% 10.7% 24.2% 17.6% 64.5% 34.0% 0.10 -0.11 0.30 0.22 -0.06 0.08 -0.25
3 1.5% 17.5% 4.8% 24.5% 15.8% 57.8% 24.1% 0.08 0.15 0.31 0.52 0.30 0.03 -0.20
4 9.7% 4.6% 4.7% 6.0% 9.4% 57.9% 22.2% 0.14 0.14 0.24 0.37 0.17 0.14 -0.35
Big 0.4% 5.4% 6.7% 5.7% 6.5% 83.4% 7.0% 0.15 0.31 0.15 0.43 0.15 0.10 -0.06
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A.3.3 Earnings-per-Price Model
Table 5c: Earnings-per-Price Model
In this table Fama-MacBeth estimates with White-Huber SE are presented along with Jagannathan-Wang coefficient of determination R2
JW
. EP is
the earnings-per-price of the portfolio. Org. Capital is modeled using Cash Flow (CFt−1), Investment Rate (Inv.Rt−1), Productivity (Prod.t−1),
Return on Assets (ROAt−1), Sales Growth (SGt−1) and Tobin’s Q (Tobint−1). 25 portfolios are created at the deciles intersection of ME and
BE/ME starting July 1975 till 2011. The portfolios are reformed annually in June of each year. The risk-adjusted value-weighted portfolio returns
is the dependent variable and it is calculated for each portfolio from July of t − 1 till June of t. All variables are lagged one year. All values are
calculated using the CPI adjusted fundamental of the portfolio assets.
Earnings-by-Price β Earnings-by-Price β(t)
Small 0.48 0.66 0.56 0.57 0.12 0.05 0.58 1.84 2.01 2.15 2.33 0.98 0.46 2.01
2 0.62 0.29 1.03 0.76 0.17 0.12 0.91 0.72 0.36 1.09 0.94 0.74 0.41 1.15
3 0.43 0.42 0.70 0.61 -1.31 0.15 0.52 1.03 0.96 1.34 1.44 -0.52 0.74 1.38
4 0.41 0.42 1.10 0.85 -0.52 0.03 1.18 0.74 0.64 1.12 1.14 -0.34 0.18 1.42
Big -0.79 -1.25 -1.43 -0.20 -3.15 -0.72 1.18 -0.36 -0.55 -0.05 0.10 -1.22 -0.97 0.47
CF Inv. R Prod. ROA SG Tobin CF Inv. R Prod. ROA SG Tobin
Org. Capital γ Org. Capital γ(t)
Small -0.44 -1.51 -0.07 -0.31 0.64 0.11 -0.98 -1.02 -1.29 -0.17 5.88 0.92
2 0.82 -2.81 -0.07 -0.98 0.82 0.20 0.50 -1.69 -1.00 -0.73 7.73 1.04
3 0.22 -1.81 -0.18 4.74 0.80 0.28 1.87 -1.07 -1.35 0.88 7.91 1.44
4 0.30 -1.75 -0.14 3.53 0.88 0.33 0.15 -0.86 -1.36 0.53 8.94 2.86
Big -2.28 -0.06 -0.21 4.84 0.95 0.02 -0.80 -0.13 -0.89 1.32 13.76 0.84
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Table 5c: Earnings-per-Price Model, continued
Please see notes from the previous page.




Small 8.4% 12.3% 13.3% 16.9% 12.5% 56.0% 14.4% 0.22 0.24 0.39 0.45 0.21 0.09 0.03
2 4.4% 9.6% 12.4% 7.7% 9.2% 73.9% 14.2% 0.16 0.08 0.52 0.36 0.15 0.05 -0.10
3 3.4% 6.6% 7.4% 16.7% 6.4% 72.8% 13.2% 0.10 0.08 0.31 0.57 0.09 0.03 -0.17
4 1.8% 4.5% 6.1% 6.7% 4.5% 76.4% 19.4% 0.08 0.07 0.27 0.41 0.05 0.02 -0.41




Small 40.6% 24.3% 16.2% 20.7% 63.8% 40.9% 21.2% 0.35 0.23 0.33 0.50 0.14 0.14 0.10
2 9.8% 23.1% 8.9% 16.9% 17.0% 63.1% 28.8% -0.11 -0.01 0.45 0.30 -0.10 0.02 -0.18
3 6.7% 21.7% 8.1% 29.8% 19.5% 59.1% 28.5% 0.25 0.17 0.29 0.60 0.10 0.02 -0.25
4 4.5% 5.1% 4.6% 7.2% 8.7% 50.0% 21.9% 0.19 0.03 0.23 0.42 0.08 0.07 -0.40
Big 4.3% 5.0% 7.0% 5.2% 11.4% 85.6% 7.4% 0.25 0.30 0.11 0.47 0.09 0.09 -0.22
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A.3.4 Dividend Yield and Earnings-per-Price Model
Table 5d, Dividend Yield and Earnings-per-Price Model
In this table Fama-MacBeth estimates with White-Huber SE are presented along with Jagannathan-Wang R2
JW
. DY is the dividend yield. EP
is the earnings-per-price ratio. Org. Capital is modeled using Cash Flow (CFt−1), Invest. Rate (Inv.Rt−1), Prod. (Prod.t−1), Return on Assets
(ROAt−1), Sales Growth (SGt−1) and Tobin’s Q (Tobint−1). 25 portfolios are created at the deciles intersection of ME and BE/ME starting July
1975 till 2011. The portfolios are reformed annually in June of each year. The dependent variable is the risk-adjusted value-weighted portfolio
returns from July of t− 1 till June of t. All variables are lagged one year. All values are CPI adj.
Dividend Yield β Dividend Yield β(t)
Small -2.87 -2.67 -2.84 -1.73 -2.17 -1.67 -2.64 -0.83 -0.80 -0.75 -0.54 -0.54 -1.17 -0.82
2 4.71 4.49 4.35 5.36 4.62 1.50 3.62 0.47 0.35 0.41 0.54 0.48 0.39 0.33
3 -3.34 -3.59 -2.92 -1.53 -2.80 -0.69 -3.58 -0.65 -0.78 -0.60 -0.19 -0.47 -0.49 -0.70
4 -2.08 -2.34 -1.81 -1.87 -1.86 -0.77 0.16 -1.41 -1.53 -1.32 -1.35 -1.28 -1.07 -0.34
Big -2.93 -1.84 -1.74 -1.37 -1.70 -1.85 0.30 -0.35 -0.14 -0.20 -0.04 -0.22 -0.66 0.09
Earnings-by-Price γ Earnings-by-Price γ(t)
Small 0.46 0.57 0.54 0.61 0.16 0.06 0.54 1.20 1.28 1.51 1.75 0.79 0.36 1.38
2 0.59 0.28 0.98 0.66 0.34 0.06 0.99 0.66 0.40 1.01 0.82 0.85 0.31 1.19
3 0.62 0.61 0.83 0.63 -1.16 0.25 0.73 1.33 1.24 1.60 1.54 -0.39 0.99 1.73
4 0.57 0.57 1.21 0.97 -0.44 0.11 1.07 1.04 0.91 1.32 1.29 -0.30 0.34 1.49
Big -0.21 -0.89 -1.00 0.30 -2.64 -0.35 1.09 -0.07 -0.41 -0.20 0.21 -0.78 -0.28 0.28
CF Inv. R Prod. ROA SG Tobin CF Inv. R Prod. ROA SG Tobin
Org. Capital ϕ Org. Capital ϕ(t)
Small -0.35 -1.73 -0.07 -0.32 0.62 0.11 -0.83 -1.17 -1.16 -0.08 5.73 0.85
2 0.73 -2.71 -0.08 -1.14 0.80 0.20 0.53 -1.66 -0.98 -0.86 7.17 1.11
3 0.48 -1.77 -0.18 4.53 0.80 0.28 1.76 -1.04 -1.23 0.87 7.68 1.49
4 0.28 -1.65 -0.13 3.67 0.88 0.33 0.15 -0.81 -1.24 0.54 8.80 2.98
Big -2.35 -0.23 -0.22 4.65 0.95 0.03 -0.78 -0.05 -0.78 1.10 13.72 0.72
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Table 5d, Dividend Yield and Earnings-per-Price Model, continued
Please see notes from the previous page.




Small 8.2% 12.0% 13.8% 16.6% 11.9% 53.1% 13.8% 0.27 0.28 0.47 0.46 0.26 0.13 0.09
2 10.7% 15.3% 18.0% 13.6% 15.8% 74.5% 20.4% 0.10 0.03 0.45 0.31 0.09 0.03 -0.16
3 4.9% 8.3% 8.6% 17.8% 7.5% 73.1% 14.7% 0.15 0.11 0.35 0.59 0.13 0.04 -0.12
4 4.3% 7.6% 8.7% 9.1% 7.1% 77.1% 22.4% 0.13 0.12 0.30 0.42 0.09 0.04 -0.40




Small 63.7% 34.4% 16.3% 22.9% 85.0% 54.1% 21.4% 0.14 0.15 0.42 0.53 -0.43 0.18 0.13
2 15.8% 30.3% 15.6% 27.2% 29.6% 69.5% 38.6% 0.17 -0.04 0.37 0.24 -0.17 0.06 -0.26
3 21.8% 22.6% 9.5% 31.4% 26.4% 60.1% 30.1% 0.36 0.16 0.34 0.67 0.16 0.03 -0.16
4 8.2% 8.5% 7.1% 9.5% 12.0% 60.2% 24.3% 0.24 0.09 0.26 0.43 0.11 0.12 -0.40
Big 4.9% 6.0% 7.8% 6.2% 12.5% 86.2% 8.4% 0.23 0.33 0.14 0.46 0.02 0.13 -0.22
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A.3.5 Size Model
Table 5e, Size Model
In this table Fama-MacBeth estimates with White-Huber SE are presented along with Jagannathan-Wang coefficient of determination R2
JW
. lnME
is the natural log of market equity (ME) for the portfolio. Org. Capital is modeled using Cash Flow (CFt−1), Investment Rate (Inv.Rt−1),
Productivity (Prod.t−1), Return on Assets (ROAt−1), Sales Growth (SGt−1) and Tobin’s Q (Tobint−1). 25 portfolios are created at the deciles
intersection of ME and BE/ME starting July 1975 till 2011. The portfolios are reformed annually in June of each year. The risk-adjusted value-
weighted portfolio returns is the dependent variable and it is calculated for each portfolio from July of t− 1 till June of t. All variables except lnME
are lagged one year. All values are calculated using the CPI adjusted fundamental of the portfolio assets.
Size lnME β Size lnME β(t)
Small 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.19 0.02 0.16 1.86 1.75 1.65 1.50 1.93 0.42 1.49
2 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.01 0.21 2.22 2.09 1.96 1.96 2.16 0.31 2.08
3 0.22 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.25 0.04 0.21 2.71 2.83 2.35 2.03 2.84 0.79 2.60
4 0.25 0.27 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.04 0.18 2.47 2.69 2.26 2.34 2.52 0.55 1.80
Big 0.31 0.29 0.37 0.35 0.35 -0.01 0.30 2.02 1.96 2.25 2.26 2.28 0.03 1.80
CF Inv. R Prod. ROA SG Tobin CF Inv. R Prod. ROA SG Tobin
Org. Capital γ Org. Capital γ(t)
Small -0.02 -0.79 -0.04 1.26 0.65 0.10 0.14 -0.50 -0.27 1.52 6.10 0.92
2 0.79 -1.54 0.00 1.06 0.82 0.17 0.84 -1.02 -0.08 0.72 7.25 0.85
3 -0.20 -0.63 -0.07 2.40 0.77 0.18 0.83 -0.32 -0.26 1.79 6.52 1.03
4 -0.59 -0.12 0.01 2.75 0.86 0.26 -0.26 -0.05 0.00 1.45 8.11 1.88
Big -2.48 2.73 0.04 1.74 0.95 -0.05 -1.04 0.76 0.24 0.88 11.74 -0.06
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Table 5e, Size Model, continued
Please see notes from the previous page.




Small 10.0% 13.3% 12.6% 14.2% 15.8% 55.0% 12.3% -0.48 -0.46 -0.34 -0.28 -0.43 0.00 -0.53
2 13.5% 18.1% 15.9% 14.6% 18.8% 74.1% 19.9% -0.94 -1.01 -0.64 -0.96 -0.98 -0.02 -1.05
3 14.7% 19.5% 15.3% 19.7% 22.6% 72.8% 20.5% -1.13 -1.20 -0.97 -0.78 -1.30 -0.22 -1.24
4 14.2% 17.0% 14.3% 17.0% 19.5% 76.9% 23.6% -1.60 -1.60 -1.56 -1.72 -1.82 -0.27 -1.44




Small 9.6% 25.1% 16.3% 21.9% 70.1% 42.1% 22.4% -0.46 -0.78 -0.40 -0.36 -2.70 -0.27 -0.60
2 13.2% 21.6% 14.4% 22.1% 26.3% 61.3% 34.1% -0.91 -0.82 -0.63 -1.15 -1.44 -0.09 -1.29
3 14.3% 31.8% 15.0% 31.2% 30.9% 63.7% 36.3% -1.09 -1.16 -0.93 -0.60 -1.92 -0.83 -1.38
4 14.1% 17.2% 12.2% 18.0% 21.2% 51.9% 27.1% -1.58 -1.73 -1.41 -1.77 -1.87 -0.79 -1.49
Big 12.2% 18.6% 18.4% 15.7% 19.0% 86.4% 18.2% -2.66 -2.28 -3.66 -3.04 -2.91 -0.13 -2.56
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A.3.6 Size and BE/ME Model
Table 5f, Size and BE/ME Model
In this table Fama-MacBeth estimates with White-Huber SE are presented along with Jagannathan-Wang R2
JW
. lnME is the natural log of market
equity (ME) for the portfolio. BE/ME is the book equity per market equity both calculated in year t− 1. Org. Capital is modeled using Cash Flow
(CFt−1), Invest. Rate (Inv.Rt−1), Prod. (Prod.t−1), Return on Assets (ROAt−1), Sales Growth (SGt−1) and Tobin’s Q (Tobint−1). 25 portfolios
are created at the deciles intersection of ME and BE/ME starting July 1975 till 2011. The portfolios are reformed annually in June of each year.
The risk-adjusted value-weighted portfolio returns is the dependent variable and it is calculated for each portfolio from July of t − 1 till June of t.
All variables except lnME are lagged one year. All values are calculated using the CPI adj. fundamental of the portfolio assets.
Size lnME β Size lnME β(t)
Small 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 -0.03 0.12 1.23 1.12 1.06 1.06 1.26 -0.28 1.03
2 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.22 0.21 -0.02 0.25 1.81 1.66 1.62 1.63 1.70 -0.35 2.14
3 0.19 0.21 0.18 0.17 0.22 0.01 0.20 1.89 2.10 1.65 1.57 2.20 0.18 1.72
4 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.31 0.27 0.00 0.26 1.95 2.03 1.80 2.14 2.04 -0.12 2.05
Big 0.28 0.22 0.33 0.33 0.31 -0.04 0.24 1.57 1.19 1.83 1.59 1.68 -0.57 1.27
BE/ME γ BE/ME γ(t)
Small -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.23 -0.23 0.01 -0.41 -0.43 -0.43 -0.37 -0.92 -1.04 -0.33
2 -0.05 -0.05 0.05 -0.05 -0.24 -0.14 0.34 -0.18 -0.18 0.12 -0.15 -0.55 -1.14 0.80
3 -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 -0.10 -0.15 -0.03 -0.24 -0.24 -0.26 -0.36 -0.73 -1.28 -0.02
4 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.15 0.00 -0.20 0.54 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.36 -0.13 -1.31 1.38
Big -0.13 -0.37 -0.36 -0.12 -0.27 -0.20 -0.06 -0.28 -0.67 -0.47 -0.20 -0.49 -1.24 -0.02
Org. Capital ϕ Org. Capital ϕ(t)
Small 0.05 -1.01 -0.02 1.37 0.66 0.05 0.30 -0.63 -0.17 1.54 5.97 0.54
2 0.81 -1.71 0.00 1.40 0.82 0.24 0.87 -1.00 -0.10 0.74 7.72 1.22
3 -0.08 -0.67 -0.05 2.31 0.78 0.16 0.71 -0.35 -0.15 1.59 6.68 0.87
4 -0.50 -0.09 0.03 2.54 0.87 0.34 -0.02 -0.07 0.42 1.13 8.46 2.60
Big -2.96 3.43 0.04 2.08 0.95 -0.12 -1.17 0.87 0.23 0.95 12.15 -0.09
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Table 5f, Size and BE/ME Model, continued
Please see notes from the previous page.




Small 13.2% 17.4% 15.5% 16.3% 18.7% 57.7% 15.3% -0.24 -0.18 -0.09 -0.13 -0.05 0.35 -0.29
2 13.9% 18.5% 16.7% 15.1% 20.5% 75.2% 22.8% -0.80 -0.88 -0.52 -0.82 -0.70 0.24 -1.50
3 17.6% 22.4% 18.2% 22.5% 24.1% 74.2% 22.5% -0.86 -0.96 -0.69 -0.57 -1.01 0.11 -1.10
4 15.6% 19.0% 15.7% 19.3% 20.1% 77.9% 27.9% -1.63 -1.59 -1.55 -2.06 -1.75 0.17 -2.35




Small 17.7% 28.6% 18.3% 26.1% 75.1% 45.2% 25.9% -0.55 -0.77 -0.24 -0.32 -1.28 0.05 -0.55
2 12.8% 22.2% 14.8% 23.2% 37.4% 64.1% 36.5% -0.90 -0.75 -0.63 -0.89 -1.19 -0.08 -1.65
3 18.3% 35.3% 18.1% 33.5% 33.2% 66.4% 37.8% -1.08 -0.92 -0.58 -0.37 -1.58 -0.23 -1.19
4 14.8% 20.7% 14.0% 21.4% 22.4% 62.7% 30.7% -1.68 -1.53 -1.43 -2.19 -1.99 0.74 -2.29
Big 15.0% 19.4% 21.4% 16.2% 20.1% 86.7% 23.0% -2.06 -1.77 -3.04 -3.06 -2.79 0.17 -2.66
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A.3.7 Size, BE/ME and RND Model
Table 5g, Size, BE/ME and RND Model
In this table Fama-MacBeth estimates with White-Huber SE are presented along with Jagannathan-Wang coefficient of determination R2
JW
. lnME
is the natural log of market equity (ME) for the portfolio. BE/ME is the book equity per market equity both calculated in year t− 1. RND/BE is
the RND per BE in year t− 1. Org. Capital is modeled using Cash Flow (CFt−1), Investment Rate (Inv.Rt−1), Productivity (Prod.t−1), Return
on Assets (ROAt−1), Sales Growth (SGt−1) and Tobin’s Q (Tobint−1). 25 portfolios are created at the deciles intersection of ME and BE/ME
starting July 1975 till 2011. The portfolios are reformed annually in June of each year. The risk-adjusted value-weighted portfolio returns is the
dependent variable and it is calculated for each portfolio from July of t− 1 till June of t. All variables except lnME are lagged one year. All values
are calculated using the CPI adjusted fundamental of the portfolio assets.
Size CF Inv. R Prod. ROA SG Tobin Size CF Inv. R Prod. ROA SG Tobin
Size lnME β Size lnME β(t)
Small 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.17 -0.03 0.16 1.44 1.45 1.25 1.09 1.40 -0.21 1.28
2 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.21 -0.01 0.27 1.97 1.86 1.79 1.83 1.73 -0.21 2.15
3 0.26 0.29 0.24 0.24 0.28 0.03 0.26 2.29 2.49 2.14 2.01 2.38 0.46 2.20
4 0.30 0.31 0.29 0.35 0.30 0.02 0.30 2.14 2.14 1.92 2.28 2.13 0.09 2.19
Big 0.32 0.28 0.36 0.35 0.34 -0.04 0.28 1.70 1.44 2.02 1.65 1.90 -0.46 1.51
BE/ME γ BE/ME γ(t)
Small -0.28 -0.26 -0.31 -0.28 -0.33 -0.32 -0.21 -0.82 -0.79 -0.94 -0.72 -1.02 -1.04 -0.63
2 -0.28 -0.21 -0.18 -0.28 -0.32 -0.21 0.10 -0.70 -0.65 -0.42 -0.69 -0.87 -1.44 0.13
3 -0.27 -0.24 -0.27 -0.26 -0.26 -0.21 -0.29 -0.98 -0.93 -0.99 -1.00 -1.26 -1.45 -0.75
4 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.07 -0.03 -0.22 0.44 -0.24 -0.23 -0.26 0.11 -0.25 -1.53 1.13
Big -0.10 -0.22 -0.36 -0.10 -0.25 -0.24 0.00 -0.04 -0.20 -0.27 -0.11 -0.22 -1.27 0.05
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Table 5g, Size, BE/ME and RND Model, continued
Please see notes from the previous page.
RND/BE ϕ RND
Small -1.57 -1.93 -1.84 -2.29 -1.02 -0.38 -1.26 -0.72 -0.60 -0.80 -1.06 -0.34 -0.37 -0.47
2 -3.66 -3.39 -3.43 -3.82 -3.65 -1.39 -3.32 -1.55 -1.01 -1.40 -1.59 -1.00 -0.70 -1.33
3 -7.30 -7.65 -7.35 -7.75 -6.89 -2.00 -6.80 -1.52 -2.00 -1.48 -1.85 -1.17 -0.84 -1.91
4 -2.82 -2.64 -2.85 -2.81 -2.02 -1.52 -1.60 -0.29 -0.38 -0.30 -0.58 -0.12 -0.72 -0.42
Big 1.10 3.93 0.67 1.03 1.37 -0.37 3.61 0.49 0.96 0.42 0.37 0.67 -0.30 0.68
CF Inv. R Prod. ROA SG Tobin CF Inv. R Prod. ROA SG Tobin
Org. Capital φ Org. Capital φ(t)
Small -0.21 -1.18 -0.05 0.93 0.65 0.04 0.26 -0.75 -0.60 0.97 5.21 0.18
2 0.50 -1.50 -0.01 0.37 0.81 0.20 0.29 -0.91 0.02 0.03 7.28 1.34
3 -0.93 -0.74 -0.09 0.85 0.75 0.05 -0.56 -0.36 -0.68 0.61 5.89 0.33
4 -0.41 0.17 0.04 1.64 0.85 0.30 -0.13 0.04 0.34 0.68 7.60 2.07




Small 18.2% 22.3% 21.4% 21.9% 21.4% 58.0% 20.5% -0.13 -0.10 0.06 0.13 -0.07 0.40 -0.20
2 20.3% 23.8% 22.6% 21.5% 23.4% 75.8% 27.6% -0.59 -0.66 -0.35 -0.59 -0.51 0.30 -1.23
3 29.0% 32.6% 29.9% 33.7% 31.9% 74.8% 30.7% -0.83 -0.90 -0.65 -0.45 -0.95 0.09 -0.89
4 22.0% 23.8% 22.3% 24.3% 25.9% 79.0% 32.1% -1.76 -1.70 -1.69 -2.25 -1.81 0.12 -2.45




Small 28.9% 35.7% 26.1% 33.9% 95.6% 47.4% 31.6% -0.10 -0.73 -0.18 -0.84 -13.02 0.19 -1.21
2 28.5% 37.5% 20.6% 33.7% 49.1% 64.6% 40.4% -0.42 -0.26 -0.47 -0.79 0.77 -0.18 -1.26
3 37.8% 46.0% 30.0% 46.9% 41.9% 68.8% 47.4% -0.50 -0.84 -0.59 -0.32 -1.43 -0.37 -0.97
4 25.0% 26.4% 20.2% 27.3% 28.3% 68.3% 35.7% -1.71 -1.66 -1.59 -2.33 -2.05 0.79 -2.33
Big 18.8% 23.5% 27.6% 21.7% 24.2% 89.8% 27.0% -2.87 -2.61 -3.18 -3.18 -3.15 0.10 -3.25
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A.3.8 CAPM Model
Table 5h, CAPM Model
In this table Fama-MacBeth estimates with White-Huber SE are presented along with Jagannathan-Wang coefficient of determination R2
JW
. Rm−Rf
is the excess return on the market portfolio constructed using the super-set of assets used in the study including the ones with negative book value.
Org. Capital is modeled using Cash Flow (CFt−1), Investment Rate (Inv.Rt−1), Productivity (Prod.t−1), Return on Assets (ROAt−1), Sales
Growth (SGt−1) and Tobin’s Q (Tobint−1). 25 portfolios are created at the deciles intersection of ME and BE/ME starting July 1975 till 2011.
The portfolios are reformed annually in June of each year. The risk-adjusted value-weighted portfolio returns is the dependent variable and it is
calculated for each portfolio from July of t− 1 till June of t. All variables except lnME are lagged one year. All values are calculated using the CPI
adjusted fundamental of the portfolio assets.
β(Rm −Rf ) β(t)(Rm −Rf )
Small 8.78 8.56 9.33 8.11 9.05 6.59 8.54 2.51 2.44 2.66 2.30 2.64 2.65 2.30
2 9.30 9.11 8.92 9.23 9.18 4.71 7.83 1.89 1.94 1.87 1.94 1.85 1.92 1.65
3 8.54 8.43 8.64 7.73 7.87 4.53 7.80 2.61 2.65 2.80 2.43 2.35 2.58 2.21
4 8.40 8.77 8.39 8.17 8.33 3.24 6.53 2.45 2.38 2.36 2.16 2.40 2.26 1.77
Big 12.47 11.72 12.47 12.62 12.84 2.73 12.35 2.52 2.57 2.44 2.56 2.40 1.71 2.27
CF Inv. R Prod. ROA SG Tobin CF Inv. R Prod. ROA SG Tobin
Org. Capital γ Org. Capital γ(t)
Small 0.11 -1.21 -0.04 0.96 0.64 0.10 0.05 -0.82 -0.59 1.11 6.70 1.12
2 1.07 -1.99 -0.07 0.29 0.79 0.15 0.72 -1.31 -1.02 0.29 7.46 0.76
3 0.62 -1.63 -0.13 1.30 0.75 0.18 1.37 -1.28 -1.16 1.01 7.32 0.76
4 0.54 -0.59 -0.07 1.25 0.85 0.23 0.25 -0.55 -0.80 0.53 8.59 1.71
Big -1.67 0.28 -0.20 0.66 0.92 -0.06 -0.60 -0.16 -1.06 0.35 12.30 -0.04
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Table 5h, CAPM Model, continued
Please see notes from the previous page.




Small 13.8% 15.8% 19.0% 17.8% 18.6% 62.4% 17.3% 0.05 0.06 0.18 0.20 0.12 0.00 -0.11
2 11.5% 16.4% 15.8% 14.3% 16.1% 76.5% 16.8% 0.03 -0.07 0.28 0.23 0.04 0.00 -0.13
3 16.2% 18.8% 19.9% 22.2% 18.8% 76.8% 22.0% 0.01 -0.06 0.21 0.35 0.01 -0.01 -0.14
4 13.0% 15.8% 15.6% 14.8% 15.9% 78.1% 23.3% 0.01 -0.04 0.10 0.20 -0.02 -0.01 -0.28




Small 8.7% 17.2% 17.6% 22.3% 44.5% 55.9% 23.8% -0.03 0.11 0.16 0.29 0.06 -0.05 -0.05
2 7.9% 27.8% 12.3% 12.1% 27.5% 62.5% 18.4% -0.09 -0.15 0.28 0.28 -0.03 0.03 -0.14
3 7.3% 30.4% 21.2% 32.1% 20.9% 67.7% 35.1% -0.02 0.02 0.19 0.41 0.09 -0.07 -0.21
4 5.6% 19.8% 14.1% 16.4% 15.5% 54.1% 28.2% -0.03 -0.08 0.07 0.21 -0.09 -0.01 -0.31
Big 10.5% 18.2% 19.8% 19.3% 18.0% 84.8% 17.2% -0.14 0.09 -0.13 0.36 -0.12 -0.10 0.01
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A.4 A Comparative Study of Human, Struc-
tural & Intangible Capitals
A.4.1 Summary Statistics
Table 6a: Summary Statistics
Panel i.
5x Rp −Rf SD(σ) SR AR(1) AR(2) AR(3)
Small 14.7% 0.34 0.42 -0.22 -0.12 -0.06
2 13.6% 0.36 0.37 -0.49* -0.17 -0.07
3 10.6% 0.30 0.34 -0.37 -0.22 -0.01
4 10.5% 0.32 0.32 -0.40* -0.21 -0.06
Big 11.9% 0.44 0.27 -0.23 -0.10 -0.25
Panel ii.
Mean (µ) Std. Dev. (σ) Sharpe Ratio (µ/σ)
5x (HC) (IC) (SC) (HC) (IC) (SC) (HC) (IC) (SC)
Small 11.5% 4.9% 20.8% 0.39 0.33 0.55 29.6% 14.9% 37.7%
2 9.8% 4.7% 22.0% 0.36 0.29 0.68 27.3% 16.1% 32.5%
3 9.9% 4.5% 14.7% 0.35 0.31 0.43 28.2% 14.4% 34.4%
4 9.5% 4.4% 21.7% 0.34 0.32 0.70 27.7% 13.8% 31.1%
Big 12.7% 4.0% 19.8% 0.48 0.39 0.67 26.5% 10.2% 29.3%
AR(1) AR(2) AR(3)
5x HC IC SC HC IC SC HC IC SC
Small -0.37 -0.36 -0.38 -0.21 -0.23 -0.26 0.05 0.06 -0.13
2 -0.32 -0.34 -0.41* -0.06 -0.08 -0.24 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09
3 -0.46* -0.49* -0.35 -0.20 -0.22 -0.21 -0.16 -0.17 -0.01
4 -0.49* -0.50* -0.35 -0.30 -0.29 -0.25 -0.11 -0.12 -0.07
Big -0.38 -0.41 -0.36 -0.12 -0.09 -0.07 -0.22 -0.20 -0.19
* significant when p-value ¡ 0.05
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A.4.2 Human Capital Model
Table 6b: Human Capital Model
In this table the human capital asset pricing model estimates are tabulated. Each model is estimated for 25 Size-BE/ME portfolios in a 5x5 matrix
increasing at 20% deciles. In the interest of space only Size variation is presented below with each factor estimates being averaged across BE/ME
portfolios in each size deciles. β is the risk loading or risk premium on human capital with β(t) showing the t-values. γ is the risk premium on DY,
Rm − Rf and ME with γ(t) being the t-values. φ is the risk premium on EP and BE/ME factors with φ(t) being the t-value. R2FM and αFM is
the model coefficient of determination and pricing error of Fama-MacBeth estimator. R2
JW
and αJW is the model coefficient of determination and
pricing error of Jagannathan-Wang estimator.
HC Return HC Return
β β(t)
Small 0.21 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.20 0.19 0.19 1.71 1.57 1.65 1.83 1.65 1.53 1.47
2 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.30 0.26 0.28 1.62 1.72 1.70 1.56 2.03 1.84 1.94
3 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.36 0.29 0.29 2.06 2.05 2.08 2.02 2.55 1.92 2.14
4 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.55 0.46 0.47 3.42 3.42 3.37 3.35 4.11 3.49 3.51
Big 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.57 0.59 5.11 5.20 5.25 5.32 5.35 4.90 5.06
DY DY Rm −Rf ME ME DY Rm −Rf ME ME
γ γ(t)
Small -2.55 -3.25 8.81 0.17 0.12 -0.83 -1.03 2.32 1.70 1.06
2 4.27 3.75 10.17 0.23 0.19 0.31 0.38 2.36 2.32 1.70
3 -1.15 -4.59 9.52 0.20 0.17 -0.43 -0.87 2.63 2.60 1.75
4 -2.38 -2.75 9.92 0.20 0.18 -1.38 -1.72 3.17 2.26 1.52
Big -4.40 -3.78 11.97 0.18 0.12 -0.94 -0.59 3.64 1.80 0.87
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Table 6b: Human Capital Model, continued
Please see table notes from the previous page.
EP EP BE/ME EP EP BE/ME
φ φ(t)
Small 0.46 0.46 -0.11 1.28 1.87 -0.57
2 0.62 0.57 -0.13 0.70 0.72 -0.51
3 0.87 0.43 -0.08 1.17 0.87 -0.14
4 0.53 0.29 -0.09 0.87 0.55 -0.60




Small 9.0% 10.7% 16.9% 17.9% 21.8% 17.1% 20.5% 0.12 0.19 0.25 0.19 0.02 -0.45 -0.13
2 12.4% 17.2% 21.6% 16.2% 26.1% 25.8% 27.0% 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.00 -0.94 -0.67
3 14.0% 14.6% 19.1% 16.5% 31.8% 25.7% 29.2% 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.07 -0.03 -1.03 -0.72
4 29.0% 31.0% 32.2% 29.8% 46.4% 38.0% 39.5% 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.05 -0.06 -1.28 -1.04




Small 5.4% 10.3% 25.1% 17.5% 12.4% 9.5% 18.5% 0.22 0.26 0.33 0.28 0.15 -0.12 0.23
2 26.0% 47.1% 53.8% 30.8% 37.8% 39.2% 47.2% 0.21 0.09 0.12 0.24 0.09 -0.56 0.04
3 11.6% 19.8% 37.0% 29.0% 40.3% 22.3% 33.4% 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.03 -0.10 -0.68 -0.07
4 15.1% 18.4% 25.0% 18.3% 40.8% 25.7% 30.8% 0.12 0.21 0.19 0.11 -0.09 -1.53 -1.10
Big 31.8% 55.3% 58.3% 48.5% 66.0% 46.9% 55.2% 0.13 0.80 0.81 0.48 -0.18 -3.54 -0.64
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A.4.3 Structural Capital Model
Table 6c: Structural Capital Model
In this table the structural capital asset pricing model estimates are tabulated. Each model is estimated for 25 Size-BE/ME portfolios in a 5x5
matrix increasing at 20% deciles. In the interest of space only Size variation is presented below with each factor estimates being averaged across
BE/ME portfolios in each size deciles. β is the risk loading or risk premium on human capital with β(t) showing the t-values. γ is the risk premium
on DY, Rm−Rf and ME with γ(t) being the t-values. φ is the risk premium on EP and BE/ME factors with φ(t) being the t-value. R2FM and αFM
is the model coefficient of determination and pricing error of Fama-MacBeth estimator. R2
JW
and αJW is the model coefficient of determination
and pricing error of Jagannathan-Wang estimator.
SC Returns SC Returns
β β(t)
Small 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.81 0.66 0.84 1.03 0.69 1.17 1.14
2 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.29 -0.24 -0.13 -0.28 0.18 -0.04 -0.02
3 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.14 1.09 1.05 0.95 1.01 1.08 1.13 1.13
4 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.13 1.68 1.85 1.71 1.59 2.63 1.93 2.09
Big 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.41 0.40 0.41 4.92 4.89 4.80 4.79 4.73 4.72 4.75
DY DY Rm −Rf ME ME DY DY Rm −Rf ME ME
γ γ(t)
Small -1.84 -2.68 8.16 0.19 0.15 -0.56 -0.64 2.44 1.99 1.25
2 4.76 4.41 9.12 0.23 0.21 0.39 0.44 1.89 2.16 1.77
3 -0.98 -3.50 8.39 0.22 0.19 -0.24 -0.66 2.70 2.73 1.89
4 -2.50 -2.96 9.01 0.25 0.24 -1.35 -1.52 2.80 2.42 1.83
Big -3.10 -3.54 11.16 0.22 0.18 -0.58 -0.49 2.90 1.94 1.23
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Table 6c: Structural Capital Model, continued
Please see table notes from the previous page.
E/P E/P BE/ME E/P E/P BE/ME
φ φ(t)
Small 0.56 0.60 -0.03 1.37 1.98 -0.45
2 0.55 0.56 -0.08 0.64 0.70 -0.22
3 0.73 0.47 -0.08 1.44 1.17 -0.25
4 0.50 0.26 -0.02 0.76 0.54 -0.43




Small 4.2% 6.1% 12.4% 13.5% 16.8% 14.8% 18.5% 0.13 0.19 0.25 0.21 0.04 -0.53 -0.27
2 3.6% 8.5% 13.3% 7.6% 14.5% 16.5% 17.1% 0.14 0.08 0.10 0.16 0.04 -0.92 -0.76
3 5.5% 5.7% 9.7% 8.5% 20.8% 20.4% 23.1% 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.08 0.00 -1.15 -0.86
4 10.2% 13.2% 14.9% 11.3% 25.1% 23.9% 25.6% 0.08 0.13 0.12 0.07 -0.03 -1.59 -1.46




Small 10.3% 21.3% 28.8% 23.2% 27.5% 19.1% 30.1% 0.14 0.19 0.23 0.18 0.11 -0.45 0.12
2 20.2% 23.6% 36.4% 30.5% 31.9% 31.0% 38.9% 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.04 0.02 -0.74 -0.63
3 16.3% 22.3% 27.4% 17.8% 27.7% 29.5% 33.8% 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.02 -0.02 -1.13 -1.07
4 10.6% 28.5% 31.3% 18.6% 27.5% 30.4% 38.9% 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.08 -1.73 -1.78
Big 53.4% 60.2% 62.4% 61.0% 74.7% 61.5% 64.0% -0.09 0.24 0.20 0.17 -0.25 -6.59 -2.81
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A.4.4 Intangible Capital Model
Table 6d: Intangible Capital Model
In this table the intangible capital asset pricing model estimates are tabulated. Each model is estimated for 25 Size-BE/ME portfolios in a 5x5
matrix increasing at 20% deciles. In the interest of space only Size variation is presented below with each factor estimates being averaged across
BE/ME portfolios in each size deciles. β is the risk loading or risk premium on human capital with β(t) showing the t-values. γ is the risk premium
on DY, Rm−Rf and ME with γ(t) being the t-values. φ is the risk premium on EP and BE/ME factors with φ(t) being the t-value. R2FM and αFM
is the model coefficient of determination and pricing error of Fama-MacBeth estimator. R2
JW
and αJW is the model coefficient of determination
and pricing error of Jagannathan-Wang estimator.
IC Returns IC Returns
β β(t)
Small 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.26 0.26 0.27 2.02 1.77 1.83 2.15 1.88 1.95 1.87
2 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.30 0.36 0.31 0.32 1.69 1.76 1.82 1.69 2.08 1.89 1.95
3 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.39 0.42 0.36 0.37 2.47 2.47 2.42 2.44 2.70 2.26 2.64
4 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.61 0.50 0.51 3.63 3.60 3.53 3.53 4.15 3.63 3.66
Big 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.67 0.68 4.44 4.42 4.35 4.37 4.98 4.21 4.21
DY DY Rm −Rf ME ME DY DY Rm −Rf ME ME
γ γ(t)
Small -2.29 -3.07 8.53 0.16 0.11 -0.79 -0.99 2.24 1.84 1.11
2 4.56 4.09 10.37 0.22 0.19 0.34 0.41 2.37 2.28 1.68
3 -0.70 -3.87 9.24 0.20 0.16 -0.36 -0.83 2.58 2.55 1.73
4 -2.72 -3.10 9.76 0.20 0.17 -1.51 -1.79 3.26 2.24 1.49
Big -3.84 -2.93 12.12 0.17 0.11 -0.79 -0.38 3.60 1.57 0.77
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Table 6d, Intangible Capital Model, continued
Please see table notes from the previous page.
E/P E/P BE/ME E/P E/P BE/ME
φ φ(t)
Small 0.46 0.47 -0.12 1.28 1.87 -0.56
2 0.62 0.59 -0.12 0.69 0.72 -0.45
3 0.83 0.44 -0.09 1.16 0.89 -0.16
4 0.51 0.24 -0.11 0.77 0.43 -0.70




Small 10.5% 12.0% 18.5% 19.7% 22.8% 19.0% 22.5% 0.13 0.20 0.26 0.20 0.04 -0.43 -0.11
2 12.2% 17.0% 21.7% 16.1% 26.2% 25.2% 26.2% 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.14 0.01 -0.91 -0.67
3 15.5% 16.2% 20.1% 18.0% 32.7% 27.1% 30.7% 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.08 -0.01 -1.01 -0.69
4 29.5% 32.1% 33.1% 30.1% 46.3% 38.2% 39.8% 0.08 0.14 0.13 0.07 -0.03 -1.25 -0.95




Small 4.6% 9.0% 24.1% 17.3% 12.5% 9.9% 21.3% 0.20 0.28 0.34 0.25 0.13 -0.20 0.19
2 25.2% 42.8% 49.6% 29.8% 37.1% 36.9% 44.2% 0.19 0.08 0.10 0.21 0.07 -0.42 0.10
3 11.6% 20.5% 33.4% 25.4% 35.8% 22.2% 33.7% 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.11 -0.88 -0.40
4 11.6% 16.2% 20.5% 13.4% 34.9% 25.2% 29.6% 0.12 0.21 0.19 0.11 -0.10 -1.66 -1.33
Big 35.4% 55.5% 58.4% 49.4% 70.4% 48.9% 55.0% -0.10 0.55 0.58 0.22 -0.34 -4.66 -2.30
Appendix B
List of Figures
B.1 Non-Financial Disclosures and Cost of
Capital
B.1.1 Information Existence
In this graph the average percentage change in the disclosure scores are
shown over the years. The percentages are calculated on the basis of “Exis-
tence” of a communication indicator in the annual reports. The values are





In this graph the average percentage change in the disclosure scores are
shown over the years. The percentages are calculated on the basis of “Qual-
ity” of a communication indicator in the annual reports. The quality is
assessed over a four point scale (0, 1, 2, 3). The values are normalized using
the total number of predefined indicators in each communication category.
B.1.3 Summary of Returns
In this graph the blue line represents the annual value-weighted returns of
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the firms in the Pharmaceuticals sector calculated between the last working
days of December t− 1 and year t. The green line is the risk-adjusted value-
weighted returns on the firms in the Pharmaceuticals sector from the year
t. The red line represents the annualized one-month treasury bills from the
year t− 1.
B.1.4 BE and RND
This graphs shows the investments some of the largest firms in the Phar-
maceuticals are making in the research and development (RND) activity
(year: t− 1) as compared to the book and market equity .
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B.1.5 Ratio Comparison of RND/BE vs. BE/ME
This graph shows change in the ratio of RND/BE and BE/ME over a
period of three years across a sample of 25 largest Pharmaceutical firms.
B.2 Regulatory Change: A Macroeconomic
Intangible Risk
B.2.1 Total Number of Firms
Source: CRSP
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This graph shows the increasing number of firms in the Pharmaceuticals,
Biotechnology and Life Sciences sectors over the past two decades that are
sampled in this study.
B.2.2 Market Value of the Firms
Source: CRSP
This graphs shows the increasing nature of the market capital of the firms
in the Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology and Life Sciences sectors, which is a




This graph shows the percentage change at the industry level value-
weighted returns based on the selected sample of the firms used for the study.
B.2.4 Analyst Following the Sector
Source: I/B/E/S
This graph shows the average Analyst following of firms in the Phar-
maceuticals, Biotechnology and Life Sciences sectors from the sample. The
graph clearly shows that over the past 21 years, the number of Analyst fol-




Source: Factiva — 10 firms are randomly selected for this graphical study
which is approximately 5% of the firms in the database of 219. The news
media reports are classified into four types, which are (i) Organizational
News, (Human Capital News, (iii) Relational News and, (iv) Financial News.
Some firms had a large number of news media reports in a particular year,
therefore only 10% of news items have been reviewed from each year for each
firm in that 5% sample size to report the findings. The individual indicators




Source: Factiva — For this graphical study Organizational News, Human
Capital News and Relational News have been added to arrive at the News
Articles on Intangibles.
B.2.6 Information Environment Break
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This graph presents that relative bid-ask spread SR and the absolute
average bid-ask spread S for firms in the sample. The graph shows that
there is indeed a fall in the bid-ask spread since the regulatory reforms of
Reg FD and SOX somewhere in the middle of 2002-03 (hypothesized as 2002
in this study; but also tested for 2001 and 2003 showing same results, but
not reported), which means that the liquidity of the stocks have increased
and the information asymmetry reduced.
B.3 Organizational Capital
B.3.1 Sales Growth vs. Market Return
Here in this graph the total rate of sales growth of all assets in the sample
is measured in contrast with the value-weighted returns on the index market
created from all assets in the sample, including the ones with negative book
equity. The sales growth is calculated in Dec of year t − 1 and the index
market return is calculated in June of year t.
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B.3.2 Org Capital Asset Pricing Model — Sales Growth
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In the above set of figures the regression line fitted values are presented
against the dependent variable which in this case is the value-weighted port-
folio returns. Although there are 25 portfolios created for the study, here the
fitted line plot is presented only for the “best” and the “worst” model fit.
Here, best being the regression with the highest coefficient of determination
R2 and the worst being the lowest score of R2. In the study, sales growth is
found to represent the best measure of performance efficiency which is hy-
pothesized as organizational capital. All the plots have it as an independent
variable along with others as mentioned in the plot figures.
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B.4 A Comparative Study of Human, Struc-
tural & Intangible Capitals
B.4.1 Human Capital Returns vs. Market
This graph shows the predictive ability of returns on human capital in
contrast with the value-weighted returns on the index market calculated from
the sample firms. The human capital return is calculated in Dec of year t−1
and the index market return is calculated in June of year t.
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B.4.2 Structural Capital Returns vs. Market
This graph shows the predictive ability of returns on structural capital in
contrast to the value-weighted returns on the index market calculated from
the sample firms. The structural capital return is calculated in Dec of year
t− 1 and the index market return is calculated in June of year t.
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B.4.3 Intangible Capital Returns vs. Market
This graph shows the predictive ability of returns on intangible capital in
contrast to the value-weighted returns on the index market calculated from
the sample firms. The intangible capital return is calculated in Dec of year
t− 1 and the index market return is calculated in June of year t.
B.4.4 Human Capital Asset Pricing Model
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This graph shows the regression fitted values against the expected stock
returns on the portfolio for which the estimates are calculated. From the 25
portfolios only best and worst model fit are shown in the above figure. Here
the independent variables are human capital (capitalized selling, general and
administrative expenses) and the index market calculated, from all stocks in
the sample including the ones with negative book equity.
B.4.5 Structural Capital Asset Pricing Model
This graph shows the regression fitted values against the expected stock
returns on the portfolio for which the estimates are calculated. From the
25 portfolios only best and worst model fit are shown in the above figure.
Here, the independent variables are structural capital (capitalized research
and development expenses) and the index market.
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B.4.6 Intangible Capital Asset Pricing Model
This graph shows the the regression fitted values against the expected
stock returns on the portfolio for which the estimates are calculated. From
the 25 portfolios only best and worst model fit are shown in the above figure.
Here, the independent variables are intangible capital (capitalized selling,
general & administrative expenses plus research & development expenses)
and the index market.
Appendix C
List of Variables
 Market Equity (ME): It is the size of an asset calculated using CRSP
market data in the month of June of each year t (share outstanding
#shrout1 x stock price #prc, corrected for stock splits and adjustments)
 Book Equity (BE): It is created by adding Book value of common equity
(ceq#60) to Deferred taxes and Investment Tax Credit2 (txditc#35)
minus the carrying value of Preferred Stock (pstk#130)
 Earnings (E): It is created by adding Income before Extraordinary
Items (ib#18) to the Deferred taxes from the Income Account (txdi#50)
minus the book value of Preferred Dividends
 Intangibles Capital (IC): Is created by adding RND (xrd#46) to SG&A
(xsga#189)
 Tangible Capital (TC): The Gross Property, Plant and Equipment is
used as Tangible Capital (ppegt#7)
 Cash Flow (CF)3: Operating Income before Depreciation (oibdp#13)
minus Total Income Taxes (txt#16) minus Change in Deferred Taxes
and Investment Tax Credit from the previous year to the current year
1The naming convention: Text name of the variable in CRSP or Compustat is followed
by numerical code with a hash-tag (#) in the middle. If one or the other is unavailable
then only the available code is used with a leading hash-tag.
2whenever available
3See Lehn and Poulsen [165].
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(∆txditc#35) minus Gross Interest Expense (xint#15) minus Preferred
Dividends (dvp#19) minus Common Dividends (dvc#21)
 Book to Market ratio (BE/ME): The is calculated using Book Equity
(ceq#60 + txditc#35 - pstk#130) in the year t-1 divided by the Mar-
ket Equity calculated (share outstanding #shrout x stock price #prc,
corrected for stock splits and adjustments) in the month of Dec of year
t-1
 Debt by Equity (DE): It is calculated by book value of Total Assets
(6#at) minus book value of common equity (ceq#60) in the year t-1
and then dividing it by ME of t-1
 Dividend Yield (D/P): The dividend is calculated by adding all the
dividends per shares (#divamt) announced by a firm between July of
year t-1 and June of year t. This dividend per share is transformed
into the cash equivalent by multiplying the per share dividends to the
shares outstanding in the year t (#divamt x #shrout). Dividend yield
is calculated by dividing the cash equivalent of the dividends between
year July t-1 and June t by Market Equity calculated in Dec of year
t-1 (#divamt x #shrout) / (#shrout x #prc)
 RND to Book ratio (RND/BE): Is created by dividing RND (xrd#46)
by BE (ceq#60 + txditc#35 - pstk#130) both in the year t-1
 Cash Flow by Price (CF/ME): The Cash Flow (oibdp#13 - txt#16 -
∆txditc#35 - xint#15 - dvp#19 - dvc#21) calculated in the year t-1 is
divided by Market Equity (#shrout x #prc) calculated at Dec of year
t-1
 Sales Growth (Salet−1−Salet−2)/Salet−2: Is the rate of growth in Sale
(sale#12) from the year t-2 to t-1
 Asset Productivity (Sale/BE): It is calculated by dividing the Sale
(sale#12) in the year t-1 by BE (ceq#60 + txditc#35 - pstk#130)
of the same year
 Tobin’s Q : Is calculated by adding Market Equity from Dec in the year
t-1 to the Book Value of Total Debt (Long term debt dltt#9 + Current
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Liabilities dlc#34) plus book value of preferred stocks (pstk#130) mi-
nus the Inventories (invt#3) and divide it by the Book Equity (ceq#60
+ txditc#35 - pstk#130) from the year t-1
 Investment Growth (Physical): It is calculated by dividing the Capital
Expenditure (capx#128) by the Gross Property Plant and Equipment
(ppegt#7) both in the year t-1
 Profitability or Return on Assets (ROA): It is calculated by dividing
the Income before Extraordinary Items (ib#18) by lagged Total Assets
(lse#6)
 Debt by Equity (DE): It is calculated by dividing Total Debt (Long
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